Agency strategy, strength, and adaptation : implementation of the Bush administration's competitive sourcing policy by Joaquin, Ma Ernita T.
ABSTRACT
Name: Ma. Emita T. Joaquin Department: Political Science
Title: Agency Strategy, Strength, and Adaptation: Implementation o f the 
Bush Administration’s Competitive Sourcing Policy
Major: Public Administration Degree: Doctor o f Philosophy
Approved by: Date:
J L J k   ^
Dissertation Director
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
ABSTRACT
In the context o f the federal bureaucracy’s shrinking discretion and the 
“thinning” o f administrative institutions, the implementation o f the Bush 
administration’s competitive sourcing policy, guided by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76, offers a venue to explore how bureaucracy 
adapts to the changing environment and creates space using various strategies and 
resources. The implementation o f this policy showcases the extent to which 
agencies obey their elected leaders when their organizational capacities are 
threatened.
The Bush administration shifted the long-standing policy o f relying on the 
private sector for the performance o f commercial activities to one o f mandatory 
competition between the government and the private sector, where winners were 
those who promised to perform the job with a lower price tag. This occurred 
simultaneously with a redefinition o f inherently governmental functions that 
enlarged the share o f potentially outsourceable jobs. With this type o f competitive 
sourcing, federal employees had to cope with the pressures o f protecting their 
capacities and defending their worth using a costly and adversarial process. This 
study examines the unintended consequences for governance of this policy and 
extends existing organization, implementation, and bureaucratic power theories to 
an initiative that threatens to shake the bedrock o f the federal civil service.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The Dissertation in Brief
This study examines the implementation o f the American federal 
government’s competitive sourcing policy. Under competitive sourcing, the 
performance o f commercial activities is subject to competition between the 
government and the private sector. The Office o f Management and Budget (OMB) 
Circular No. A-76 contains the guidelines for competitive sourcing. Competitive 
sourcing is therefore also known as “public-private competition,” “A-76,” “A-76 
study,” “job contest,” “managed competition,” or “competitive sourcing initiative.”
The competitive sourcing policy was the biggest component o f George W. 
Bush’s 2001 President’s Management Agenda (PMA). Through competitive 
sourcing, the Bush administration opened up to competition between the 
government and the private sector commercial jobs performed by an estimated
400,000 federal servants. The idea o f outsourcing commercial activities first 
appeared in 1955, but the mechanics o f competition evolved over time. Under the 
2003 A-76 Circular, if  a competition showed that it costs more to perform the job 
with federal employees, then the work was contracted out and the employees were 
either terminated or reassigned to other positions. They may then be re-hired by the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
winning contractor. However, a study on the A-76 competitions from 1995 to 2004 
found “no data on how many of the separated employees were subsequently hired 
by the contractor” Gansler and Lucyshyn (2004, 24). OMB nonetheless (2005a, 1) 
claimed that for the first two years that the Bush administration released 
government-wide results on the policy, the government doubled the amount o f 
estimated net annual savings per position from FY 2003 to FY 2004.
Competitive sourcing brings into focus the “unanalyzed assumptions for 
continuation o f public service tasks by standard government bureaucracies” (Wise 
1990,144), the growing challenges o f govemment-by-contract, and the dilemmas 
for public administration of an instrumentalist view of bureaucracy (Olsen 2005) 
that leads to the so-called “thinning” o f administrative institutions (Terry 2006). 
With federal workers viewing competitive sourcing to be a danger to morale and 
agency capacity, the dynamics surrounding its implementation offers a venue to 
explore how bureaucracy adapts to the demands o f its environment or how agencies 
comply with a threatening initiative or create discretion and space for themselves in 
a centralized setting, and whether their strategies relate to strength or other 
organizational characteristics. A well-developed body of research on agency 
adaptation to personnel and budget cutbacks (Rubin 1985 and 2003; Kaufman 1971 
and 1976; Levine 1978 and 1979, among others) inspired this research. Qualitative 
research methods were primarily used to explore the research themes.
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3Statement o f the Problem and the Research Questions
The research problem studied was: How did federal agencies adapt to the 
pressure o f implementing the competitive sourcing policy and what factors 
influenced their adaptation to, or compliance with, the policy? To answer this 
research problem, this dissertation answered the following questions:
1. Were federal workers threatened by competitive sourcing? Did the employees or 
their agencies resist competitive sourcing?
2. How did the agencies adapt to the pressures to carry out the policy? What kind 
of strategies did they form? To what extent were they acted upon by their 
environment, and to what extent did they try to change their environment, 
individually or collectively?
3. What were the characteristics of the agencies that formed particular strategies? 
Were they strong or weak? Was there a nexus between the adaptation theory of 
organization and the bureau politics/power theory o f public administration?
4. What does bureaucracy’s adaptation to market-based governance suggest about 
the future challenges and dilemmas in public administration?
Rationale and Objectives
When this research was being written in 2006, the Bush administration was 
in its second term of implementing the competitive sourcing agenda. Competitive 
sourcing embodies the enormous pressures on the bureaucracy in the age of 
privatization. Organizational theory says that agencies aim to survive, they develop
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4a culture that maximizes survival resources, and they avoid uncertainty. Public 
fiscal realities, however, often support political views o f creating a government 
machine that works better and costs less (Gore 1993). Beyond fiscal conditions, the 
“ideological imperative” that pushed privatization in the past (Wise 1990, 147) 
appears to be the same rationale behind the intensification o f competitive sourcing.
To understand the anxiety with A-76, it is necessary to look back at 
previous efforts to shrink the federal government. Public administrators had long 
been acquainted with presidential reform efforts, even those pushed by 
bureaucracy’s “ideological adversaries” favoring market-oriented approaches to 
doing government’s work (Lambright 1998, 249). But these approaches solved 
some problems o f public administration and exacerbated others. Observers noted 
that the federal government’s capacity was diminished by the bureaucratic 
misdiagnosis in the 1980s in the Reagan administration. The reforms under Reagan 
produced a civil service that was less accountable, weaker in confidence, and in an 
extremely diminished position in governing (Peters and Savoie 1994).
Under the Clinton administration, the workforce shrank by about 347,000, 
with most cuts occurring at the Defense Department (OPM 2001). The downsizing 
fed a shadow workforce o f contractors with illusions o f smallness, accountability, 
and productivity (Light 1999). Contracting out yielded an appearance o f a hollowed 
state (see Milward and Provan 2000) that did more with less. But reduced federal 
staffing levels did not necessarily shrink the scope of government functions. 
Cutbacks also did not ensure that the institution would be better managed or more
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5responsive to political direction (Peters and Savoie 1994; Levine 1979). Downsizing 
merely forced agencies to contract for the skills lost as some o f the best workers 
accepted buyouts to flock to the private sector (Rubin 2003; Segal et. al 2003). It 
changed some agencies overnight. For example, at the National Aeronautics Space 
Administration (NASA) contracting out “transformed the nature o f the agency’s 
work, converting engineers into contract administrators” (McCurdy 1991, 312). 
According to the Merit Systems Protection Board (no date), previous decades’ 
downsizing eroded agency capacity and institutional memory. The change from 
being direct program deliverers to contract managers overwhelmed some agencies. 
Studies on the hollowing out o f government (e.g., Rubin 1985; Rubin 2003; Cooper 
2003; Light 1999; Oman et al. 2003) uncovered adverse outcomes such as: 
weakened accountability, greater complexity o f what used to be ordinary functions, 
shrinking institutional memory, loss of core staff competency, reduced contract 
management capacity, incapacity to make difficult decisions and criticize officials, 
lessened diversity and stability o f the labor force, and declining government 
attractiveness as an employer. Competitive sourcing was being pushed as low 
morale and a sense o f powerlessness and vulnerability typified the government 
workforce o f the 21st century (Oman et al. 1999, 908). “The new order for public 
administration (was) much more challenging and less deferential to expertise” 
(Peters and Savoie 1994,418). Bureaucrats had to endure criticisms of inefficiency 
as private sector expertise was praised.
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6The Bush administration believed that having federal workers compete for 
their jobs would lead to savings, especially if  contractors won. But critics charged 
that “a government that costs less (was) a government that either (did) less or (did) 
what it presently (did) less well” (Frederickson 2005, 93). In addition, “claims that 
empirical studies (found) ‘consistently’ and ‘without exception’ that contracting 
(was) more efficient... (were) demonstrably untrue” (Boyne 1998,482). With little 
proof o f savings and a great risk to government, competition was a weak rationale 
on which to justify contracting government’s work (Sclar 2002). A “bottom-line 
ideology” (March 1981, 568) raised deep issues o f accountability in public service 
(Kettl 1993; Denhardt and Denhardt 2003; Johnston et al. 2004). Contracting often 
led to a loss o f visibility, and, as the number and range o f contracts increased, so did 
possible ethical lapses (Frederickson 2005). Contracting also depended on contract 
management abilities that may not always be there. Even the Department o f Defense 
(DoD), which alone for a long time provided regular training on contract and 
procurement skills, often fell prey to contract mismanagement.
Bush's President's Management Agenda echoed Reagan’s President's 
Management Improvement Program. Both presidents directed agencies to curb costs 
and establish a system to record the results (Peters and Savoie 1994,421). Reagan’s 
OMB set target numbers for A-76 for agencies expected “to meet them, or to face 
budget cuts” (Dudley 1990, 487). The environment o f federal agencies turned very 
hostile with the creation o f the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control.
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7Reagan famously asked its chair, J. Peter Grace, and commission members from the 
private sector to
work like 'tireless bloodhounds' in uncovering waste, inefficiency, and poor 
management practices in government [Goodsell 1984, 196-204], He also 
instructed Grace to look at government agencies as if  he and his colleagues 
were considering a merger or takeover. (Peters and Savoie 1994,419)
A Bush administration Official remarked for this study that competitive 
sourcing put a lot o f private interests at stake and that many would “fight tooth and 
nail to keep the status quo .” 1 Former Office Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
Director Angela Styles, who, with former OMB Director Mitchell Daniels presided 
over the launch o f the initiative in 2001, acknowledged that o f Bush’s management 
initiatives, competitive sourcing was the most complex, challenging, and politicized.
The Bush A-76 could lead to an erosion o f bureaucratic discretion to choose 
the functions suitable for outsourcing, even though the original A-76 Circular 
preserved such discretion. As a result, with A-76 under Bush, agencies must defend 
their own turf. Turf defense is a known bureaucratic trademark (Wilson 1989), but 
A-76’s adversarial nature (GAO 1985a) was foreign to most civilian agencies. Civil 
servants suddenly had to compete for jobs that they had sought, been tested for, 
been selected for, and had performed for a significant length of time.
1 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
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8In this context o f shrinking bureaucratic space and significance as an 
institution, the federal agencies’ response to the policy invited careful examination. 
This study explored organizational adaptation and bureaucratic politics in A-76, 
unlike previous studies. I had assumed at the beginning of this study that powerful 
and powerless agencies would behave differently than theories had originally 
anticipated under these conditions. To test this assumption, the study pursued these 
objectives: ( 1) to describe the different responses o f federal agencies to competitive 
sourcing; (2 ) to explore themes o f bureaucratic adaptation as suggested by known 
theories, with careful awareness o f emergent themes; (3) to uncover any relationship 
between organizational response and strength; and (4) develop new theories or 
extend existing theories that would be relevant to the study o f public administration 
in the United States.
Significance of the Study
This study on the A-76 process under the Bush administration is significant 
for a number o f reasons. First, the study enhances understanding o f the extent to 
which agencies obey or resist their elected principal when organizational capacities 
are threatened. It illustrates how agencies in a centrally controlled environment 
manage to create space or discretion for themselves. Second, the study develops 
existing knowledge on bureaucratic adaptation and power by looking at the 
strategies and tactics o f the different agencies to respond to the A-76 pressure, and 
the resources they utilized in their response. Agencies might respond to their
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
environment differently and even modify the parameters o f behavior. Third, it looks 
at the unintended consequences of the competition push, a pressure that could 
radically alter civil service. Finally, the research is important to show the adequacy 
o f traditional theories in describing and explaining how agencies adapt to the 
pressures o f competitive sourcing.
A-76: The Competitive Sourcing Policy
This section discusses the mechanics of the A-76 process, the brief history of 
A-76 and the civilian agencies’ success in the past to avoid it, the intensification of 
the policy under George W. Bush, and the dilemmas that agencies faced in 
competitive sourcing as the competitions began in 2 0 0 1 .
Competitive Sourcing Mechanics under the 2003 Circular
Competitive sourcing requires agencies “to determine the best and most 
cost-effective provider o f commercial activities” (OMB 2003a, 2) currently 
performed by federal employees by comparing the costs of their performance 
against private contractors and other public reimbursable sources, through a 
streamlined or a standard bidding process. Agencies' commercial activities, defined 
as recurring services that can be obtained from a private sector source, must be 
listed annually in accordance with the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) 
Act o f 1998. OMB (2003a, 3) estimated at the beginning of the initiative that some
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Available for competition 
416,000 (26% of total)
Inherently Governmental 
751,000
Figure 1. Estimated Workforce Profile for Competitive Sourcing
In the latest, May 2003 Circular A-76 (OMB 2003b), agencies are required 
to take the following steps . Agencies first select certain activities or a group of 
functions for competition. This involves (1) submitting every 30th o f June to OMB, 
workforce inventories that distinguish commercial and inherently governmental 
activities. OMB reviews, approves, and announces in the Federal Register these 
inventories for public challenge;3 (2 ) identifying activities that may be suitable for 
competition from those that should not be for various reasons (Appendix A shows 
the reason codes); (3) developing competition/A-76 plans according to OMB 
directives; and (4) preliminary planning for competition.
2 These steps are largely taken from Blum (2005), a presentation on competitive sourcing by Raymona Stickell 
that I personally obtained, and the Department o f  Defense on-line A-76 Library. 
http://sharea76.fedworx.org/sharea76/Home.asDx (accessed on February 16, 2005).
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The Circular directs agencies to use either a streamlined or standard (full­
blown) public-private competition. Direct conversion from in-house activity to 
contract for 10 Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) and under was previously allowed and 
made up the majority o f A-76 studies in the past. Direct conversions took up around 
54 percent o f the A-76 studies conducted from 1994 to 2004 (Gansler and Lucyshyn 
2004). The Bush OMB banned direct conversion later in 2003.
The streamlined method may be used if  the work is performed by an 
aggregate o f 65 or fewer positions. The agency conducts market research to 
compare costs with the industry or a public reimbursable source, or, in some cases, 
reconstitute the current staffing to form the new in-house staffing plan, called the 
“Most Efficient Organization” (MEO) that will compete against outside bidders. 
Streamlined competition must be concluded within 90 days after the public 
announcement, with a 45-day extension, upon OMB approval. For more than 65 
FTEs, agencies should use the full, standard process (Figure 2) that requires MEO 
formation and solicitation o f formal bids. Competitions must be completed within 
12 months after the announcement, with extension of 6  months.
3 The FAIR Act o f  1998 allows interested parties, such as actual or prospective private sector offerors, agency 
offerors, and workers unions, to challenge the inclusion or omission o f an activity or the classification o f  an 
activity.
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Figure 2. The Standard Competition Process
Once the agency has decided to compete the selected activity, the agency (1) 
appoints the competition officials, namely: the Agency Tender Official who will 
develop, certify, and represent the agency bid; the Contracting Officer; the Human 
Resource Advisor and the Source Selection Authority; (2) analyzes benefits, costs 
and risks o f potential service providers, including the MEO; (3) establishes the 
Performance Work Statement (PWS) Team to develop the performance work 
statement; (4) develops the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP), and (5) 
develops the solicitation based on the performance work statement. Next, the 
competition is announced and the solicitation issued to commercial vendors. The 
agency’s MEO begins to form after the public announcement. Proposals are 
received and technical and cost evaluations may result in a Contract (for private 
sector) or Letter o f Obligation (for the MEO).
Agencies may select the winner on a basis other than cost under the so- 
called “tradeoff source selection process” or “best value” as guided by the Federal
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Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Subpart 15.101-1. If the federal team wins, 
agencies must hold them to a performance agreement no longer than five years, after 
which their jobs must be subject to a re-competition, a restriction later outlawed by 
Congress. Post-competition accountability involves the implementation o f the 
quality control plan.
While all agencies were directed to carry out A-76, OMB chose 26 agencies 
to publicly grade every quarter beginning in 2001 using a traffic-light Management 
Scorecard with “yellow,” “red,” and “green” scores that corresponded to a set of 
performance criteria (Appendix B).
Evolution o f OMB Circular No. A-76
How radical was the idea o f workers competing for their jobs with private 
contractors, and how far-reaching was the Bush administration's A-76 thrust 
compared to its predecessors? The letter o f the policy underwent a series of 
revisions in five decades. Circular A-76 was revised in 1977, 1979,1983,1996,
1999, and 2003, sometimes with accompanying Executive Orders and Supplemental 
Handbooks. The government’s policy o f “make or buy” to achieve efficiency was 
supported by every administration since 1955 (OMB 1988). Each one endorsed the 
principle that government performance o f commercial activities should be 
prohibited when it could be done by the private sector (Light 2003). Different 
administrations, however, tailored Circular A-76 to their priorities. As an expert on
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A-76 commented in an interview, “A-76 was used by different administrations for 
different reasons.”4
The bureaucracy that emerged from the Second World War produced a lot of 
goods and services that were widely available in the market (Kettl 1993). On 
January 15,1955, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) under President Dwight 
Eisenhower issued the precursor o f Circular A-76, Bulletin 55-4 entitled 
“Commercial-industrial activities o f  the Government providing products or services 
fo r  governmental use"  This bulletin stated that
the Federal Government will not start or carry on any commercial activity to 
provide a service or product for its own use if such product or service can be 
procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels. (OMB 
1955,1)
As a result o f this bulletin, agencies had to identify those products and activities 
obtainable from business. But where agencies were already performing the 
commercial work, contracting out would take place only when proven to be cheaper 
(OMB 1988). In 1966 the BOB issued the policy as Circular No. A-76. The 
Commission on Government Procurement (1972, 60) noted that the philosophy of 
A-76 favored “contracting over in-house.”
In 1979 under President Jimmy Carter “OMB began to recognize in earnest 
the value of having Federal workers compete for the jobs they were holding” (Blum
4 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
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2005, 9). Until then, “in-house activities could expect a long-term existence in 
relative security” (Handy and O’Connor 1984, 1). OMB revised the Circular (OMB 
1979) to require periodic reviews o f activities in the Military Services, introducing 
for the first time competition to many government activities “that had never felt any 
externally applied pressure to be cost efficient” (Handy and O’Connor 1984:1).
Privatization, the management thrust during the Reagan era, easily found a 
niche for the A-76 process. In 1983, the Circular was revised to state that
In the process o f governing, the Government should not compete with its 
citizens.. .In recognition of this principle, it has been and continues to be the 
general policy o f the Government to rely on commercial sources to supply 
the products and services the Government needs. (OMB 1983, 1)
In practice, the original A-76 called more for outsourcing (Blum 2005) with 
agencies’ discretion. More guidance was provided in a Supplemental Handbook. By 
this time the policy had evolved to state that all new work requirements that the 
private sector could provide must be outsourced, except where a statute or national 
security interests required performance by government employees.
The launching of A-76 studies by the thousands began in the 1980s as A-76 
quotas first came on to the scene. President Reagan issued Executive Order 12615 
requiring annual A-76 goals as OMB “set savings targets for each agency based on 
the size o f its commercial activities” (Kettl 1993,480). No less than three percent of 
each agency's total civilian personnel were ordered for possible contracting out, a 
scenario expanded under the Bush administration. Reagan eventually presided over
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A-76 studies o f more than 72,000 positions (Table 1), which resulted in 
approximately $696 million in annual savings, $9,700 savings for each position 
reviewed, and 45,697 positions “saved,” or moved to higher priority needs (OMB 
1988, 3). From 1981 to 1988, OMB allowed the DoD to keep all o f the savings from 
A-76 (GAO 1989a, 57).
Table 1
Varying Commitments o f Presidents to Competitive Sourcing Policy
Administration Average Number o f FTEs 
Studied Annually For A-76
Ronald Reagan 16,000 over 8 years
George Bush 5,200 over 4 years
William Clinton 7,000 over 8 years
George W. Bush* 9,142 over 2 years
Sources'. Data from Light 2003,163; OV B 2004a; OMB 2005b.
Under Clinton, OMB issued Policy Letter 92-1 to distinguish inherently 
governmental from commercial functions. In March 1996, a Revised Supplemental 
Handbook was issued, and the concept o f “best value” was introduced (OMB 1996). 
Best value, retained by the present Circular as “tradeoff source selection” criterion 
allowed agencies to disregard the least-cost consideration in exchange for the 
promise o f better quality. A-76 was again revised on June 4,1999 after the FAIR 
Act’s passage.
A-76 was called a “quiet revolution” at the Defense Department (Harney 
1998,49). DoD reportedly netted 20 to 30 percent savings, with about 60 percent of
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the contests resulting in in-house victories (GAO 1999a, 2). That A-76 was largely 
confined to Defense agencies (Table 2) was due to three reasons. One, DoD 
accounted for a great amount o f spending and almost half of the government 
workforce. The self-contained nature o f the services and o f base life was seen as 
more amenable to outsourcing and the Cold War’s end offered a rationale to reduce 
spending. Plus, the incentive to keep all of the savings from A-76 studies was 
granted by OMB only to DoD among all agencies, giving DoD a unique reason to 
pursue A-76 vigorously (Kettl 1993,49).
Table 2
A-76 in Defense versus Non-Defense Agencies (1984-1997')
Year Total Number of Defense Non-Defense
Positions Studied (% of total) (% o f total)
1984-1987 63,636 48,028 15,608
(75.47%) (24.53%)
1988-1997 72,963 61,516 11,447
(84.31%) (15.69%)
Source'. Data from Light 1999, 149.
Two, the civilian bureaucracy largely ignored the directive and political will 
was lacking to pursue it beyond DoD. For instance, in 1996 OMB requested 
agencies to submit inventories, but not all agencies complied. O f those that did, 
many were largely based on previous inventory efforts. Two years later, GAO 
(1998a, 6) found that 6 o f the 24 largest agencies still had not complied with OMB's 
requests. In 1997 only the DoD reported completion o f cost-comparison studies
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(GAO 2000a). “Agencies, with some exceptions, were not making serious effort 
(under A-76)” according to GAO (2000b, 4).
Civilian agencies must have watched how, in DoD’s case, Congress clashed 
with OMB about A-76. DoD had to contend with numerous Executive Orders, 
legislation, and Departmental directives on A-76 that, while generally predisposed 
to outsourcing, also contained “many restraints and exclusions,” some had “rational 
underpinnings” and some “intended simply to raise impediments” (Robbert et al. 
1997,10). Some restrictions were codified while others recurred with the Defense 
appropriations and authorization processes.
Three, it was apparent that OMB under Clinton did “not view its role as 
requiring agencies to undertake A-76”; rather, it encouraged agencies “to 
understand and use A-76 as one o f a series o f tools” federal managers could employ 
to make sound business decisions (GAO 1998a, 2). In contrast to the centerpiece 
position o f competitive sourcing in President Bush’s agenda, GAO (1998a, 3) noted 
that “A-76 did not appear to be a high priority within OMB” under Clinton. OMB 
made only limited efforts to gather and use the commercial activities inventories, 
provided limited A-76 guidance to agencies, and only reviewed agencies' strategic 
and streamlining plans on an ad hoc basis in conjunction with budget reviews (GAO 
1998a, 6-7).
On October 19,1998, due to the perceived under-utilization o f A-76 as a 
money-saving tool, Congress passed Public Law 105-270, the Federal Activities
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Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, to require agency submission o f commercial 
inventories. FAIR stopped short o f saying these activities must be contracted out but 
the implication was that agencies would “strongly consider outsourcing as an 
alternative” (Grasso 2001,16).
Policy Intensification under the Bush Administration
Competitive sourcing gained a determined advocate in President Bush. In 
2001 Bush set the long-range goal of competing 50 percent o f commercial 
inventories by the end o f FY 2008. As one conservative supporter noted, Bush was 
“after bigger fish,” by using A-76 “to change the institutional structure in which 
decisions about what an agency should be doing are made” (R PPI2005,1). Indeed, 
OMB talked about institutionalizing competition (OMB 2003c, 2). In 2003, OMB’s 
memorandum warned that completing less than 15 percent risked getting a “red” 
agency score in the Management Scorecard (OMB 2003c, 2), with all the penalties 
it might carry. Below is a timeline that illustrates how the A-76 initiative 
significantly threatened agencies since President Bush took office.
October 30, 2000 - On the eve of the presidential election, Congress passed 
Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act providing in 
Section 832 for a GAO-led Commercial Activities Panel “to study the policies and 
procedures governing the transfer o f commercial activities” from the government to 
contractors. The panel had representatives from contractors, unions, agencies, and 
the Administration.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
January 2001 - Bush launched his agenda to “open government to the 
discipline o f competition.” In February OMB Director Daniels wrote Memorandum 
M01-11 requiring agencies to incorporate outsourcing measures into their 
performance plans.
March 2001 - Contractors claimed that the FAIR Act o f 1998 could be 
improved by executive action alone (Peckenpaugh 2001a), and urged the Bush 
administration to tie outsourcing goals to the FAIR Act inventories. On March 9, 
OMB Memorandum MO 1-15 ordered agencies to produce a plan to start competing 
their commercial FTEs and to compete at least 5 percent in FY 2002 or risk getting 
red marks. Unions and allies criticized this “quota” while industry urged OMB to be 
extremely vigilant so that agencies do not avoid competition. Carl de Maio, head of 
a think-tank supportive o f A-76, warned, “The budget process in FY 2002 provides 
structures for OMB to take corrective action for agencies that are not in 
compliance.. .1 would not want to be the first agency to try that” (Peckenpaugh 
2001b, 2).
June 2001 - OMB opposed the Truthfulness, Responsibility and 
Accountability in Contracting Act that would allow in-house workers to compete for 
contracted-out work and directed agencies to compete at least 10 percent for FY 
2003. Congress began expressing alarm to OMB about the A-76 targets and their 
impact on morale and mission. On June 11, the GAO Panel began its hearings on 
A-76 targets, employee morale, and the definition of “inherently governmental 
functions.”
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July 2, 2001 - OMB asked some agencies, especially the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and Department of the Interior (Dol), to prepare to surpass the 
mandated targets (Peckenpaugh 2001c). OMB published a Federal Register notice 
to amend the Supplemental Handbook to OMB Circular A-76, proposing 
competition o f agency commercial activities on a recurring three- to five-year 
review cycle, similar to the competitions required for the renewal o f service 
contracts with the private sector.
August 2001 - OMB announced that it was not planning to use A-76 savings 
to cut agency budgets amid widespread anxiety. Simplification o f the A-76 Circular 
was top priority for new OFPP Director Styles, as the revision o f the Circular began.
April 2002 - The Interior Department began using a variant o f the 
streamlined competition process to accommodate the agency’s needs. Many 
agencies tried to meet OMB’s targets using direct conversions. Interior and 
Department o f Health and Human Services (DHHS) agencies tried to avoid laying 
off employees by directly converting vacant positions to contract. The GAO-led 
Commercial Activities Panel submitted its recommendations to Congress, 
promoting 10 sourcing principles (GAO 2002a). These principles explained that 
competitive sourcing should: (1) Support agency missions, goals, and objectives; (2) 
Be consistent with human capital practices designed to attract, motivate, retain, and 
reward a high performing federal workforce; (3) Recognize that inherently 
governmental and certain other functions should be performed by federal workers; 
(4) Create incentives and processes to foster high performing, efficient, and
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effective organizations; (5) Be based on a clear, transparent, and consistently 
applied process; (6) Avoid arbitrary full-time equivalent (FTE) or other arbitrary 
numerical goals; (7) Establish a process that for activities that may be performed by 
either the public or the private sector, would permit public and private sources to 
participate in competitions for work currently performed in-house, work currently 
contracted to the private sector, and new work, consistent with these guiding 
principles; (8) Ensure that when competitions are held, they are conducted as fairly, 
effectively, and efficiently as possible; (9) Ensure that competitions involve a 
process that considers both quality and cost factors; and (10) Provide for 
accountability in connection with all sourcing decisions. The Panel also 
recommended implementation of an integrated competition process (using FAR), 
temporary and limited changes to Circular A-76, and establishment o f “high 
performing organizations” (HPOs) within federal agencies.
November 2002 - OMB decided not to issue a government-wide A-76 target 
for FY 2004. Critics noted that setting unique agency targets would make it more 
difficult to monitor agency implementation. Unions maintained that the quotas did 
not disappear, and that “sanctions for failure to comply” were severe (Peckenpaugh 
2002a, 2).
Additionally, the Coast Guard’s problems with A-76 were leaked to the 
media while two unnamed agencies were supposed to have received forced 
reductions in FTEs in the latest round o f budget submissions for failure to comply. 
Documents obtained by the press (Peckenpaugh 2002b, 1) quoted Coast Guard
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leadership as saying, “The environment has changed significantly and we must 
change our approach accordingly. To avoid similar (cuts) we must move smartly 
and deliberately towards compliance.” Amid these reports, OMB announced that it 
would not cut personnel at agencies that failed to comply. Later, OFPP’s Director 
announced:
Agencies that fall behind in their competitions will undergo sharp scrutiny 
by OMB, and if  in-house employees fail to submit a proposal on time, their 
jobs could be directly outsourced to the private sector. (Peckenpaugh 2002c, 
2)
On November 14,2002, OMB released its draft revision o f Circular A-76. 
The draft declared, “All commercial activities performed by government personnel 
should be subject to the forces of competition.” FAR-type principles incorporated in 
the Circular would:
(1) require in-house offerors to respond to a solicitation within the same time 
frames applicable to the private sector, (2) provide for the simultaneous 
evaluation o f all proposals, including in-house tenders, and (3) permit 
agencies in certain circumstances to eliminate in-house proposals from the 
competition. The proposed A-76 revisions also would allow agencies in 
some procurements to conduct cost-technical tradeoffs involving both the 
commercial and in-house proposals, which would represent a significant 
shift from the “cost-only” focus o f the Circular’s current cost comparison 
procedures. (The Government Contractor 2003,1)
December 2002 - Critics charged that the draft Circular defied the will of 
Congress. According to GAO Commercial Activities Panelist Robert Tobias:
The reason Congress legislates in a certain area is because the public has a 
need that's not being supplied by the private sector.. .the presumption is that 
it will be performed by federal employees.. .1 think we're starting at the
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wrong end o f the continuum by assuming that it is indeed commercial unless 
proven otherwise. (Peckenpaugh 2002d, 1)
GAO Comptroller General David Walker wrote OMB Director Daniels about 
GAO’s disagreements with the proposed rules, especially:
the absence o f a link between sourcing policy and agency missions, 
unnecessarily complicated source selection procedures, certain unrealistic 
time frames, and insufficient guidance on calculating savings... .sourcing 
policy is not just about choosing among potential service providers. Rather, 
an agency’s sourcing policy should be viewed as part o f an overall strategy 
for how best to accomplish the mission of the agency. (GAO 2003a, 1-2)
GAO also decried the lack o f A-76 resources and expertise and contract 
management in agencies, some o f which were on GAO’s list o f High-Risk 
Management agencies. Agencies pointed out the tilted playing field and its 
demoralizing effect. Contractors pushed for the proposed FAR-based framework 
and speedy time lines.
April 2003 - To prove that competition, not outsourcing, was their focus, 
OMB proposed eliminating direct conversion o f work as an A-76 option.
May 2003 - Some agencies began planning major competitions as many 
hastily carried out direct conversions to meet the FY 2003 OMB target. Agencies 
and workers’ associations worked overtime to press their case with Angela Styles. 
After more than 700 public comments, the revised Circular was unveiled on May 
29. The new Circular relaxed some of the hard language, but the thrust o f the 
initiative, and most o f the technical requirements, remained daunting. Opponents 
began mobilizing allies to change the A-76 rules. Table 3 shows the changes
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between the historical Circular A-76 as used extensively in DoD (1st column), and 
the Bush administration draft and final releases (2nd and 3rd columns).
Agency Dilemmas in A-76: Anatomy of the Threat
Management dilemmas
Competitive sourcing, even by OMB’s own admission, is complex, time- 
consuming, and takes agency time off mission performance. As an employee of an 
agency that was “being A-76’d” wrote to OMB in 2002:
The process for A-76 is monstrous and massive and is costing our agency 
over a million dollars.. .It has put an unbearable strain on my division—a 
division that is already stressed due to budget cuts that have resulted in our 
being severely understaffed...Morale in our agency...is at an all-time low.5
A local union chief spoke about loss o f jobs in this way:
I’m sure that if  a RIF occurred, that employees could possibly end up being 
offered a job with the company that get the contract. But there are so many 
fallacies with that - insurances, retirements, there are so many other aspects 
to employment other than salaries. You will find that most government 
employees would rather work for the federal government rather than the 
private sector, and maybe the private sector salary for grass cutting might 
not be the same as cutting grass for the government.6
5 Emailed by an anonymous commenter to OMB official David Childs, Subject: A-76. 12/17/2002. 
www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/ circulars/a076/comments/a76-138.pdf (accessed on August 4, 2004).
6 Interview with Dale Yielding, November 8, 2004.
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Table 3




Revisions under the 
Bush Administration
Remarks
N o v em b er 2002  D raft M ay  29 , 2003 F inal
The last Circular 
revision was under 
Clinton in 1999 to 
enforce FAIR Act 
reporting 
requirements
OFPP under Angela Styles took 
over the re-write o f the Circular 
in the middle o f  criticism over 
competitive sourcing “quotas” 
for FY 2002 and FY2003
Over 700 public 
comments sent to OMB
GAO A-76 Panel send 
recommendations to OMB
Bush ordered 
OMB revision to 
simplify and speed 
up competitions 
that were taking 
DoD, on average,
3 years
FAIR Act Law was 
passed in 1998 but it 
did not mandate 
competition
Workforce inventories should 
classify functions as inherently 
governmental or commercial
Agencies must justify 




reduced as OMB 
increased scrutiny 





require either the 
exercise o f  discretion 
in applying 
Government 
authority or the use 
o f  value judgment in 
making decisions fo r  
the Government."
“All activities are commercial in 
nature unless an activity is 
justified as inherently 
governmental.”
Inherently governmental 
activities "require the exercise 
o f substantial official discretion 
in the application o f  government 
authority and/or in making 
decisions for the government. ”
Deleted presumption in 
the Draft that all activities 
are commercial unless 
proven otherwise
Kept the stricter definition 
o f inherently 
governmental activities
GAO did not call 
for a redefinition 
o f  functions
Agencies saw 
threat to mission 
as core functions 





NTEU filed suit 
against OMB
Preference for private 
performance o f 
commercial functions 
"In the process o f  
governing, the 
Government should 
not compete with its 
citizens "
Replaced the old provision with: 
"For the American people to 
receive maximum value fo r  their 
tax dollars, all commercial 
activities performed by 
government personnel should be 
subject to the forces o f  
competition ”
Emphasis is on the 
competition process:
"To ensure that the 
American people receive 
maximum value fo r  their 
tax dollars, commercial 
activities should be 




biggest threat to 
the traditional civil 
service
New work or new 
requirements were 
directly outsourced
Private sector sources 
considered as the incumbent 
method o f  performance for any 
new requirements and 
expansions o f  existing 
commercial activities.
Competition not required 
for private sector 
performance o f new 
requirements but required 
before government may 
perform them
OMB said best 
value mostly could 
be used to let feds 
compete for new 
projects (see 
11/14/02, Styles)
(continued on following page)






Revisions under the 
Bush Administration
Remarks
November 2002 Draft May 29,2003 Final
Emnhasis on cost 
considerations in 
making the award
Best value (Trade-off source 
selection concept) competition 
allowed whereby cost is not a 
consideration in making the 
award
Changed the draft 
provision, to at least half 
o f  best value consideration 
should be based on cost; 
10% cost advantage given 
in best value competitions
GAO noted that 
OM B’s
requirements to 
justify best value 
decisions were 
vague.




given to incumbents 
(federal employees) 
in all competitions
Cost advantage removed for any 
kind o f  competition
Restored 10% cost 
advantage in full or 
standard competitions and 
in “best value” 
competitions; Cost 
advantage removed in 
streamlined contests
OMB ignored 
GAO proposal to 




cost advantage in 
appropriations 
bills
Solicitation for bids 
not required if 
estimates were 






Agencies could use full blown 
standard competition or direct 
conversion from government to 
contract for 10 FTEs and less
Eliminated direct 
conversion, only standard 
competition and 
streamlined allowed; DoD 
could use direct 
conversion based on 
statutory authority;
OMB still considered 










No strict deadlines 12-month deadline (6-month 
extension) for standard 
competitions; 90-135 days 
deadline for streamlined
Retained strict timelines GAO opposed the 
deadlines;
OFPP’s Director 
said she did not 
endorse the 12- 
month limit
No limit to 
nerformance oeriods
Performance agreements based 
on the solicitation
Limits length of 
performance period to 5 
years for in-house 
winners, with 3-year 
extension, after which 




Final rule allowed 
agencies to 
temporarily waive 





outside the scope o f 
Circular A-76
OMB proposed public-private 
competition for ISSAs; proposal 
was folded into draft circular. 
Agencies must compare in- 
house cost against a proposed 
contract or ISSA price
Dropped the proposal to 






ISSA to A-76 
process
(continued on following page)






Revisions under the 
Bush Administration
Remarks
November 2002 Draft May 29, 2003 Final
Cost comparison did 
not call for creation 
o f the Most Effective 
Oreanization bv the 
in-house team
FTEs 10 and below did not 
require MEO formation
Agencies could use MEO 
in streamlined to base 
their current estimate o f 
costs;
MEOs required in 
standard competitions





consideration o f in- 
house offers
Winner take all; In-house team 
could be eliminated before the 
final round o f  competition
Winner take all; In-house 
team could be eliminated 
before the final round o f 
competition
Elimination o f 
guarantee of 
government as 







Replaced old appeals process 
with FAR Part 33
Replaced old appeals 
process with FAR Part 33; 
In-house team may elect a 
representative to appeal in 
internal agency protests
GAO remained the 
final arbiter o f 
contractor protests
Because public-sector organizations are designed not as competitive 
instruments but to ensure legality and equality (Peters and Pierre 1998,230), A-76 
understandably created severe strains from 2001 onwards. Agencies needed to pull 
some o f their best people from their jobs to work on the competitions. Ironically, 
among those personnel that were downsized in the 1990s were acquisition 
employees critical to the complex system o f federal procurement and A-76. Under 
Bush’s A-76 rules, agencies also worked within difficult timeframes and met 
stringent A-76 requirements (reporting, monitoring, evaluation and planning for 
future A-76). As a result o f these timeframes and requirements, the anxiety inside 
agencies was palpable. A-76 threatened erosion of control, loss o f trained personnel, 
and accountability for results that were largely beyond their control. The recent 
(2007) Walter Reed Army Medical Center controversy was a case where a flawed
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A-76 competition pushed by DoD resulted in contracting out and the grave loss of 
the Center’s capacity even before the contractor assumed operational control 
(Mandel 2007). That veterans had to suffer neglect in wartime exposed the 
competition agenda’s adverse effects.
The blending o f workers was another concern. The call o f the National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA 2005) to examine the management 
challenges o f managing a diverse workforce was a result of the Bush 
administration’s push to treat employees like contractors -  for example, by 
subjecting them to recurring competition under the FAR framework. NAPA’s Dan 
Guttman criticized the little thought put on the fact that longstanding laws did not 
provide “for the blurring o f the boundaries between official and contractor status” 
(Peckenpaugh 2003a, 2). Other unknowns concerned the complexities o f managing 
the winning MEOs working under performance agreements with the agency. For 
example, what kind o f cultural dynamics occurred when former co-workers 
operated under different sets o f rules?
Institutional dilemmas
The huge difference between the old A-76 and the Bush brand, as an A-76 
official explained, is that the old one was a discretionary tool while the new one puts 
bureaucrats “on the chopping block” in the name o f efficiency. Said one official at a 
science agency:
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Often what you were doing was contracting out functions that needed to be 
done for which you didn’t have staff to do them .. .it was staff augmentation. 
A classic example o f that is ... (w)hen IT exploded in the federal 
government, some grew their IT staff; some grew their IT contractor support 
and staff. So, it worked both ways, but it wasn’t like.. .we’re taking (our) IT 
government staff and forcing them to compete for their jobs against a 
contractor. That is not what it was about for the most part in those days. And 
that is what it’s about now.7
The institutionalist view o f bureaucracy invites a more careful consideration 
o f impacts beyond an instrumentalist perspective that holds bureaucracy against a 
simple efficiency criterion (Olsen 2005). In Max Weber’s thinking, habituation to 
the bureaucratic setting is an essential ingredient to employee productivity. 
“Motivation was a result o f material incentives inherent in lifelong careers, as well 
as socialization and habituation in educational and bureaucratic institutions” (Olsen 
2005,4). By demanding regular competition, the Bush A-76 initiative threatened 
the institution o f civil service by diminishing the concept of career and removing a 
fundamental incentive to attract qualified workers. The 2003 Circular simply 
reinforced the policy o f determining “the best service provider - irrespective o f the 
sector the provider represents” (Blum 2005,12). But regular competition, according 
to Donald Kettl, challenges the idea of a career federal service:
The bedrock o f the civil service has long been neutral competence and 
strong expertise, grounded in a career service.. .Staging regular competitions 
. . .  would undermine the commitment to a career service, especially if  the 
scope of services and the standards for competition shift over time and, in 
the process, put more federal workers at risk. (Peckenpaugh 2003a, 2)
7 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15, 2004.
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H. George Frederickson (2005,119) argued that job security is what is owed 
in exchange for having a highly trained, low-tumover, reliable cadre o f public 
servants: “How can we possibly expect them to be loyal to us if  we are not loyal to 
them?” NAPA noted that the psychological contract between the civil servant and 
the government becomes fragile and workers lose their dedication when job security 
and retention are uncertain. In the 1980s, DoD officials pushing A-76 saw “good 
employees leave,” while others worried about keeping their jobs and did not do their 
jobs (Kettl 1993,60).
Regular competition was doubly threatening because o f the perception of 
uneven playing field in A-76 contests. A timetable that forced decisions within a set 
period, the costing rules, and the lack of employee standing to protest decisions in 
the GAO tainted efforts to portray A-76 as fair. In-house bidders were also thought 
o f as handicapped because “one-sided rules against conflicts o f interests” could 
keep the most experienced personnel from working on the MEO (Tiefer 2003, 8). 
Best-value rules would also make it harder for employees to win when factors other 
than costs influence the decision. Bias was also seen when a competition must first 
be done before government employees, but not contractors, could perform new 
work.
Other institutional issues raised were the potential loss o f diversity and 
representativeness o f the bureaucracy. Worries about the effect o f the policy on 
minorities, women, the disabled, and veterans surfaced at the National Park Service, 
(Mainella 2003a), for example, and at the Department o f Veterans Affairs.
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Philosophical dilemmas
Due to the elusive definition o f inherently governmental functions (GAO 
1991a), the “adversarial process” o f cost comparison between industry and 
government (GAO 1985a, 3), and the inevitable attachment to an anti-bureaucratic 
ideology, competitive sourcing posed philosophical problems for public 
administration. Among these problems was the nature o f the government’s work 
and how that work should be done. The Bush A-76 forces agencies to define the 
proper role and activities o f government through an inherently antagonistic process. 
Notwithstanding the fact that A-76 could result in keeping the activities within 
government, the steadfastness with which the Bush administration pushed it put 
agencies in a defensive posture. While advocates o f A-76 claimed that it would shift 
personnel and resources to core missions, agencies might be failing to do that under 
current pressure to treat all activities as potentially outsourceable (Bumes and 
Anastasiadis 2003).
One o f the biggest dangers in competitive sourcing involved contracting out 
for inherently governmental activities. During the elder Bush’s Administration,
GAO tried to find out whether contractors were performing inherently governmental 
functions. The results were less than conclusive because the concept was hard to 
define, according to GAO’s staff. For instance, consultants and management support 
contractors were involved in preparing studies and analyses to assist agencies in 
policymaking, developing agency reports, preparing testimony, conducting
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administrative hearings, and researching technical issues “that may be beyond the 
expertise of...agency technical staff’ (GAO 1991a, 18).
OMB's definition o f “inherently governmental” functions did not map out 
well with what agencies regarded as their mission, core functions, or technologies. 
But under Bush in 2001, government activity was being shrunk by definition, or by 
changing the definition o f what is inherently governmental. With Circular A-76, the 
divide between the inherently governmental and the commercial was shifting in 
favor of the latter. In the past, Clinton’s OMB directed agencies to apply function 
codes that led to ambiguous and inconsistent classification o f activities among 
civilian agencies. As a Commerce Department official put it, the function codes 
were “oriented toward military activities” (GAO 1999a, 7). Some agencies added 
their own codes and reasons (GAO 2000b). Under Bush, the 1998 FAIR Act 
requirement, listing commercial functions only, and the 1992 Policy Letter 
definition o f inherently governmental activities, those that require the “exercise of 
discretion,” were simultaneously modified. Not only must agencies list all 
activities, but also the definition o f what should be government performance was 
redefined as those requiring the “exercise o f substantial discretion.” As OMB 
explained:
Policy Letter 92-1 defines “inherently governmental” activities to include 
activities that require the “exercise of discretion” in applying Government 
authority. While the phrase “substantial discretion” does not appear in the 
definition, the policy letter provides additional guidance.. .(that) expressly 
states that “inherently governmental functions necessarily involve the 
exercise o f substantial discretion.” Several commenters asserted that the
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proposed addition of the word “substantial” . . .constitutes a major policy 
shift. OMB does not agree... Although the absence o f the adjective 
“substantial” from the definition.. .may have caused some confusion in the 
past, OMB does not believe the clarification to require the exercise of 
substantial discretion will unnecessarily restrict the definition o f inherently 
governmental, as some commenters argued. (Federal Register 2003,12)
OMB’s clarification did not satisfy many. The National Treasury Employees Union 
(NTEU) filed a suit accusing the Bush administration of unfairly rewriting the FAIR 
Act to facilitate outsourcing and redefining “inherently governmental” in a way that 
could affect thousands o f IRS employees. According to NTEU, OMB’s revision
restricts the inherently governmental designation to only those functions that 
'establish policies or procedures' for carrying out these tasks... OMB's 
efforts have illegally trumped Congress.. .If OMB is putting out an 
administrative directive, it should be in accord with the statutory definition 
of “inherently governmental.” (Peckenpaugh 2003b, 2)
Finding workable definitions for inherently governmental activities has been 
difficult. To one scholar (Light 1999) the critical issue was not whether an activity 
was inherently governmental or not, but whether it was essential to the core mission 
and therefore should remain in-house. The 2003 definitions were aimed at resolving 
prior ambiguities but the problems remained. GAO suggested describing the scope 
of activities an agency had already outsourced to “provide an important perspective 
on and context for agency's operations” (GAO 1999a, 8). But while OMB's 
guidelines for A-76 at the beginning were inadequate despite the tough memoranda, 
their very inadequacy could aid agencies to strategize and protect their core 
functions, even as they complied with the agenda.
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Adaptation in the Era o f Competitive Sourcing
The central research theme of this study is that agencies perceiving the A-76 
initiative as an external threat to personnel, capacity, or survival would try to adapt 
to A-76, using various strategies, including proactive ones and tapping various 
resources to aid their strategies. Agencies faced different levels o f vulnerability in 
A-76, as indicated by their FAIR Act inventories (Table 4). Some agencies had a 
large proportion o f commercial FTEs because o f their missions, but how many of 
those they would eventually bid out were, at the start o f this study at least, subject to 
arbitrary targets. Once, on its web site OMB featured “the good, the bad and the 
ugly,” or what OMB deemed as successes and failures in A-76 implementation. For 
this study, the good, the bad, and the ugly were all relevant in examining agency 
adaptation.
Organization o f the Study
Chapter 1 explains why the implementation o f competitive sourcing policy is 
an important problem for students o f political science, public administration, and 
organization. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on implementation, adaptation, and 
bureau power for theoretical guidance and describes the research themes. Chapter 3 
describes the research design and methodology, including the research challenges 
and limitations.
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Table 4
OMB Estimates o f Agency Commercial Activities
Agency Total Workforce 
FTEs
FTEs Performing Commercial 
Activities
DoD 596,600 410,700
USD A 98,500 46,500
Dol 70,200 33,900





















Source: Data from U.S. OMB 2003a, 5.
Notes: Figures are rough OMB estimates based on initial 2002 inventory
submissions and do not reflect workforce restructuring associated with the 
creation o f DHS. DHS represents 135,206 positions, o f which 8,884 were 
available for A-76 in 2003. OMB and DHS were not on the initial Scorecard.
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The findings are discussed beginning in Chapter 4, wherein a range of 
adaptive agency strategies are described, illuminating the continuum of compliance 
and resistance in policy implementation and the characteristics o f the agencies that 
used them. Chapter 5 highlights a major adaptation strategy o f agencies: creating 
wiggle room and using Congress to gain some discretion in implementation and 
mitigate the policy’s adverse impact. Chapter 6 shows how agencies responded to 
the threat o f competitive sourcing based on the agencies’ actual competitions in FYs 
2003 and 2004. The chapter examines the determinants o f agency response, agency 
strength in particular, across all the agencies and at the micro level. Chapter 7 
examines the important contribution of leadership to agency response. Leadership 
emerges in the study at the nexus o f organizational adaptation and bureau power, an 
intervening variable that pushed agencies toward more or less competition. The 
chapter also highlights the concept o f evolutionary adaptation. Chapter 8 concludes 
by putting the findings in the context o f continuing changes in public 
administration, governance, and democratic control o f the bureaucracy. Some 
thoughts are offered on the challenges facing practitioners and leaders. The chapter 
describes the study's contribution to the literature and recommends areas for further 
exploration.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH THEMES
To understand federal agency responses to policy implementation pressures, 
organization theory must blend with political theory: bureaucratic adaptation needs 
a political, as well as organizational, explanation. This chapter reviews the 
theoretical grounds for studying federal agency adaptation to competitive sourcing 
and develops the key research themes. Policy implementation, bureaucratic power 
and politics, and contingency theories can contribute to a systematic understanding 
o f agency responses to A-76. These theories in turn need to be extended to allow for 
any research evidence that public organizations do not always react as predicted by 
established models.
Assumptions of the Study
The study started with the assumption that organizations such as federal 
agencies act in a rational and strategic fashion. They try to adapt to the pressures 
from their political environment in order to maintain their domain and control their 
mission, resources or capacity. The Bush administration competitive sourcing 
agenda (A-76) posed a threat to the agencies expected to carry it out. OMB could 
penalize the agencies, especially their budgets, if  agencies did not satisfactorily 
comply.
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Agencies would likely comply with competitive sourcing directives if the 
perceived threat was minimal. Other agencies, however, that perceived a bigger 
threat from A-76 would resist implementation. In the middle were agencies that 
would try to make the agenda fit their needs and goals, including bargaining with 
OMB for more flexibility, resources, and performance credit. They could mount an 
appearance o f policy support as they minimized the turbulence from A-76. The 
threat to them could be high but they would fix the implementation to make A-76 
agency-friendly. Finally, the study assumed that where variations in responses are 
observed, the influencing factor would be agency power or strength.
Theoretical Framework
This study is guided by three bodies o f literature to understand the dynamics 
where bureaucratic capacity is at stake in policy implementation:
1. The implementation literature, including studies o f implementation o f policies in 
relation to certain agency characteristics including presidential appointment of 
agency heads, organizational culture, and bureaucratic accountability (Wood and 
Waterman 1991, 1993, and 1994; Koenig 1994; Bardach 1977; Golden 1992);
2. Adaptation literature, particularly the contingency and systems theories 
(Thompson 1967; Katz and Kahn 1966; Evan 1972; Lawrence and Lorsch 1976; 
Miles et al. 1978; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Kast and Rosenzweig 1973) that 
approach organizations with the biological viewpoint of resource scarcity,
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environmental hostility, uncertainty, and ecological determination of 
organizational survival or death; and
3. Bureau power and politics literature that looks at the ability o f agencies to 
succumb to or ward off external threats against the organization (Rubin 1985; 
Rubin 2003; Kaufman 1976), the level of political conflict involved in the policy 
to be implemented (Matland 1995), and bureaucracy’s independent sources of 
power (Rourke 1969 and 1992; Meier 1987).
Together, these thoughts provide the pillars for examining organizational 
strategy, strength, and adaptation in A-76. They complement one another in that 
using only one lens to look at A-76 implementation could yield only a limited view 
o f organizational adaptation to a threatening reform. To use them, the study 
integrates as well as extends these theories, as discussed in the following sections.
Implementation
For a long time, the locus o f policy implementation literature remained in 
the discussion of the theories of the policy process -  formulation, development, 
implementation, and feedback -  whereby studies looked at the “gap” between the 
politicians’ formulated policy and the observed output o f policy administrators or 
implementers (Hill and Hupe 2002). Most implementation studies examined the 
control o f different actors at the top or the influence o f the bottom actors in policy 
implementation (Lipsky 1980; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981) and the delays and 
coordination problems in inter-organizational policy implementation (Pressman and
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Wildavsky 1984). The problematic question often revolved around how much of the 
implementation actions and problems could have been anticipated at the formulation 
stage and how policy makers could have done a better job o f shaping the language 
o f the policy (most policy statements are ambiguous; see Matland 1995), providing 
a bigger budget (Montjoy and O’Toole Jr. 1979), installing more effective agency 
heads, or designing the structure o f the implementing agency in order to arrive at an 
output that better resembled the aim of policy makers (see McCubbins et al. 1989). 
The focus o f these variations often rested on the policy to be implemented, or the 
actions at the top, and not the autonomous interests o f the implementing actors. As a 
result, the literature continues to be limited in that implementation tends to treat 
bureaucratic organizations as somehow interchangeable, with little internal 
variability between them that can arise out of different levels o f power and other 
organizational attributes.
Subsequent studies contextualized implementation within presidential 
ideologies and the historically displayed cultures o f federal organizations. Works on 
agencies submitting to the ideological leanings o f the Reagan administration by 
implementing more tolerant regulation of private business activities (see Harris and 
Milkis 1996) provided glimpses of organizational adaptation to policies that 
bureaucrats either opposed or did not identify strongly with, as well as the political 
tactics o f administrators. Bardach’s early idea o f implementation as “games” 
suggested looking at the players and their adaptive responses:
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It directs us to look at the players and what they regard as the stakes, their 
strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules o f play.. .the rules 
o f ‘fair’ p lay .. .the nature of the communications.. .among the players, and 
the degree o f uncertainty surrounding the possible outcomes. (Bardach 1977, 
56)
However, implementation studies have not carried this kind of examination forward 
enough, leaving it up to the bureaucratic politics and power and organizational 
theories to fill in the dynamics that goes on between political principals and non­
elected agents. For this study, implementation theory must be supplemented to 
answer the research problem because competitive sourcing is critically different 
from other policies in many respects. Unlike legislated programs or executive 
policies that bureaucracy must carry out for constituents, competitive sourcing was 
an initiative directed at the bureaucracy, for implementation within the agencies that 
could potentially result in radical organizational changes. As in any other type of 
policy for implementation, the commitment o f the agencies to obey their elected 
principal was expected, if  not mandated completely. Studying the nuances of 
implementation requires a stronger organizational lens.
Organizational Adaptation
Organization theory is “the natural basis for understanding public 
bureaucracy” (Moe 1994, 18). Montjoy and O’Toole Jr. (1979) observed that 
government policy implementation can be conceptualized as an organizational 
problem, one to which organization theory applies. This research therefore relied on 
organization theories, mainly systems theory and contingency theory, to understand
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A-76 implementation. Systems and contingency theories addressed the conceptual 
limitations o f classical organization thought by putting organizations in a dynamic 
context (March and Simon 1958) where organizations assume competitive and 
learning postures or they risk losing their domain, status, or plain existence. The 
relevance o f these theories to public organizations reside in their emphasis on the 
scarcity o f resources (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976) and the uncertainties, even hostility, 
coming from the economic, political, and social environments that organizations 
cope with.
In this study, bureaucratic reform is framed as a form of environmental 
turbulence from the agencies’ perspective. Systems and contingency theories 
suggest that with various strategies, organizations adjust themselves and constantly 
strive to change internally as the environment changes (Scott 1970). For the federal 
bureaucracy, adaptive or adaptation skills - with the changing orders at the top, 
fluctuating amounts o f financial and human resources, and competition from other 
“organizations that seek to perform the agency's tasks” (Wilson 1989,189) - are 
necessary to avoid extinction. Even when an agency’s functions are continued by 
other organizations (such as private contractors), it can be counted as a “fatality,” 
according to Herbert Kaufman (1991,17). Thus, organizational adaptation theories 
are suitable for understanding the dilemmas federal agencies faced in the Bush 
administration, and their corresponding strategies to ward off threats to their staffing 
and mission. Agencies are not only implementing entities, they may seek resources 
and discretion to implement orders so as to preserve organizational interests.
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The literature’s definitions of “adaptation” -  the process o f accommodation 
(Lawrence and Dyer 1983), organizational adjustment (Kaufman 1991), or 
organizational alignment (Snow and Hambrick 1980) between an organization and 
its environment -  are apt descriptions o f the challenge the agencies met in A-76. 
“Strategies” are defined in the literature as the “links between the intentions and 
perceptions” o f actors in order to get what they want, in the budget arena, for 
example (Wildavsky 1988,101), or the mechanism that guides environmental 
alignment (Snow and Hambrick 1980). Studies on adaptive strategies are 
exemplified by those of Raymond Miles and his colleagues (1978), who developed 
a typology o f strategies and classified organizations depending on their unique 
responses in dealing with environmental and internal problems.
Some modification would be required to make systems and contingency 
theories more useful for this study. The strength of these theories is also their 
weakness. Biological and ecological perspectives theorize that organizations seek 
resources like living beings (von Bertallanfy 1950), that they exist within a 
particular niche where only certain structural forms can flourish, and that adaptation 
occurs through flexibility in horizontal and vertical structures (see Rubin 1979). To 
make the analogy work, organizations only begin to adapt when their survival is 
threatened, not merely their prestige, status, capacity, or control over their mission. 
In competitive sourcing, however, the threat in the abstract might well have been 
against the survival o f bureaucracy as we know it, but the threat was actually more 
on the agencies’ level o f staffing and control over mission and programs.
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The theories also are limited in specifying the kind of adaptive strategies that 
organizations could take in different situations. Systems and contingency theories, 
particularly the population ecology’s ideas (Hannan and Freeman 1977), are 
deterministic in terms o f organizational survival or death that the authors attribute to 
natural selection. In ecological thinking, agencies can only survive if  they adjust 
their organizational structure (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976) according to the dictates of 
the environment. Organizations that do not change their structures are selected out 
of the population. The theory does not allow much for organizational variation in 
strategic devices, which agencies could employ in A-76. Ecological thinking also 
does not anticipate non-rational and proactive strategies (Miles et al. 1978; Perrow 
1986; March 1981) that organizations take to change their own environments. 
Hrebiniak and Joyce’s study (1985) shows that environmental determinism can be 
offset by strategic choice. As Pfeffer (1982) noted, if  an organization successfully 
alters the situation confronting it, compliance may be less necessary in cases where 
the organization is expected to obey certain rules.
Bureaucratic Power and Politics
The theoretical gap left by the two pillars (inability to examine variations in 
organizations and their adaptive mechanisms) and limitations in applicability to the 
research problem at hand (the implementation o f a policy to be carried out internally 
by the federal agencies and the qualitative difference in the nature o f the threat from 
outright death in a population o f similar organizations) required that the study turn
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to the power and politics literature to fill in the gaps in exploring the problem of 
implementing the competitive sourcing policy.
In bureaucratic politics, organizations have varying measures o f power and 
preferences that they seek to promote (Welch 1998) using that power. These 
interests consist o f maintenance or expansion o f organizational jurisdiction, budget, 
and functions. Agencies resist encroachments on their territories because they tend 
to diminish control. A bureau is extraordinarily sensitive to “invasions” o f its zone 
(Downs 1966,215). In competitive sourcing, the agencies’ goal o f defending their 
organizations may be part o f their role as “administrative conservators” (Terry 
2003), a more positive framing of bureaucratic interests against those who would 
like to see bureaucracy diminished.
Public policy implementation is essentially bureaucratic politics (Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1984). Much of the politics revolves around control. “Controlling 
the bureaucracy has become one of the highest imperatives o f democratic politics,” 
according to Rourke (1992, 544). With this control mindset comes different tactics 
to make civil servants toe the line. The concept o f bureau power was recognized 
after public administrators abandoned the dichotomous thinking regarding policy 
and administration (Goodnow 1900) and acknowledged the role o f un-elected civil 
servants in policymaking (Appleby 1949). Bureaucracy has since contended with 
presidential distrust and wariness against perceived accumulation o f agency power 
(Rourke 1992) or encroachment into policy formulation. But even though 
bureaucracy remains an implementer more than policymaker, it retains varying
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measures o f power that it could tap if asked to carry out a threatening initiative such 
as competitive sourcing.
The literature on bureaucratic power and politics suggests that bureaucracy 
responds in ways beyond the completely subservient model o f the old politics- 
administration dichotomy, and the newer thoughts on public choice (see Saltztein 
1992). The implementation literature tends to emphasize control o f the 
implementation process by regarding all of bureaucracy as undermining and 
resistant to the reform agenda of its political principals, by default (Peters and 
Savoie 1994; Aberbach and Rockman 1988). Bureaucracy is “often presented as 
being little more than a source of resistance” (Eisner and Meier 1990,283), but the 
power and politics literature addresses the gaps by dealing with a variety o f 
conditions threatening different public agencies and by looking at various 
mechanisms o f response.
Bureaucracy can afford to adapt in different ways -  resist as well as obey 
presidential agenda, be passive, proactive -  even evolutionary - in responding to 
threats to organizational capacity - because it has power. Interest-group support 
through coalition building and mobilization, political allies in Congress and the 
White House, leadership skills, organizational vitality, size, expertise over certain 
areas o f government, and public support for the agency’s work are some o f the most 
established bases or sources o f agency power (Rourke 1969; Meier 1987; Wilson 
1989; Eisner and Meier 1990; Koenig 1994). Clientelism, a variant o f bureau 
politics literature, highlights the relationship between agencies, their patrons and
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constituents in pursuit o f authority, resources, and policies favorable to the agency 
mission, and as a means o f averting threats (Long 1949; Selznick 1949; Maas 1950; 
Cater 1964). In this competitive sourcing study, agency power is based on historical 
levels o f support and alliances with Congress, media, unions, and other public 
organizations. Civil rights groups (e.g., National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People) and government workers unions, particularly the American 
Federation o f Government Employees (AFGE), were the most vocal in protesting 
against A-76, in alliance with some Members o f Congress.
In the public administration literature, the act o f implementation itself gives 
power to agencies because their function is to “to fill in the gaps o f official policy,” 
and filling in gaps “involves the exercise o f discretion” (Meier 1999, 52).
Discretion, or the “ability to decide how policies will be implemented, is a key 
component o f bureaucratic power” (Licari 2003,276). If the implementation 
literature sees policy ambiguity as a main source o f the gap between what is 
intended and what is realized, ambiguity in the bureaucratic political sense is itself a 
source o f power, as in the case o f regulatory agencies (Wilson 1989, 330). In turn, 
these sources o f power can lead to more funding and personnel resources.
A number o f studies put flesh on adaptation and implementation theories by 
describing a wide array of agency responses to political directives (Spriggs 1997; 
Oliver 1991; Golden 1992) and the different means used by organizations and their 
leaders to cope with conditions o f decline in the public sector (Levine 1979; Levine 
1978; March 1981; Weitzel and Jonsson 1989; Lambright 1998). Some authors
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employed typologies o f strategies. For instance, to examine the degrees of 
conformity or resistance to institutional pressures, responses varied “from passive 
conformity to proactive manipulation” (Oliver 1991,145). Golden (1992) extended 
Albert Hirschman's (1970) concepts o f exit, voice, and loyalty as reactions of 
dissatisfaction or support, in looking at resistance as a dependent variable. To the 
three concepts Golden added “neglect,” following the work o f Lowery and Rusbult 
(1986). Neglect is a type o f cooperative behavior that occurs when there is policy 
disagreement but not resistance, when there is policy ambivalence, or lack o f a 
strong conviction on the part o f the civil servants to support or oppose White House 
policies. Spriggs (1997, 575-576) conceptualized on a four-point scale the 
faithfulness o f agency implementation o f court orders. He called these categories 
defiance, evasion, narrow compliance, and compliance. In the 1990s, Lambright’s 
(1998,259) study o f downsizing at NASA and the Energy Department identified 
three categories o f coping strategies that agency leaders could take: resistance, 
mitigation, and a mixed strategy. Rubin’s works (1985 and 2003) on cutbacks 
during the 1980s and the 1990s demonstrated that federal organizations deal with 
threatening mandates in different ways and that they can obey presidential directives 
to the point o f organizational suicide.
Other authors stressed the various ways organizational threats are dealt with 
as “opposition is rarely a frontal attack” (Lynn and Vaden 1979, 333). Instead, they 
engage in what Rourke (1969, 2) referred to as “guerilla warfare.” Guerilla warfare 
in competitive sourcing, as will be shown in the next chapters, was more an
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umbrella o f strategies than a particular strategy. Levine (1978, 319) also talked 
about “a mixed bag o f tactics intended to either resist or to smooth decline.” A 
bureau chief responding to policy changes could choose to “adapt himself, resign, or 
fight a rearguard action” (Miles 1965, 221). From opposition to compliance to 
engaging in policy change, these studies described government organizations in a 
very dynamic scheme beyond outright obedience or opposition to political 
principals and as actively modifying their environment, going beyond adjustment to 
external demands.
For this study on competitive sourcing, bureau politics and power, then, 
complete the theoretical framework. The implementation literature sets up the 
problem that a threatening mandate (competitive sourcing) emerged and that OMB 
would monitor how the federal agencies complied with the policy. Organizational 
adaptation views the federal agencies as behaving not simply to avoid or obey the 
policy but seeking wiggle room and using different strategies to minimize internal 
disruptions arising from the policy. Bureaucratic politics and power provide the 
agencies with the resources or tools to seek more discretion in A-76, and they frame 
the search for the nexus between strength and adaptation, between organizational 
theory and political theory.
In sum, the framework as described above guided this exploration of 
organizational adaptation to the challenges o f implementing an adverse policy. The 
following are this dissertation’s research themes that are necessary to investigate the 
research problem posed in Chapter 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Research Themes
51
Research Theme # 1
The first research theme is that federal government organizations perceive 
varying types and levels o f threats in implementing the Bush administration’s 
competitive sourcing policy. Charles Levine (1978, 319) defined “vulnerability” of 
government organizations as “an internal property that indicate(s) a high level of 
fragility and precariousness which limits their capacity to resist budget decrements 
and demands to contract from their environment.” As presented in Chapter 1, the 
study describes the threats perceived by the federal workers with regard to 
competitive sourcing. There are several indicators o f vulnerability or perceptions of 
threat. Morale is one -  employees do not wish to lose their jobs, obtained with a 
promise o f security and stability. But rank-and-file employees, even managers, may 
feel targeted by A-76. Thus, an additional indicator o f vulnerability is how intensely 
felt this threat o f loss o f public employment is and how much it dominates 
conversations about the policy. Another is the perception of competitive sourcing as 
a challenge to defend agency mission, core capabilities, and program integrity. 
Agency perceptions may be couched in temporal terms: some may see the threat as 
an ideologically based policy that could vanish with a change in leadership, or a 
long-term threat to institutional integrity, memory, diversity, and capacity.
Agencies may differ in how severe they perceive the threat to be. Those 
crippled from previous downsizing policies may not be able to muster enough
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challenge to OMB pressure, so the pressure to contract out is particularly severe. 
Agencies like DoD may have honed their adaptive processes as a kind of 
organizational learning from experience. Agencies with powerful allies to rely on 
may perceive a lesser threat than less-connected agencies. Some agencies may be in 
a precarious situation if the Bush administration sees them as a partisan target to 
scale their funding and mission down, and the agencies lack countervailing support 
or power. Indeed, the organizational threat from A-76 is a multi-faceted concept 
determined by a mix o f factors, and each agency could define it differently based on 
its unique conditions.
A quantitative indicator o f the A-76 threat, the agencies’ number of 
commercial FTEs, is examined alongside the unique qualitative perceptions. The 
size o f commercial FTEs compared to inherently governmental positions based on 
FAIR Act inventories could indicate the kind of pressure on the organization to 
conduct A-76. Agencies with missions that tend to be inherently governmental are 
less vulnerable to outsourcing initiatives than agencies whose missions could be 
performed largely by the private sector. Wilson’s work (1989, 364) suggests that 
“production and craft bureaus,” or agencies whose outputs are observable and 
measurable, are more susceptible to contracting out. However, agencies that 
contracted out their work significantly before 2001 may have been left with mostly 
inherently governmental functions (e.g., contract management functions) and 
therefore could perform very few competitions even if they desired to. The converse 
could be true as well: contracted-out agencies may feel more pressure from OMB
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
because o f their experience in contracting out and because they have contract 
oversight structures in place. The study investigates these possible influences on 
agency response.
Research Theme # 2
The second research theme is that as adaptive organizations, federal agencies 
respond to the threats and pressures posed by competitive sourcing with a range of 
passive and formal to active and strategic responses. Marissa Golden's 1992 study of 
bureaucratic responses to Reagan’s presidential control provides a very good model 
for this research by describing the nuances of organizational adaptation in adverse 
situations. Studying two federal bureaus, the author found that agency behavior is 
not simply characterized as resistant or cooperative. Instead
the extent o f resistance varies, depending on agency context.. .'Resistance' 
and 'cooperation' are overly broad concepts that differ not just in degree but 
in kind.. .because all resistance is not alike and all cooperation is not alike, 
identifying the dimensions o f these concepts is critical to understanding 
bureaucratic behavior. (Golden 1992, 29, 31)
The second research theme is that federal agencies could take different steps 
to meet their goals in competitive sourcing within the parameters set by OMB. The 
study anticipates a typology o f strategies and responses in competitive sourcing 
styled as a continuum (Figure 3) from compliance to resistance in quantitative and 
qualitative terms.
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Com pliance & Strategic R esistance &
Over-Com pliance Adaptation Environm ental Modification
4......... ♦ ....- ..........♦ .................. • .................. ♦ .... — ..........»
Figure 3. A Continuum of Adaptive Strategies
Some agencies, for instance, could remain passive in A-76, as if  there was 
no threat at all. This results in the agency taking the threat for granted and 
complying readily without raising loud objections. Some agencies could also 
implement the policy in a self-interested way, openly or covertly. Agencies could 
also strategize to win all competitions regardless o f the costs o f competitions and 
potential savings. Additionally, they could try to bargain with OMB to make up for 
low effort in A-76 by good efforts in other areas o f management. An intuitive 
strategy that agencies could take was careful delineation of functions and 
conducting job contests in ways did not break the rules but protected core functions.
Strategies could also include covert tactics to delay implementation.
Agencies could also resist openly by refusing to open up their agencies to 
competitive sourcing. A question budget scholar Irene Rubin asked in Shrinking the 
Federal Government (1985,25) is relevant here. Even if  it is accepted that 
organizations strive to survive amid threats, do federal agencies have what it takes 
to carry out a successful opposition campaign? Rubin’s study shows that even if 
there is a lack o f demonstrated evidence o f agency power to carry out a successful 
opposition campaign, agencies have varying potentials to resist. Even weak agencies
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are not powerless in that they could withhold effort or drag their feet (see Kelman 
2005).
Federal agencies could also strive to change their environment and the “rules 
o f the game.” In the literature, agencies do this by harnessing clientele and 
congressional support. This study anticipates a range o f compliance and resistance 
responses as rational or non-rational manifestation o f organizational adaptation in a 
resource-scarce, highly political setting (Table 5).
Table 5
Anticipated Strategies in Competitive Sourcing





Involves policy adherence, committing to OMB targets, 
complying formally with FAIR and Circular A-76 requirements, 
to the extent that the agency had to cut itself to go through 
contests or get too much contracted out
Strategic Adaptation Involves environmental scanning, uncertainty reducing efforts, 
organizational learning, bargaining for flexibility and credit, 




Involving various forms of evasion, delay and gaming the rules, 
non-implementation and alliance building to change the 
parameters of competitive sourcing policy
Research Theme # 3
The third theme is that federal agencies differ in terms o f strength. 
Differences in strength are based on increasing or stable personnel levels, budgets
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and political ties. Strong agencies are less likely to yield to the threat o f competitive 
sourcing, or more likely to respond effectively to the threat, or both.
The literature suggests that public organizations have varying capacities to 
react to threats because o f their independent bases o f power. Power emanates from 
internal and external sources and agencies rarely lack opportunities or conditions to 
exercise power. Strong or powerful agencies are expected to resist OMB’s 
directives, or adapt effectively to them, while weak agencies are expected to 
comply, or adapt in less effective manner. To see the significance o f power or 
strength in influencing agency response to the pressures of competitive sourcing, the 
research examines indicators o f agency strength such as budget, personnel, 
closeness/loyalty to the White House, and congressional involvement in agencies’ 
A-76 implementation.
Budget and personnel growth
Agencies with stable or increasing budget and personnel levels would be 
better situated to cope with the pressures and bargain with OMB in implementation. 
Severe cuts in budget and staffing before 2001 would suggest a prior lack of power, 
and hence an inability to resist future Executive Office initiatives that could lead to 
decline, such as competitive sourcing.
As a measure, budget size itself may not be significant (Meier 1999) because 
an agency good at extracting resources may lack autonomy in using its budget 
compared to another that has a small but autonomous budget. Budget authority
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growth rates would suggest if  agencies were maintaining, reducing, or increasing 
their resources relative to other units during a time of cutbacks. Being able to 
maintain or increase in the Clinton years would mean that the agency was powerful 
going into 2001. Previously cut agencies might have lost their future ability to resist 
threatening mandates.
The same logic is applied to personnel as basis o f strength measured by 
personnel growth rates under the Clinton Administration. As an initial condition, a 
huge personnel size could exacerbate the A-76 threat (see Theme # 1 ) because the 
bigger slice o f the pie could attract the most attention from a White House intent on 
shrinking the federal bureaucracy. But bigger size could also mean more union 
representation for employees, broader agency programs, and therefore clients and 
political allies to rally on its behalf in case o f a threat (Rourke 1969, Wilson 1989, 
Rubin 1985). Bigger and older agencies are supposed to be harder to influence and 
less vulnerable to change efforts (Koenig 1994; Kaufman 1976) because o f their 
experience and a longer time to cultivate political alliances. As GAO (2000a;
2000b) found, large agencies tended to ignore OMB’s directives, such as inventory 
submissions, in previous administrations. This dynamic is examined particularly in 
the A-76 processes at the Department o f Defense and Department o f Agriculture.
On the other hand, this study examines if bigger agencies complied more 
easily with A-76 because they possessed slack or the capacity to produce slack.
Slack is defined as the “cushion of spare resources necessary for coping with 
uncertainty” (Levine 1978, 316). Implementation politics requires resources
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(Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984) in order for an 
agency to execute public policy with the least amount o f disruption.
Closeness to the White House
The appointment o f key officials is a major instrument to make the agency 
respond to presidential directives (Nathan 1983; Koenig 1994; Wood and Waterman 
1991; Rubin 1985). Reagan utilized appointments more intensively than others 
before him to secure agenda implementation, thereby politicizing the upper echelons 
of the federal bureaucracy (Moe 1985; Peters and Savoie 1994). This strategy was 
also a pillar of the Bush management system. Upon election, Bush was advised that 
the secret to controlling both the management and policy processes was to make 
“appointment decisions based on loyalty first and expertise second” (Nesterczuk 
2001, 9). Political appointees may influence whether a policy like competitive 
sourcing is implemented with more or less vigor by the agency, and more or less 
discretion from OMB. As OMB scholar Shelley Tomkin (1998, 8) noted, an agency 
“headed by a loyal White House insider.. .would tend to be subject to less of OMB’s 
micro-management.”
The study explores if political appointees in charge of the policy steered 
their agencies toward the Bush administration’s goals. Appointees placed in 
historically resistant agencies could potentially clash with careerists in pursuing A- 
76. An administrators' program loyalty often conflicts with the political loyalties of 
appointees. Political leaders often affiliate with the White House more than the
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agency they manage (Heclo 1975; Maranto 1993). But during downsizing, political 
appointees may also decide not to cut their agencies and instead call for cuts 
elsewhere. Leadership in organizational adaptation involves skills in steering the 
agency toward success without antagonizing bureaucracy’s two primary principals, 
the White House and Congress. Appointees usually try to avoid having a 
controversial record in Washington (Maranto 1993) or getting captured by their 
organization (Rubin 1985) so that a middle-road strategy is plausible for many. The 
NASA and Energy Departments’ downsizing experiences show that strategic 
success depends on leadership, timing, and alliances. The study also explores these 
themes.
Congressional support
Congress can be an active player in policy implementation. When it comes 
to contentious policies, bureaucracy is caught between two principals, Congress and 
the president. While OMB controls the budget and supervises operations, Congress 
regulates and scrutinizes anything impinging on agency mission and spending. This 
tug-of-war between the principals led James Wilson (1989,276) to brand some 
agencies “presidential” and some “congressional,” with the latter type having more 
distributional effects in its functions and therefore inviting greater congressional 
attention than the former.
Agencies can and do cleverly adapt. Wilson said the bureaucracy is far from 
the helpless pawn of whatever control measures the president puts in place. When
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presidents are not supportive o f agencies, they “fight back.. .By getting Congress to 
give them the money, the autonomy, and the missions that the White House has 
threatened” (Wilson 1989,274). The confidence o f appropriation subcommittees 
with agencies determines to a huge extent whether administrators and their 
programs breathe easily or not (Wildavsky 1988,105).
Competitive sourcing is an Executive initiative but its implementation draws 
major attention from Congress. As a source o f agency strength, Congressional 
support is already indicated by an agency's budget growth but a more direct 
indicator for this study are congressional bills filed and/or passed in regard to 
agencies’ implementation o f A-76. The study examines the bills and amendments 
from the 106th to the 109th Congresses to analyze Congress’s role in bureaucracy’s 
attempts to create discretion and space in competitive sourcing.
Research Theme # 4
The fourth and final research theme is that agency strength can determine 
agency compliance in competitive sourcing but powerful agencies may choose not 
to exercise their power in policy implementation.
Theme 4 rivals, or extends, Theme 3’s assumptions regarding the 
relationship between agency strength and policy response. It is possible to see 
strong agencies comply while weak agencies resist OMB directives. Theories of 
bureaucracy cast agencies in a resistant posture, especially agencies with traditional 
political backing. The implementation literature suggests that strong agencies would
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be the ones leading any resistance, if  there was any, to Bush’s competitive sourcing 
policy, while weak ones would open up their organization to possible outsourcing.
Organization and PA theories assume that with resource endowment and 
strong clientele relations and support, an agency gains some ability to defy 
principals who impose unwanted policies. But an unexplored theme in the literature 
involves the opposite scenario o f powerful agencies complying and weak agencies 
disregarding or opposing a political directive. This study contributes to the public 
administration literature by looking at these counter-intuitive actions. To explore 
agency strength as an intermediate predictor o f response (degree o f threat based on 
commercial FTEs being the independent variable), and the adequacy o f existing 
theories in explaining adaptation, the study looks at several cases o f strong and 
weak federal agencies.
Visually, agency threat and response can be viewed on a quadrant (Figure 4). 
The assumption is that most agencies with low levels of threat regardless of strength 
would comply. Agencies that suffered from previous downsizing would be passive 
or compliant regardless o f the threat. They would obey because of their weakened 
status. Agencies that faced high threats but with low strength would try to resist, but 
not be successful at it, concentrating instead on internal adaptive strategies rather 
than external ones that would ameliorate the threat, perhaps because they lacked the 
leverage or clientele or support groups necessary to get congressional action. Those 
that were not too weak or too strong would try to find ways to protect their agency 
as they complied.
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Compliance Did strong Igencies comply?







Did weak agencies resist?
Most strong agencies 
w/high threats
Low Threat High Threat
Figure 4 . Threat of Outsourcing and Hypothesized Response
Most agencies that faced high threats but with good capacity to respond 
(high strength) were expected to behave strategically from narrow compliance to 
active resistance in the continuum. Powerful agencies, however, might choose not 
to resist and even over-comply for reasons of loyalty to President Bush and his 
agenda.
Finally, weak or strong agencies that perceived the absence o f a fit between 
competitive sourcing and their missions would try to resist. Strong ones might use 
their power to advance their view while weak ones might resist even without a 
strong power base if  they could rely on leaders to stand their ground. In this light, 
power may not prove to be the only determinant o f agency response.
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter describes the research design and the methods that were used to 
study federal agency implementation of the competitive sourcing initiative. It 
examines the variables for investigation and how they were measured; the data 
needs and research methods employed; the units o f investigation and the cases 
selected for a closer study; the data collection, triangulation, and adjustments that 
were made in the field; the role o f the researcher; and the remaining limitations of 
the study.
Variables for Investigation
The independent variable is the threat to the agency posed by competitive 
sourcing policy, or A-76. The dependent variable consists o f agency responses and 
strategies to implement OMB’s competitive sourcing goals and rules. The 
intervening variable expected to influence the agencies’ response is organizational 
power or agency strength, based on historical levels o f budget and staffing. These 
three research variables were measured using a mix o f qualitative and quantitative 
indicators.
Quantitatively, the study used the agency’s baseline number o f full-time 
equivalent positions (FTEs) that were classified in the 2002 inventories as available
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for public-private competition (Commercial Code B positions, per OMB’s reason 
codes) to measure the threat posed by the policy. This number is viewed in the 
context o f the agency’s size, nature o f mission, and how contracted out it was at the 
beginning of the initiative.
Qualitatively, threat from competitive sourcing is described in elite 
interviews by key informants, primarily agency managers. For example, agencies 
worried about potential loss o f work and personnel to contract, and the implications 
o f that loss, including reduced mission control, capacity, morale, and incentives to 
attract qualified personnel in the future. Vulnerability felt regarding A-76 was 
expected to be greater in hollow agencies (as discussed below regarding “strength”) 
and agencies that lacked skills and resources to conduct A-76.
The dependent variable is the agency response to the threat o f competitive 
sourcing. Quantitatively, response was measured by the total percentage o f the 
agency’s Code B FTEs that were competed in FY 2003 and FY 2004. These two 
years were the years in President Bush’s first term when Congress and OMB started 
publishing annual reports o f completed A-76 activities, at least for the agencies 
included in OMB’s Scorecard. This measure o f the response is meant to capture 
whether agencies actually obeyed OMB’s percentage targets for agencies (later 
prohibited by Congress in 2004). I expected to find that those with the bulk of 
outsourceable FTEs would conduct the competitions whether streamlined, standard, 
or through direct conversion (the type that converts positions to contract for FTEs 
10 and under, without actual competition); that those agencies with less could afford
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to do a lower number o f competitions; and that variations would exist for other 
agencies with a moderate level o f FTEs. The agencies’ response to the policy was 
also indicated by their individual, quarterly scores in the OMB Management 
Scorecard, from red to green over time, since December 2001.
With a qualitative approach, the study explored a range o f agency responses 
from passive to active, from policy support/obedience to resistance, and from 
internal adaptation to external efforts to remove or modify the competitive sourcing 
policy based on the agencies’ perceptions o f threat and strength to meet that threat. 
The study used a typology o f responses, styled as a continuum, to outline these 
responses. To the extent allowed by this dissertation’s confidentiality agreement, the 
agency responses were linked to the department or bureau that used them.
An intervening variable is the agency’s strength. The study assumed that 
variations in agency response, compliance, or adaptation would be influenced by 
how strong or weak an agency was at the beginning o f the implementation o f the 
policy in 2001. To gauge agency strength, the study looked at the agency’s ability to 
withstand cutbacks based on the previous history o f personnel downsizing and 
budget growth from FY 1993 to FY 2000. There growth rates are then correlated 
with the agency’s response, or A-76 efforts in competitive sourcing in the period 
under study. Other intervening variables consisted of congressional actions on 
behalf o f the agency and agency closeness to the White House/OMB. I looked at 
both the Hill initiatives in regard to A-76 implementation and the political 
appointees’ push for A-76 inside their agencies, respectively.
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Overall, each o f these measures was limited. For example, agency size, 
budget, and power could all be measured by other variables. Nonetheless, a 
qualitative discussion o f an agency’s strength based on historical events can provide 
a picture o f organizational ability to resist or comply with a policy that threatens 
domain, control and capacity.
Data Needs
Two groups o f data sources, key informants and documents, supplemented 
each other to investigate the themes. Documents served as the main sources o f 
information on agency context, budget, personnel, and political support. Data 
collection involved A-76 information in print or electronic form from OMB and the 
individual agencies. Congressional sentiments on agency dilemmas with A-76 were 
gleaned from bills, hearings, and interviews. Agency memoranda and reports, union 
reports, congressional documents, industry reports, news, official reports by 
oversight agencies like OMB, CRS, GAO and Inspectors General, and websites that 
pertained to A-76 activities (Appendix C) provided information on threats, 
strategies, and political appointee/leaders’ response to President Bush’s competition 
agenda. Data on agency perceptions o f threat and responses to the policy emerged 
mainly from the qualitative interviews with key informants from OMB, contractors, 
unions, and agencies. These interviews were especially important when A-76 plans, 
implementation, and internal issues were not made publicly available.
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The study attempted to investigate the responses and strategies o f all 26 
federal agencies that OMB had monitored under the President's Management 
Agenda during the first term of President George W. Bush (2001-2004). The study 
explored their perceptions o f policy and responses through key informant interviews 
and documentary analysis. Their observable and/or revealed strategies of 
compliance, adaptation or resistance were aggregated to inform the typology or 
continuum o f responses as described in Chapter 2.
To gain a comparative perspective, agency response to the policy was 
compared with the level o f threat faced. Agencies like DoD, VA, USDA, Treasury, 
Interior, and Army Corps o f Engineers, for example, had higher numbers of 
Commercial Code B (outsourceable) FTEs than many others, while the 
Smithsonian, NSF, OPM, NASA, HUD, and Energy had fewer FTEs for A-76
o
(Table 6). Agency vulnerability could result from the previous decade’s 
downsizing or contracting efforts. The selected cases therefore included those with 
staffing levels and capacities that could be threatened by further outsourcing. In 
Table 6, the third column offers a glimpse o f how they complied by the end o f the 
Bush administration's (first) term, based on OMB-given scores. A quantitative
8 These agencies are discussed more deeply in Chapters 6 and 7 to explore the nuances of adaptation 
behind the quantifiable response of FTEs competed, among agencies with varying strengths and 
vulnerabilities.
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measure o f their performance and a qualitative analysis o f their strategies and 
perceptions are later analyzed together.
Table 6
Mini-cases: Varying Threats and Strengths in Competitive Sourcing
Selected Agencies FTEs for A-76 in 2002 
(% o f Total Workforce)
OMB Scorecard 
(Dec 2004)
Agencies with High Number of FTEs
1. DoD 270,600 (45%) Yellow 
(Green in June 2004)
2. VA 52,600* (23%) Red
3. USD A 35,600 (36%) Yellow
4. Dol 23,000 (33%) Yellow
5. Treasury 18,400(12%) Green
6. ACE 16,500 (59%) Red
Agencies with Low Number of FTEs
1. Smithsonian o** Red
2. NSF 200(17%) Red
3. OPM 600 (20%) Green
4. NASA 3,400 (18%) Yellow
5. HUD 3,600 (39%) Red
6. DoE 4,700 (31%) Green
Sources: Data from OMB 2003a, 10-12,14; OMB Scorecard from www.results.gov.
Notes: *In October 2002, VA created a plan to compete 52,600 positions through a 
modified A-76 process. ** Smithsonian did not declare a single FTE as competable, 
according to OMB.
Research Methods
A study o f agency adaptation like this required an exploratory design with 
ample use o f qualitative research methods. There was a dearth o f research on 
adaptation and politics involved in A-76. Public-private competitions were largely 
confined to DoD and most studies o f A-76 focused on the dollar savings often
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examined in privatization research. How agencies as organizations adapted to a 
policy that could hobble them was a subject that needed to be explored rather than a 
theory that needed to be tested or perhaps modified. With the kind o f research 
question posed, the lack of researcher control over an unfolding process, an 
exploratory design suits this study. The main goal is to find and explain mechanisms 
of behavior and to see patterns and distinctions.
Nonetheless, one o f the study’s goals was to extend or modify existing 
theories based on the results o f investigation. The themes served as tentative 
hypotheses, but the boundaries of the research problem were actually unknown at 
the beginning. These themes required exploratory techniques and qualitative 
methods to “develop pertinent hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry” (Yin 
1994, 5). This study explored implementation strategies and OMB-agency dynamics 
that included: understanding which agencies chose what strategies, how their 
strategies related to strength, and what resources were relevant to agency strategies, 
with what kind o f outcomes. I assumed the role o f investigator, describing an 
unfolding phenomenon and looking for meaningful, testable propositions for future 
research.
Qualitative research methods -  in particular, qualitative interviewing, case 
study and documentary analysis -  were maximized to get the data. The politics of 
A-76 required these methods because agencies differed in potential power, 
perspectives, and strategies. Following studies by Rubin (1985 and 2003), Tomkin 
(1998), and Koenig (1994) o f agency adaptation, OMB-agency dynamics, and
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presidential influence efforts on agencies, respectively, qualitative research methods 
suited the research aim to construct a detailed description and explanation of 
organizational responses and speculate on their relationship with a problematic 
variable, power. In addition, sensitive topics are often best explored in interviews or 
situations in which trust can be built in a relationship. Because competitive sourcing 
was politicized, the sensitivity of the information I sought, including resistance, 
adaptation, or environmental modification when most o f the literature assumed that 
there ought to be nothing but compliance demanded qualitative methods, in 
particular, interviewing.
Qualitative research methods were also suitable because causality might not 
have been in the direction traditionally assumed; agency strength might or might not 
have influenced the responses or strategies taken. Qualitative methods could capture 
this kind o f situation more adequately.
This was also a process study; the policy was being implemented and the 
dynamics o f adaptation was continuing in federal offices when this study was 
conducted. Qualitative research could yield more flexibility in studying an ongoing 
phenomenon that was new to the vast majority in the civilian bureaucracy and the 
public. The use o f qualitative research methods also encouraged the use o f different 
sources o f data to create a more complete picture o f organizations under stress.
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The research also contains a few mini-cases. Case studies tend to use every kind of 
data available. As a result, case study research “allows for the generation of a great 
number o f hypotheses, insights that might not be apparent” to the researcher who 
works with a thinner set o f empirical data (Gerring 2004, 350).
Data Collection and Adjustments in the Field
The research anticipated data-gathering problems arising from the delicate 
nature o f the topic, the wide coverage o f agencies under study, and the distance of 
the student’s base from Washington, D.C. Most o f these problems were ameliorated 
by the access provided by several sources, supplementing one source o f information 
with another, and careful treatment o f qualitative data.
Documentary Analysis
Actual collection o f published data began in the summer o f 2004, while the 
search for informants and actual interviews started in August 2004. Problems were 
encountered in getting accurate FAIR Act inventories, which was not surprising 
given that OMB and the agencies bargained about job classifications from year to 
year, and that within the agencies, employees and management dealt with similar 
issues. Some agencies did not have inventories from 2001 on their web sites; and if 
they did, some agencies did not have inventories for all o f their component units. 
Most requests for copies o f the inventories, even summary statistics for commercial
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and inherently governmental FTEs, were ignored. Some referred me to other 
sources that contained partial numbers.
Information deficit also occurred in the assessment o f the A-76 planning 
stages, the primary venue for bureaucratic politics between OMB and the agencies. 
While a few agencies publicized their competitive sourcing plans and the thoughts 
behind them, some agencies did not, for reasons that included ignoring the OMB 
directive, delaying the planning, or hiding preliminary A-76 plans so as not to alarm 
field employees. The interviews attempted to get answers on matters o f perceptions 
and strategies but in order to address the data (numerical) gaps, information from 
external sources like news magazines, Congress, or GAO reports were tied together 
to create a picture o f  the competitive sourcing challenges faced by particular 
agencies. In a few cases, informants who agreed to provide the information moved 
out of the agencies before I could find a chance to get the information or meet with 
them in D.C.
Qualitative Interviewing
The decision to examine all the agencies in the OMB Management 
Scorecard within a limited time and budget meant that the study could provide 
deeper treatment o f only a few agencies and interview a limited number o f key 
informants. For the interviews, negotiation for access varied depending on the 
potential interviewee’s position in government. Retired agency officials, and current 
union and industry spokespersons granted interviews with little hesitation and in
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some cases referred me to potential interviewees in other agencies. I sought help 
from distinguished professors of Public Administration and members of the 
American Society fo r  Public Administration for introduction to informants. The 
initial list o f contacts contained the names o f competitive sourcing officers of 
different agencies that could be found on their web sites. I e-mailed these officers 
for an interview, explaining the topic, the need for interview to supplement 
published data, the letter o f introduction, confidentiality protocols as approved by 
Northern Illinois University, the flexibility o f interviews, and a possible phone call 
to explain the research further before going through any interviews. Those 
personally referred by the academic network were often individuals other than A-76 
officials and generally in high management positions. I phoned or emailed them 
with the same information. Most o f the actual interviews were granted on the basis 
o f an informant referring me to the next potential informant, demonstrating that a 
researcher does not have to be a Washington insider to get further access, but that it 
is necessary to start the process and get a foot into the network.
A total o f 42 informants from OMB, departments and bureaus, the 
contracting industry, employees’ unions, and interested parties -  including think 
tanks, individual consultants, GAO, current and former officials, and academics -  
were interviewed from August 2004 to February 2006. O f these, eight individuals -  
representing the largest employee union, the service contracting industry, OMB, and 
a few agencies - were interviewed more than once. There were a few who agreed to 
interview but became unavailable when I traveled to their area. The interviews
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generally lasted an average o f 45 minutes, with the longest at one-and-a-half hours 
and the shortest at 20 minutes.
The research aimed to provide a balanced picture from as many sides as 
possible; however, many agencies included in the Scorecard did not grant requests 
for interview, perhaps for fear o f reprisal. This left me to use only external sources 
of data or opinions o f sources outside the agency. Some who said they were pressed 
for time gave referrals, only to have the new persons declare they were not the 
authorities on the subject, or unavailable, themselves. In other words, persons 
referred by persons who refused interviews were likely to refuse themselves, and the 
opposite is true in the case o f successful interviews. This limitation might have 
impaired some of the findings and analysis, but overall, I was able to interview key 
people who knew about particular agency strategies.
As an incentive to grant the interviews, the interviewees were given a chance 
to modify their remarks, add or delete certain comments, and voice their opinions on 
a controversial issue. In cases where the informants agreed to the use o f tape 
recording to back up my notes, the tapes would be destroyed at a certain point 
according to the research protocol. Almost half o f the informants edited or gave the 
go-signal to use their comments, and one had asked for the chance to change their 
remarks at a future time, unless the dissertation had already been completed. The 
rest of the informants did not reply or give any more feedback on their interview 
answers, in which case the verbal agreement was that I could use the original 
information. A few sources wanted their names cited while the rest would rather be
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anonymous in the dissertation, for example with references like “Administration 
Official,” “OMB staff,” “long-time, career federal official,” or “A-76 manager” to 
hide their identities. In a few cases, the sources said I could use their names 
regarding some information but not in others that they revealed. An unintended 
consequence o f anonymity is that even the names of a few agencies sometimes had 
to be masked, especially when the interviewees revealed covert strategies.
Adjustments Made in Data Collection, and Their Impact
The success or limitation of the actual interviews depended on the medium 
used to conduct the interviews, the busy schedules of government managers in D.C., 
the sensitivity o f the questions, and the assurance that identities could be masked. 
Due to the large number o f potential interviewees, the limited time for the research, 
logistical limits, the distance between Washington, D.C. and Northern Illinois 
University where the student worked, and the busy schedules o f government 
managers, many interviews occurred over the phone or e-mail; a few o f the 
informants were able to meet me in Washington, D.C., months after the original 
interview. The long-distance communication might have impaired the kind of 
information provided, losing the advantages conferred by face-to-face interviews to 
establish trust and probe nuances, or to clarify immediately some o f the things heard 
or said. But the fact that these informants were willing to talk to me about a 
sensitive topic over the telephone, and given that these interviews occurred at a 
critical tim e- the campaign had begun for the re-election of President Bush in 2004,
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and the large unions opposing his initiative sided with the challenger, Senator John 
Kerry -  suggests that information gathered from the interviews were as complete 
and honest as they would have been had I been talking to them face-to-face. With 
phoned interviews, the informants and I did not have to work on the opposite sides 
of a large Washington, D.C. office desk that could have given the conversation more 
of an air o f formality. It might have even been an advantage that the informants 
were not face-to-face with a researcher who was not an American national. The 
initial interview questions revolved around the topics listed in Appendix D. They 
were reformulated depending on the interviewee's wishes to speak about certain 
topics above others.
Competitive sourcing and privatization o f government functions are 
sensitive subjects to government employees, managers, and political leaders. Since 
the Reagan Administration, Republicans especially have identified with smaller 
bureaucracies and increasing the private sector role in government. When this 
research started, the Bush administration was facing re-election, the President’s 
Management Agenda threatened to become more intense if Bush was re-elected, and 
the federal worker unions were at the opposite side o f the debate. Collecting data 
about the internal strategies that agencies took to comply with competitive sourcing 
directives proved very difficult.
The promise o f anonymity worked in some cases -  the “real” dynamics 
could, obviously, only be approximated by outside researchers employing different 
data sources -  and in some cases the incentive failed. A potential interviewee
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referred by a previous one, for instance, declared that the research ought to rely only 
on published reports and that opinions should not be relevant to the dynamics that 
might be taking place. This failure to get an interview only proved the sensitivity o f 
the topic.
Role of the Researcher
My role in data gathering was a listener and an observer trying to understand 
organizational adaptation in a very uncertain setting. Informed by the literature on 
how organizations are supposed to behave under cutback management, there 
remained significant unknowns regarding what I could expect to see in that the 
policy was new to many civilian employees and that the threat could be greater 
because o f the regularized competition that the Bush administration was seeking at 
the time. The perceptions o f the key players - their hesitation, cynicism, fear, 
support, or belief in the philosophy behind competitive sourcing - were crucial for 
the study, and the findings chapters provide ample room for their voices to be heard.
Finding the Boundaries o f the Research
Most o f the key concepts were undefined at the beginning and progressively 
developed as they were construed by the key actors in interviews or in secondary 
sources. The idea for the strategy continuum (see Chapter 2) itself arose during data 
collection, when it became clear that all o f the strategies could fit some form o f a 
typology despite the complex variations from one agency to another.
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As I grew more familiar with Washington, D.C. and the issues surrounding 
competitive sourcing, the boundaries o f the phenomenon being explored became 
more defined. From a wide focus on policy implementation issues and fishing for 
facts and figures that could not be handily produced, the research focused more on 
adaptation and the questions narrowed down to topics or issues that informants 
appeared to have felt the most familiarity with or strongly about, giving this study a 
wealth o f descriptive information on which to base future empirical research.
Research Depth and Evidence
The study aimed for dependability using depth and evidence (Rubin and 
Rubin 1995). For depth, qualitative interviews probed details and nuance from the 
key informants. I tried to inform the questions for the succeeding interviews by the 
preceding interviews, cross-referencing the claims and counter-claims, and finding 
evidence for some o f the assumptions implicit in the research themes. To 
compensate for the lack of interviews in several agencies, I performed documentary 
analysis even more carefully to get “glimpses” of the dynamics behind agency plans 
and performance in competitive sourcing. As much as possible, I sought to 
corroborate events or strategies that occurred by other sources o f information, such 
as news articles and reports from the agency and others like OMB, GAO, or think- 
tanks.
While most interviewees received copies o f the themes or topics for 
conversation ahead o f time, they discussed the topics or answered some questions in
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different ways or from different angles. To avoid leading the interviewee during the 
conversation, I sometimes posed the opposing argument, stressed how informants 
were from different sides of the debate, and/or acknowledged the limits of my 
knowledge o f the issue or the dynamics in D.C. There were instances when I sought 
to confirm evidence for the assumptions o f the study and the informants, rather than 
completely debunk the idea just because they did not see evidence in their own 
agency. This helped me see the theme in a different light, for which I was grateful. 
In no instance did I feel that the informants agreed with an assumption they believed 
to be false, however the question was actually posed. If the informant thought that 
the question was not within their purview to discuss, they told me exactly that.
Formalistic answers definitely showed up in some interviews; but these 
might indicate that managers believed that their organization was unique or their 
circumstances were unique, and therefore they resisted attempts to give details of 
their A-76 actions, classify their behavior as compliant or resistant, or describe their 
strategies as anything but following the White House. In these conditions I thought 
o f Snow and Hambrick (1980, 530), who warned that “probably the most significant 
reason that researchers have trouble discerning organizations’ strategies is that 
managers seldom conceive o f  strategy in the same terms as researchers'’ (italics in 
the original). Researchers may come across vague goals and interpret them as an 
absence o f strategy, whereas a vague strategy is actually “politically astute and 
effective management” (Snow and Hambrick 1980, 530). In exploratory research 
using qualitative research methods like this one, researchers ought not to impose
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definitions or typologies upon the subject. Coming up with categories that were 
consistent across interviews proved difficult in this study, and by sorting into these 
categories I might have done slight injustice to one or another strategy that could 
have been classified differently by others. It is hoped that not much o f this occurred 
in the dissertation; but I acknowledge that there might have been some. It is a cost 
o f analysis, as the only alternative was to present only raw data. While “the world 
o f organizations is much too changeable and complex” to allow a typology to 
encompass every form of organizational behavior (Miles et al. 1978, 550), I had to 
group elements that appeared similar in this study.
Despite the formalistic answers, however, qualitative interviewing meant 
hearing between the lines -  did voice or body language indicate differently, did they 
look pressured to voice the Administration line, union line, or agency line, were 
they playing safe against all sides -  and/or using evidence against what was being 
said. Hopefully these observations are evident in the chapters.
Remaining Limitations o f the Study
The units o f research were not a uniform variable. They were all federal 
agencies but they differed in so many ways. Qualitative research addressed these 
variations but some simplifications were done in order to generate a manageable 
picture o f policy implementation and adaptation.
It should be noted that the length of time needed to observe strategic 
adaptation was a limiting factor in this study. Because this study (1) focused mainly
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on policy implementation during the first term of the George W. Bush 
administration, and (2 ) obtained interviews from a limited number o f key 
informants, only some intended and realized strategies could be observed. In fact, 
some o f the strategies observed early on could only be understood in light o f recent 
developments (coinciding with the second term o f the Bush administration, when 
this was written). In addition to the difficulty o f labeling a response different from 
the way agencies could have labeled them, this is a problem of labeling responses or 
strategies when they might still be emerging.
On secondary sources, Snow and Hambrick (1980) cautioned against using 
them exclusively, as the focus might concentrate on the dramatic (see also March 
1981, 564) or newsworthy, strategic situations. This research, however, utilized a lot 
o f newsworthy accounts to bolster discussion of strategies. Care was taken here to 
make sure there was temporal coherence when discussing a particular agency’s 
strategies, despite the gaps between secondary data publication and actual interview 
dates. Analysis o f further developments in the news after conducting the interviews 
was done as needed to shed more light on bureaucratic adaptation.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPLIANCE, RESISTANCE, AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY STRATEGIES
How did federal agencies implement a threatening policy? Was compliance 
a singular behavior and policy resistance its opposite? Golden (1992, 31) once wrote 
that “the bureaucratic world is neither outright intransigence nor blind loyalty. 
Instead, it is nuanced in .. .important respects.” In this study, it is useful to 
conceptualize agency policy acceptance on a continuum. On one end o f the 
continuum, agencies complied completely with the mandate from its principal, 
sometimes going beyond what the rules required (over-compliance). In the middle 
o f the continuum, agencies adapted to the new policy and requirements with 
intermediate responses to create some flexibility and protect agency staff. At the 
other end o f the continuum, agencies employed different tactics o f resistance and 
created alliances to change their environment. I labeled these three categories as 
compliance and over-compliance, strategic adaptation, and resistance and 
environmental modification. In Table 7, each category is associated with the 
dominant actors, the agency discretion and uncertainty in A-76 implementation, and 
the agency’s A-76 goal and possible definition o f adaptive success.
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Table 7






Agency Discretion / 
Certainty
Agency Interests and 












Agency interests can be 
sacrificed; success is 
weathering the turbulence 







some wiggle room in 
implementation
Agencies protect staff 
and organization while 
following the policy; 
success means adapting 













promoted over policy; 
success means changing 
the rules o f the game
Some agencies used a range of tactics at any given time, sometimes with one 
public strategy and another less public, and their reactions varied over time, making 
any simple assessment o f their strategies rigid, at best, and unusable, at worst. This 
catalogue tries to answer the question of what kind of strategies agencies formed, to 
what extent they were acted upon by their environment, and to what extent they 
tried to change it, identifying or characterizing the agency whenever possible.
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Compliance and Over-Compliance 
Definition and Strategies Involved
Compliance is policy adherence or implementing the policy as required by 
the dominant actor, OMB/White House. Agency certainty about the implementation 
outcome was low, unless the agency chose to use only direct conversions. Agencies 
did not have much wiggle room and little or no power was used to resist. If the 
agency was strong, it chose not to use power to resist OMB. Agency goals seemed 
to be either to show loyalty to the White House, to ease the pressure as soon as 
possible, and/or to avoid possible budgetary consequences o f non-compliance, or a 
combination of these.
While I expected compliance by the majority because o f the strong, 
centralized supervision from OMB, a sub-theme that emerged during the study was 
over-compliance or serious compliance. With compliance, an agency’s effort could 
be minimum, as long as the participants in the implementation process acted within 
a context o f expectations that something would happen that bore “at least a passing 
resemblance to whatever was mandated” (Bardach 1977, 50) by the policy. But with 
over-compliance, the agency had to make organizational sacrifices to comply.
Under compliance and over-compliance fall into at least seven types o f responses; 
each is explained below.
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Submitting the inventory o f activities
When it came to meeting the requirements o f the 1998 FAIR Act law, 
most agencies studied, as expected, fell on the compliance point o f the continuum. 
Almost all o f the agencies drew up their lists and submitted them to OMB for 
review; transmitted the final list to Congress; and published it on the Federal 
Register. Based on the interviews, Treasury had merited the highest OMB approval 
for its rigorous inventory process since 2 0 0 2 .
But agencies were “under no obligation to list” those activities that they 
considered inherently governmental (Grasso 2001, 16). Most agencies obeyed OMB 
and submitted lists o f both commercial and inherently governmental activities, with 
written justifications for the way the FTEs were classified. Over-compliance also 
occurred when they sought OMB approval for their lists before transmitting to 
Congress. OMB would send agencies a letter that either said OMB approved or it 
had reservations, according to a source. A bureau official thought that this over­
compliance was due to political loyalty. “OMB does not have to approve our list, 
but the Department reviews it; and people in the Department have some allegiance 
to OMB. So in a way, OMB has an indirect authority to approve our list.” 9
Complying agencies allowed for interested parties such as contractors, 
unions, and employees to challenge the exclusion or inclusion o f certain commercial
9 Interview, name withheld by request, February 8, 2005.
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or governmental activities. Adverse agency decisions could be appealed. In Interior, 
some employees protested their positions' identification as commercial in nature, but 
according to a high ranking official, generally speaking, they ended up denying the 
appeals; there might have been “one or two instances” when Interior management 
decided the employees were right. 10 Such rejection was in line with a GAO study of 
FAIR Act appeals in 2000 (GAO 2000a, 2) that only a small number o f appeals and 
challenges were successful (about 3 appeals out o f 96, and 20 out o f 332 
challenges). To the extent that the lists bore OMB’s stamp of approval, agencies that 
did not make substantial changes to their FAIR list o f commercial functions were 
compliant (or over-compliant).
Publicly committing to OMB’s A-76 targets
A mark o f policy compliance is publicly signifying commitment to policy. 
Table 8 indicates which agencies gave OMB their commitment in 2002. Commerce, 
General Services Administration, Interior, Justice and Office o f Personnel and 
Management committed to the target number o f FTEs to compete ahead of others, 
becoming the “top agencies” by OMB’s own ranking, while Energy and State were 
the last ones to commit to numerical goals.
What was a common denominator among the “top” agencies? It could not 
have been their proportion o f outsourceable FTEs to total workforce in the 2002
10 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
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baseline because agencies like the Small Business Administration, Education, Army 
Corps, Defense, and Housing and Urban Development had more than these “top” 
agencies. In terms of absolute number o f outsourceable FTEs, DoD, USDA, 
Treasury, and DoT also had a lot more. One could speculate that this “public” 
commitment was the leaders’ symbolic support to the newly-installed administration 
in an effort to “out-loyal” others.11 Eventually, some o f them followed through on 
their commitment while some did not. What Table 8 says is that some agencies 
signified commitment early.
Preparing and submitting A-76 plans
Most agencies submitted “Green Plans” to OMB to achieve green in the 
Scorecard (Appendix A shows the scoring criteria). The document spelled out multi­
year plans to subject their functions to A-76. Agencies commonly planned a number 
o f A-76 reviews for four years, but some planned beyond 2004. According to OMB 
sources, some agencies had eight-year plans. 12 Over-compliance occurred when 
agencies tailored plans to numerical targets that were subsequently outlawed by 
Congress.
11 It could also have been simply a result o f the amount it was taking some agencies, especially the bigger ones, 
to assess the potential impact o f  competitive sourcing on their mission and personnel, so that they could not 
immediately give OMB their commitment.
12 Interviews with Omar Nashashibi and David Muzio, September 13, 2004.
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Table 8
OMB Ranking o f Agencies According to Commitments in 2002
Type of Commitment 
Given in 2002
Agencies Outsourceable FTEs as 
% of Total Workforce
Top Agencies 1. Commerce 18
2 . GSA 37
Top agencies had committed to 3. Interior 33
meet the 15 percent goal and 4. Justice 3
created offices and incentives to 
make the program go forward
5. OPM 20
First-Tier Agencies 1. Agriculture 36
2 . Defense 45
First-tier agencies had pledged to 3. Education 62
meet the goal; OMB was 4. EPA 2
working with them to develop 5. HHS 17
more detailed plans. 6 . HUD 39
7. NASA 18




12. Veterans Affairs 3
Second-Tier Agencies 1. Energy 31
Second-tier agencies had yet to 
commit to the goal.
2 . State 10
Source: Govexec.com 2002, 1.
Notes: The labels and ranking represented OMB's informal working assessment of 
agency plans in 2002; the plans were still being modified. Homeland Security was 
not yet in included in the OMB Scorecard at this point. The Corps, OMB, SBA, 
SSA, and AID had not yet been reviewed at this point.
To monitor how the plans were carried out, OMB put a progress column to 
the Scorecard. The column was there, according to an OMB official, to show an 
agency had the momentum: “It's a valuable piece o f information to know, 'Is this
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agency taking the problem seriously?' And that is the sort the progress score tries to 
catch: are they working hard at it? ” 13 At the Internal Revenue Service, which won a 
Presidential innovation award, the A-76 Director believed that agencies could get 
credit for starting, having a plan, a program office, and if  the agency had visibility.14
Creating A-76 offices and spending agency funds
A majority o f agencies complied with the Circular by appointing 
Competitive Sourcing Officials. Some agencies put A-76 management in existing 
offices and simply added the function on top of, say, the Chief Financial Officer’s 
responsibilities. Many staffed key positions and provided the office with some 
funding to get the operations started. But some big agencies like DoD, Energy, 
Interior, HHS, Commerce, and Treasury seriously complied by creating new 
structures, oversight bodies and steering groups, and their own FAIR Act inventory 
systems (Appendix E).
Funding issues followed the staffing o f A-76 offices. Table 9 lists the 
agencies, led by DoD and Treasury, with the biggest Fixed Costs15 or the costs of 
providing central direction and oversight for A-7616 in FY 2004. There were no data 
available for FY 2003.
13 Interview with Mark Weatherly, September 9,2004.
14 Interview with Raymona Stickell, September 10,2004.
15 A different measure o f  spending, the Incremental Cost, varied as some agencies did not collect the data.
16 Fixed costs include “the cost o f FTEs that are fully dedicated to managing the competitive sourcing initiative 
at the agency and any contract support costs associated with this effort,” excluding the cost o f  FTEs or contract
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Table 9
Agency Spending on A-76
90
Agency $ Fixed Costs 
(FY 2004)
Scorecard Status as o f 
December 2004
DoD 21,983,314 Yellow (Green in June 
2004)
Treasury 3,207,266 Green























Source: Data from OMB 2005b, 40.
support or out-of-pocket (incremental) costs for conducting the contests. OMB admitted that some agencies 
were not collecting information on fixed costs in a  systematic fashion (OMB 2005b, 31).
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For FY 2004, as expected, the ones with the most outsourceable FTEs also 
spent the most; however, State, EPA, and NASA did not have a lot o f outsourceable 
FTEs and yet they had some o f the highest costs in FY 2004. Possibly, other mid­
sized agencies spent a lot during FY 2003 and EPA did not; but since EPA had 
delayed conducting most o f its competitions until FY 2004, it stands out in Table 9. 
All else being equal, the heavy spending by some agencies despite budget scarcity 
for A-76 was a serious indicator o f obedience because the money-saving promises 
o f A-76 were under dispute. It could mean that agencies took the money away from 
other programs. Some managers spoke of the challenge of looking for A-76 funding 
as “pulling money out o f our hide” (PSC 2004,12). Over-compliance in this matter 
meant refusing to go to Congress to ask for money despite the burden and toeing the 
OMB line that A-76 should be funded out o f their management funds, according to 
some interviewees. 17 As a result, reprogramming issues were raised often in 
Congress (see more discussion o f Congress in Chapter 5).
Conducting the competitions
Many agencies scrambled to meet their Green Plans, or Yellow Plans since 
some could not, by law, actually conduct A-76.1 expected to find that those with the 
bulk o f Code B FTEs would conduct A-76, that those agencies with less could
17 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004. Interview with an OMB budget examiner, name withheld 
by request, September 9, 2004.
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afford to do a lesser number o f competitions, and that variations would be found in 
the middle.
Table 10 shows that six agencies did not complete any competition in 2003 
and 2004. The NSF, AID, OMB, and Smithsonian, which had fewer FTEs 
compared to the rest o f the 26 agencies, avoided competing for a long time but so 
did HUD and the Army Corps, which had a lot o f outsourceable FTEs. These last 
two stand out in Table 10 for their apparent lack o f commitment. Although both 
announced one contest each, neither was completed in FY 2004. The rest o f the 
agencies completed several competitions. As an indicator of their support to the 
President’s agenda, OPM (61%), HHS (31%), and GSA (25%) led the agencies with 
the highest proportions o f competed FTEs to their total outsourceable FTEs.
Heavily contracted-out agencies like OPM, NASA, EPA, and DoE also competed a 
significant number o f their FTEs. Noticeably, OPM alone competed out more than 
50 percent while five agencies did more than 15 percent each. Two (NASA and 
USDA) o f these were at yellow by the end of President Bush’s first term, meeting 
their target FTEs for A-76 after some negotiations and controversies.
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Table 10




FTEs in Completed 
Competitions in 
FYs 2003 & 2004
(C)




Score by December 
2004
OPM 366 61.00% Green
HHS 3,480 31.07% Green
GSA 1,301 25.00% Green
NASA 602 17.70% Yellow
USDA 5,416 15.21% Yellow
EPA 51 12.75% Yellow
DoC 506 10.54% Yellow
DoE 402 8.55% Green
DoL 222 8.53% Yellow
ED 230 7.93% Yellow
SBA 229 7.89% Yellow
Treasury 1,351 7.34% Green
Dol 1,641 7.13% Yellow
DoD 18,366 6.78% Yellow
DoJ 173 5.08% Yellow
State 33 3.30% Yellow
DoT 329 2.76% Green
SSA 102 2.55% Yellow
DHS 151 1.7% Yellow
VA 276 0.53% Red
HUD 0 0 Red
Smithsonian 0 0 Red
OMB 0 0 Red
Army Corps 0 0 Red
AID 0 0 Red
NSF 0 0 Red
Sources: Data from OMB 2005b and OMB 2004a for column B; OMB 2003a, 5,14
for column C; OMB Management Scorecard for column D.
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Agencies over-complied in conducting competitions in four ways: first, by 
doing A-76 despite having contracted out a lot o f existing commercial functions. 
Heavily contracted-out agencies like DoE and OPM appeared to have over­
complied. In DoE’s case, achieving green ahead o f many others when it was already 
doing most of its work through contract was remarkable. DoE complied the way 
OMB envisioned, it seemed: competing despite having not many in-house 
employees left, projecting savings and adjusting its budget request in anticipation of 
the savings. As suggested by its Chief Financial Officer Bruce Carnes:
Even though at DoE we perform our mission largely through contractors, we 
have still found competitive sourcing opportunities...We expect to achieve a 
25 percent cost savings in each o f these (studies).. .and have factored the 
cost savings into our FY 2004 budget request and five-year budget plan . 18
In comparison, OPM’s compliance, based on Table 10, was incredible 
because it was previously downsized and many o f its functions contracted out (a 
strategy examined more deeply in Chapter 6 ). OPM was only spared from further 
getting contracted-out by winning all its contests. OPM is in marked contrast to 
NSF, which did not conduct any contests throughout the first Bush term.
Second, trying to meet the OMB-set targets despite a congressional ban was 
over-compliance. At the Department o f Homeland Security (DHS), controversy 
erupted when news came out that OMB urged officials to complete their
18 White House updates on the President’s Management Agenda. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/departmentuDdates05.html
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Information Officer (IIO) studies before the 2004 presidential election, presumably 
in time for OMB to report the achievement. A letter to the DHS Secretary by 
several Members of Congress on June 15,2004, noted that “the decision to conduct 
the competition at least partly grew out o f Department officials’ desire to comply 
with numerical goals.. .imposed by the Administration” (Lieberman 2004a, 1).
Third, a powerful indicator of serious compliance was the extent to which 
agencies reduced their staffing levels in order to meet targets and compete with a 
fair chance o f winning. Responding affirmatively to a presidential initiative could 
mean decline for agencies (Kaufman 1976; Rubin 1985). Even though OMB had 
denied that A-76 was a downsizing measure, they acknowledged that it could lead to 
a trimming o f personnel. GAO (2001a) had warned at the outset that A-76 saved 
primarily by reducing the number o f federal workers.
The study found evidence o f this shrinking effect in that both civilian and 
Defense agencies cut staffing levels to go through A-76. IRS cut 218 technology 
service employees to win one o f its competitions in 2004. At Energy, 63 positions 
were cut for a financial services contest; at the National Institutes o f Health, 468 
jobs were cut in two competitions in 2003. Interior, Transportation, OPM, and 
USDA had all cut jobs to mount bids. At the Forest Service, 500 information 
technology positions were cut in the winning government bid that consolidated data 
center operations in 2004 (Perera 2004a). This trend mirrored DoD, where winning 
employees had to cut 44 percent o f their FTEs (Table 11). Winning contractors, in 
comparison, proposed to cut only 28 percent from the previous levels. These figures
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signify the drastic reduction in federal employment to keep the work in, 
demonstrating GAO’s point.
Table 11
Winning In-House Bidders Reduce Staff by more than 44 Percent












% Decrease from Civilian 
Authorizations to FTEs in 
Winning Bids
In-House 525 41,793 23,253 44%
Contractor 667 23,364 16,848 28%
Total 1,192 65,157 40,101
Source: Data fom Gansler and Lucyshyn 2004,24.
This “resultant drive toward self-preservation” (Handy and O ’Connor 1984, 
3 ,6 ) in A-76 clearly pushed agencies to accept some downsizing in lieu o f total 
outsourcing. The idea behind cutting FTEs was to minimize the agency’s losses, a 
tactical response, according to a long-time observer o f A-76:
And so, in those cases where the government proposal was more dramatic 
than any of the commercial bids, I think the idea was, if  they did that they 
would keep some jobs, whereas if  they lost they would lose ALL the jobs . 19
Some agencies, in their desire to win, instead o f cutting staff lowered the 
grade scales o f employees in their bids. USDA, Labor, and OPM were a few that 
used this strategy. This was over-compliance, as it entailed sacrifice on the part o f
19 Interview with William Lucyshyn, September 8, 2004.
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some employees. In one agency that already had a large amount o f their work 
contracted out, the strategy was described by an OMB source in this way:
They had 13 positions- three or four o f those positions were empty so that 
seven or nine people were doing the work -  and in order to make them more 
competitive the MEO (in-house team’s staffing plan) said, ‘We’re going to 
say we have 13 positions. There are nine o f us now.’ Let’s just say they were 
GS 9 to 13... .The MEO lowered it to make themselves more competitive. 
‘We’re going to lower the scales, we’re going to change to GS 7 to 11’.. .If 
you want to stay in that job, you probably have to take the cut to stay 
competitive. From that perspective, I don’t think that is fair. You do your 
best.. .But that is what a lot o f agencies have to do to make themselves more 
competitive. They are having to scale back the numbers -even though they 
w in.. .They eliminated a lot o f positions that were included in the study 
initially, to make themselves more competitive.20
This indicates how big the pressure was for this agency or how strongly the 
agency’s leaders pushed A-76 regardless o f the agency’s hollowed-out condition.
Fourth, some over-complied by using direct conversions. Direct conversion 
was somewhat similar to direct contracting out o f new work (work not performed 
previously by federal employees) because both avoided the competitive route. But 
even if  direct conversions involved groups o f 10 FTEs or less, the practice did not 
protect staff because it still resulted in more outsourcing. Like the downsizing effect 
o f A-76, outsourcing as the goal was nevertheless debunked by Matthew Blum of
20 Interview, name withheld by request, September 10, 2004.
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OMB-OFPP, who stressed that the thrust o f A-76 was to find the most efficient 
performer.21 The 2003 Circular eventually disallowed conversions without approval.
Some went to the extreme by directly converting positions to contract even 
after it was disallowed. I was unable to verify if  all were approved by OMB, but 
AFGE cited instances like the EEOC Call Center’s jobs that were contracted out 
even though federal employees were performing them. “EEOC never bothered to 
get a waiver,” according to AFGE’s lobbyist John Threlkeld. “Because o f arbitrary 
in-house personnel ceilings direct conversion happens all the time.” 22
The case o f Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) showed how 
some, when they ran out o f the option to use direct conversion under the 2003 
Circular, still opted to contract out by justifying that the functions consisted o f new 
work to make it legitimate under the rules. According to Threlkeld:
DFAS has been trying to get out o f A-76 altogether. They just want to be 
able, when they do not want to keep the employees and contract out.. .And 
DoD won't discipline them, OMB won't discipline them .. .What DFAS will 
do, other agencies will do, because they will say, “this work is new even 
though we are performing it.” They say, “it is new because we are going to 
perform it differently.” But if  you go to the A-76 Circular, it says it does not 
matter how the work is going to be performed, if  it had been performed by 
government employees, you've got to do a competition.. .If (their argument) 
was admitted, then agencies could contract out everything.23
21 Interview with Matthew Blum, April 6, 2005.
22 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23, 2004.
23 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23, 2004.
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Note that direct conversion also falls under strategic adaptation (the next set 
o f strategies) when the agencies used it to increase discretion or ease off pressure on 
the larger organization or meet A-76 goals in a less costly way.
Clearing A-76 reports with OMB
Agencies must report annually to Congress its A-76 activities. Over­
compliance occurred when agencies had to go through OMB in preparing the report. 
According to an OMB official, the agencies would send OMB a draft o f their 
information to review. For instance, OMB Memorandum 06-01 instructed that 
agency reports (including transmittal letters) must be cleared by OMB prior to their 
transmission to Congress. All agencies' testimonies in Congress on A-76 ought to 
come from OMB and agencies had to “discuss the Bush administration’s position” 
on competitive sourcing.24 As agents, this was true obedience to principals to the 
extent this was done. In fact some managers who criticized OMB’s approach voiced 
the theme o f how, despite their reservations, the White House goal was really to 
save some money.
Praising and internalizing the president’s agenda
When a policy such as A-76 generates so much controversy, heaping praises 
on it stands out as a sure sign of loyalty, commitment, and compliance. An official
24 Interviews with Omar Nashashibi and David Muzio, September 13, 2004.
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from one of the first agencies that scored “green” remarked that criticism o f A-76 
was just “press garbage,” and that the Circular was actually reasonable, for example, 
in terms o f that day's debate on employees' standing to protest A-76 awards.25 Such 
concordance was echoed by arguments that A-76 saved. Support was similarly 
displayed by EPA’s Chief Information Officer Kimberly Nelson, when she praised 
the OMB's scoring system, as “the best thing I've seen in a long time” (Perera 
2004b, 1). Yet another mark o f concordance was integrating A-76 plans with 
appraisal systems for senior managers. As a Bush administration official explained, 
“that is probably the only way you get things done -  by holding people accountable 
for it. Employees at the NIH, for example, were asked to sign and return within a 
day an addendum to their performance plan contract. The addendum included the 
objective o f completing the fiscal year 2003 competitive sourcing program (Akaka 
2003, 2).
Energy, Treasury, and Interior were a few of the agencies known to have 
assessed their managers in their implementation o f the initiative. Mimicking OMB, 
Interior in 2002 developed scoring criteria for its bureaus, according to Deputy 
Secretary Steve Griles. Another big agency that used internal scoring was 
Homeland Security. The SBA created an Execution Scorecard to monitor its own 
progress.
25 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
26 Interview with an OMB official, September 9, 2004.
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Strategic Adaptation: Creativity Within the Limits 
Definition and Strategies Involved
“Each federal agency has to weigh the aspect o f saluting their commander 
President Bush and trying to correctly do what he wants yet trying to save jobs,” 
observed a long time administrator28 (see also Dudley 1990,488). Strategic 
adaptation moves away from a subservient posture to one that balances obligations 
to the policy with the mission and needs o f the agency. The desire for self- 
preservation is higher. In A-76, agencies tried to add to existing discretion to 
achieve more certainty. They bargained to protect the organization while keeping an 
appearance o f adherence; for example, in AFGE’s words, “going slow without 
incurring wrath” 29 from the White House. Agency strength in the compliance/over­
compliance level was either absent, low, or not exercised. In Strategic Adaptation, 
agencies hinted at their power by boldly approaching OMB. It was possible that at 
this point (strategic adaptation) some form o f agency resistance began.
Falling under the adaptive strategies are five types of action. They mirror 
NASA chief Daniel Goldin’s mitigation strategy, involving anticipation, planning, 
and adaptation during the cutting years o f the 1990s (Lambright 1998,261-262).
27 White House updates on the President’s Management Agenda.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/departmentupdates07.html (accessed on December 3, 2004)
28 Interview with Dale Yielding, November 8,2004.
29 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23, 2004.
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This leader turned threats into opportunity by using subtle tactics that avoided 
confrontation.
Scanning and anticipatory action
In order to align their strategies and reduce uncertainties, agencies tried to 
figure out the costs and benefits of compliance, what kind o f pressures or leeway 
others were getting, how they dealt with pressure, and what techniques they used to 
do A-76 with the least disruption. They tried to anticipate OMB demands. I also 
came across the role o f intuition and sensemaking (Weick 1995). Agencies strived 
to measure their responses to match the OMB pressure or expectations. They 
watched for what kind o f A-76 competitions others were running. Comments like 
these during the interviews were suggestive:
You mentioned Smithsonian; I noticed that in their FAIR Act 
inventory...they have said they have no position suitable for competition. 
That is interesting. I don’t know how much pressure they are receiving on 
that.30
One of the cases that we have made to OMB is that.. .what we see is a lot of 
organizations in government running competitions for functions that (this 
agency) has been running through contracts for years and years.31
I’m kind o f shocked when I look at what’s been done by other agencies -  to 
see that some agencies have still had civil servants mow the lawns.. .it has 
been inconceivable to me that those kinds o f functions had been retained in- 
house. . .How were they able to retain those functions since the Reagan 
years? 32
30 Interview with a career federal manager, name withheld by request, November 4,2004.
31 Interview with a competitive sourcing manager, name withheld by request, October 14, 2004.
32 Interview with an agency manager, name withheld by request, November 4, 2004.
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Agencies were aware that they had no other model than DoD of what or 
what not to do. Numerous GAO reports evidenced the burdens and limited savings 
from A-76 in military installations and some interviewees said that they were 
actually familiar with those findings. It therefore encouraged them to know to what 
extent imitation could occur, as an official explained: “We knew that A-76 as DoD 
was pursuing it was not what we wanted to do at Interior... .So we knew we had to 
come up with a less expensive and faster approach.”33
Against the backdrop o f flat budgets, agencies listened for stories o f the 
trouble A-76 brought others. They used the information to justify a careful approach 
and avoid wasting money. Sources cited how much they knew A-76 studies had cost 
other agencies. For example, an A-76 manager from a small agency said:
We have heard, and based on the lessons learned and benchmarking other 
agencies, w e’ve been told it costs about $8 ,0 0 0  a position on a standard 
competition and about $2,000 to $3,000 minimum, per position, for 
streamlined competition if  the government goes ahead and does an MEO .34
Another form o f anticipatory action was figuring out whether responses 
would in fact be met with penalties or rewards from the White House. A manager 
from one agency candidly remarked, “So we're red. What is the downside of being 
red in competitive sourcing for us? Come to think o f it, there really isn't one.” 35 
One o f the threatening aspects o f the policy, as discussed in Chapter 1, was the fear
33 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
34 Interview, name withheld by request, November 4,2004.
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set early on in the initiative, when Mitch Daniels was still the OMB Director, that 
budgets could be cut for resisting A-76. A 2002 report regarding the Coast Guard 
(Peckenpaugh 2002b) revealed that the anxiety was well founded at that time. A 
different view emerged in 2004, however, as my interviews went on, perhaps 
because the anxiety had died down a little, and elections were looming. As a long­
time manager explained to me:
The only thing that causes your budget to take a hit is when the 
Appropriators pick on your budget in the federal government. And don’t let 
anybody tell you anything different. You know, if  you get bipartisan support 
on the Hill, among your appropriations committees, and we do, all this other 
stuff really becomes an exercise.36
Chapter 5 looks more closely on the role o f Congress in A-76. The quote above 
supports the view that when there is legislative support for the agency mission, even 
a presidential initiative could become an “exercise” without substantial 
repercussions.
As a final example o f scanning, an A-76 official in a big agency stressed that 
streamlined competitions, despite the huge costs they entailed were favored by all, 
even by OMB, which had criticized the practice, because “all OMB cared about was
35 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15, 2004.
36 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15,2004.
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• • ♦ 0 7basically their statistics.” Such perceptions are vital to organizational adaptation, 
as subsequent discussion will show.
Organizational learning
Because the threat o f losing was so huge, when agencies realized that they 
would not get enough A-76 training or funds they adapted by learning the ropes 
with help from old hands during the initial years. Resisters in 2002 not only cited 
the lack o f technical knowledge among civilian agencies in A-76. One o f the 
ironies o f A-76 is that it requires agencies whose contract management capacity had 
declined with the downsizing of acquisition specialists (Bandera and Chin 1998) to 
write good solicitations and bids to keep the jobs in-house. As a Contracting Officer 
revealed, “Employee morale was low because doing business based on market- 
based concepts was new to many of them...many HR and Contract personnel needed 
to be trained very quickly as the competition process was unfolding.”38 
Additionally, in the past, some DoD managers made “an almost universal complaint 
that they were left to fend for themselves without the benefit o f lessons learned from 
others.” They said that in hindsight they would have prepared their bid differently 
knowing what they know now (Handy and O ’Connor 1984,4-5).
One way the agencies tried to reduce uncertainties was to recruit former 
federal officials from the Army, Navy, Air Force, or GSA. Agencies recognized that
37 Interview, name withheld by request, September 24,2004.
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these experts would know the ways to meet OMB’s demands and at the same time 
win contests. According to Interior official Scott Cameron, it was not surprising that 
alumni o f DoD were scattered around most federal agencies for the A-76 work.39 In 
addition to DoD alumni, private consultants helped civilian agencies to mount bids. 
Unions and Congress would later blow the whistle on expensive consultants, but 
hiring them partly indicates the pressure that A-76 created. Some even invited staff 
from other agencies to sit on their PWS Team. Agencies also created an informal 
group to discuss A-76 together. According to sources from the agencies and OMB, 
the group met every month and traded “stories and nightmares and ideas” on A-76. 
They talked about their challenges and experiences to “help each other out.” Such a 
collective enterprise allowed participants “to get information passed between the 
various agencies on an informal basis, without anybody being held accountable” for 
what they shared.40
Creating wiggle room
The service contracting industry association once criticized the “disparate 
processes being used at different agencies” in A-76 (PSC 2004, 13). This 
appearance o f inconsistency or disparity, in hindsight, was probably masking a
38 Interview, name withheld by request, October 19 2004.
39 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
40 Interviews with Omar Nashashibi and David Muzio, September 13, 2004; Interview with Scott Cameron, 
September 13, 2004; Interview with Raymona Stickeli, September 10, 2004.
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flurry o f adaptive, strategic responses by the federal workers, especially since OMB 
was getting “schizophrenic” in implementing competitive sourcing.41
Creating wiggle room involved at least three strategies. One, against public 
humiliation and the threat o f budget cuts if  performance in A-76 was lower than 
what the White House expected, agencies began to bargain with OMB to get some 
credit for the Scorecard. Two, they used direct conversions to ease the pressure and 
create some breathing room in A-76 spending. Three, to get some flexibility, 
agencies asked for more resources and buyout authority.
Only slightly more than a third o f the agencies achieved green at the end o f 
Bush’s first term. As soon as OMB publicized the scoring mechanism, several 
managers argued that the Scorecard was simplistic and its criteria were 
unreasonable and inapplicable in certain cases. OMB, they said, was applying a 
simplistic, one-size-fits-all assessment o f agencies facing different challenges, and 
that the Scorecard could not reflect enough what they were going through in A-76. 
EPA, along with the USAID and NSF, collectively voiced out their view o f the 
Scorecard’s inadequacy as a performance measure (Perera 2004b). Others argued 
that OMB should not have held it against them that they faced obstacles, such as 
legal blocks or few competable FTEs, to get to green. The NSF, for example, did 
not have enough numbers in its inventory to conduct a standard competition (for
41 Interview with an agency manager, name withheld by request, November 4,2004.
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more than 65 FTEs), an OMB requirement to get to green. The same could be said 
for other small agencies like the OMB itself.
Legal safeguards in the U.S. Code, on the other hand, barred the Veterans 
Affairs from doing A-76. Some 52 percent of its blue-collar workers in food service, 
housekeeping, and grounds maintenance -  jobs particularly vulnerable to A-76 -  
were veterans. VA's A-76 chief noted that they would remain red unless OMB 
allowed them to do some other things that did not require the studies (Perera 
2004b). Though no fault o f the agency, OMB's Scorecard penalized VA with a 
“red.” Asked how OMB would deal with those barred from doing A-76, an OMB 
source simply replied, “They won't get to green.”42 But the VA’s Chief Financial 
Officer thought that if  officials realized that there was no possibility o f earning 
higher grades in the Scorecard, they would likely get frustrated and give up (Gruber 
2004a). He insisted that it was difficult “to compare the red from one agency to 
another” (Perera 2004b, 1).
At least two agencies interviewed appealed the scores they received in one 
quarter in 2004. An official in one heavily contracted-out agency tried to get OMB 
to give them green for the following quarter. This agency gave OMB a list of 
milestones and the agency’s position was they had met all those milestones, except 
for making the source selection, which would be done by the end o f that year. The
42 Interview with Omar Nashashibi, September 13, 2004.
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official said, “And if  everything else is on schedule, why couldn’t we move ahead to 
go to green? That's our position. OMB does not necessarily see it that way.”43
According to IRS, part o f the dynamic o f greening was that education: they 
needed to sit down with OMB and show them how the IRS was different:
If you are an agency with 100,000 positions, you are different from an 
agency that has 200 positions. And if you are running competitions for 5 to 
15 FTEs, how much is that different from running a competition for 500 
FTEs? And OMB understood us... we continuously have dialogue with 
OMB about all the progress: where we believe we are making progress, and 
then we share with OMB what the barriers and obstacles are.
Other agencies appealed in the context o f having contracted out in previous 
periods. Another manager decried what he saw as the unfair advantage being 
enjoyed by those agencies that had kept a lot o f commercial FTEs over the years:
What we have been trying to say is, 'All o f those low-hanging fruits, if  you 
will, for competitive sourcing we've already taken care of. We should be 
getting a little bit o f slack for having done all that years ago. And until you 
have got everybody else caught up with u s .. .you ought to consider leaving 
us alone.45
At this point it emerged that “slack” contributed in adapting to external threats. 
(Slack would also come up when informants discussed using direct conversions.) 
Those with relatively flat staffing for years, or without many outsourceable FTEs 
left due to earlier contracting, had few devices to “play the game” and would like
43 Interview with an agency manager, name withheld by request, October 6, 2004.
44 Interview with Raymona Stickell, September 10, 2004.
45 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15, 2004.
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OMB to give them credit for playing fairly. As one official commented against the 
backdrop o f the poor grade received by their agency, “I would be dishonest if  I told 
you that I knew that the other agencies played the game as fairly as (we) did.”46
But agencies succeeded in getting OMB to change the Scorecard criteria in 
July 2003. OMB removed the condition that said “must have completed competition 
o f no less than 50 percent o f the FTE listed on the approved FAIR Act inventories” 
to get to green.
In organizational and policy theory, “garbage-canning” (see Cohen et al. 
1972) entails making the problems suit pre-existing solutions instead of the other 
way around. In this vein, bureaucratic adaptation to A-76 not only meant scanning 
the environment but making threats or problems more manageable for the kind of 
solutions the agency could generate, such as directly outsourcing work to create 
some breathing room. If some agencies still could not get to green using the 
arguments above, some tried taking the short route. Creating wiggle room meant 
taking advantage o f direct conversions. This option was strategic when used to ease 
the pressures on staffing and morale by sparing the bulk o f the organization the 
rigors o f competing, pressures on the management by achieving OMB targets 
immediately (Figure 5), and pressures on the budgets by abbreviating the A-76 
process.
46 Interview, name withheld by request, November 1, 2004.




Figure 5. Conversions and Streamlined Contests Used to Meet Targets
The DoD used mostly direct conversions under A-76 the last three decades. 
A DoD A-76 alumnus in one civilian agency said that he was “glad” direct 
conversion was not in the new Circular because he thought that the option was 
abused by DoD.47 Nonetheless, the option proved useful under the tight situation the 
civilian agencies were in. GAO had testified that since OMB’s targets were “based 
on the universe o f the FAIR Act list, not a smaller subset that, after further analysis, 
may be deemed eligible for competitions,” there was a concern that agencies that 
lacked experience in A-76 would “opt for direct conversion in order to meet their 
specified FTE goals” (GAO 2002b, 2).
It appeared that direct conversion was looked upon favorably by the Bush 
administration. The approach seemed to have won agencies points with OMB and 
the civilian agencies might have anticipated this. Table 12 lists the agencies’ use of 
conversions in FY 2003 and FY 2004. Several got greens and yellows immediately.
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Table 12
FTEs Directly Converted from Government to Contract
Agency FY 2003 FY 2004 OMB’s Scorecard by 
December 2004
GSA 954 0 Green
DoD 879 750 Yellow (Green in June 2004)
Dol 756 0 Yellow
HHS 431 0 Green
Treasuiy 357 0 Green
USDA 340 0 Yellow
DoC 182 0 Yellow
DoL 156 0 Yellow
NASA 152 0 Yellow
DoT 61 0 Green
OPM 22 0 Green
EPA 12 0 Yellow
DHS 7 0 Yellow
DoE 0 0 Green
DoJ 0 0 Yellow
SBA 0 0 Yellow
ED 0 0 Yellow
SSA 0 0 Yellow
State 0 0 Yellow
Army Corps (Civil) 0 0 Red
HUD 0 0 Red
VA 0 0 Red
AID 0 0 Red
NSF 0 0 Red
Smithsonian 0 0 Red
OMB 0 0 Red
Sources: Data from OMB 2004a, Appendix A-l for FY 2003; OMB 2005b,
Appendix A -l for FY 2004.
47 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13,2004.
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One could speculate that conversions increased their chances o f getting out 
o f the embarrassing red column. Direct conversion also avoided the expensive 
contests for which agencies did not have appropriations. EPA, along with AID and 
NSF wanted the option to help them deal with “extraneous lines o f business and be 
able outsource the onesies and twosies directly.”48 They thought it was more cost- 
effective (Perera 2004b). As a USDA source remarked, “competitions in a 
decentralized and highly technical agency” could be “precarious and costly. The 
ability to privatize activities (through direct conversions) should be put back into the 
Circular.”49 Direct conversion served the NASA’s purpose well, according to an 
official. NASA's argument was that even direct conversion could save without 
having to expose their people to competition. Despite the unions’ disdain for direct 
conversion, some managers evidently preferred to have it on their A-76 menu to 
maximize their discretion. I speculate that some quarters probably resented OFPP’s 
decision to disallow it, for their individual reasons: unions thought that although 
conversion was disallowed, the streamlined option merely took its place; political 
leaders at the agencies needed the direct conversion option to show their loyalty to 
President Bush’s agenda immediately without having to antagonize the majority of 
the employees, and for their part A-76 managers might have needed direct 
conversion to make their jobs easier.
48 Interview with agency managers, names withheld by request, November 4, 2004 and November 23, 2004.
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Finally, agencies sought wiggle room by asking for more funding and 
buyout authority. Interior confidently spearheaded requests for greater buyout 
authority. They thought the biggest problem was that OPM refused to automatically 
provide early out and buyout authority at the same time a competitive sourcing plan 
for an agency was approved. According to a senior Interior official,
What I’d like to be able to do is to tell an employee, ‘Look, for the next year, 
your position is going to be studied as part o f A-76.. .If we lose, for sure 
you’ll have early out and buyout authority.’ The best I could tell them right 
now is, ‘You’ll probably have early out and buyout authority.’ The level of 
employee anxiety is much higher...What I’d like to do is .. .to provide 
(authority) for a study, not for individuals.50
OPM, however, believed it did not have the legal authority to upfront provide early 
out and buyout authority, because they needed to know precisely which positions 
were going to be eliminated, something that could be uncertain at the beginning o f a 
study.
You haven’t done an MEO yet. The only thing that you could say is, ‘These 
are the FTEs that we’re planning, or starting planning on.’ But those may not 
be the same FTEs that 6 months or a year later are actually involved in the 
study. In the process o f planning, you may decide you need to drop out some 
FTEs, you need to add some FTEs.51
49 Interviews, names withheld by request, October 19,2004.
50 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
51 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
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Interior was negotiating the issue with both OPM and OMB at the time of the 
interview (2004), but the official believed that they had pushed them as far as they 
could, with little success.
In asking for wiggle room, sometimes agencies were victorious in pressing 
their case, and sometimes they were not, but they tried hard to guess how successful 
they could get at bargaining. A few interviewees underscored how they achieved a 
good level of understanding with their Budget Examiners only to be dismayed by 
the lack o f consideration when the issue reached the higher echelons at OMB. 
According to a manager:
I think the people we deal with, they want to be understanding, but then by 
the time you get into the top level o f OMB, I think they are looking across 
the board at every agency and they haven't been willing to have to give us 
any special favors. I think our working-level people, at least, appreciate our 
situation. But we have not gotten any special dispensation from OMB.52
Another added they had only good words for their Examiner but could not say that 
the same level o f understanding existed between the agency and the OFPP.53
Minimizing adverse employee impact
Managers were vocal about A-76’s turbulent effects on the morale of 
employees who, according to the interviews, felt the policy evoked the Reagan and
52 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6, 2004.
53 Interview with an agency manager, name withheld by request, November 4,2004.
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Clinton downsizing. Charles Levine wrote that “credibility, civility, and consensus 
problems” normally plague organizations and governments during periods of 
cutbacks (Levine 1979,183). The same problems hounded this initiative. The 
credibility o f A-76 as a money-saving tool was in question; A-76 also clashed with 
some organizations’ cultures so that managers had to harmonize different goals.
First, some made the process as participatory as possible to assuage anxiety. 
For example, DHHS used a survey for its Human Resources Management index to 
find out if  A-76 had negatively impacted employees. Forest Service sought help 
from unions in developing their MEOs or in-house bid’s staffing plan. At Energy, 
unions served in the A-76 advisory board. Being decentralized, the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service let its employees have a hand in the process.
Second, soft landings were assured.54 All the agencies I interviewed had 
activities going on related to avoiding reductions in force, freezing recruitment to be 
able to move affected employees, publicizing the right o f first refusal to work for 
winning contractors, and training employees on jobs hunting. At the IRS, Director 
Stickell described how their efforts related to their Distribution Center study:
54 Gansler and Lucyshyn (2004, 16) explain what happens when an agency is considering “major” downsizing 
efforts: “OPM can grant the agency Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA), or the ability to offer 
employees a choice to retire early, minimizing the number o f  employees who are involuntarily separated. For A- 
76 competitions, agencies have the option o f  requesting that an organizational unit, rather than the whole 
agency, be considered eligible for VERA. OPM will then consider the request and grant VERA if  the unit is 
considered to be undergoing major reorganization, a  major RIF, or a major transfer o f  function (where a 
significant percentage o f  the workforce is subject to a separation or downgrade). Once granted VERA, the 
agency has the option to offer retirement incentives to those affected by a RIF, and the age and years o f service 
required for an employee to be eligible to retire are reduced.”
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The employee has to start taking care o f themselves early and say, “Okay, if  
I don’t  know if  my Center is in the bid, do I take my chance, do I start 
looking for another job now, am I eligible for early retirement? Am I 
interested in that separation incentive?” We have a communication strategy 
with employees and unions, telling them, “Here's the potential outcome. We 
owe it to you to tell you that now.” We know it is uncomfortable so we bring 
in Organization Development specialists in to help u s.. .It does get very 
emotional. If I have 15 to 20 years with the government, it is difficult (to go 
through A-76).55
Reduction in force was an inevitable product of A-76, which was ironic, 
since the government cited the coming retirement wave as one problem A-76 was 
supposed to remedy. News o f losing in-house bids were many but managers strived 
to avoid termination. An official commented that NASA historically had been able 
to take care o f its employees: “We have an aging workforce and we think we can 
take care o f the retirements and buyouts and those kinds o f things without having to 
do a RIF.”56 In many cases, according to OMB, workers could be re-assigned but 
mobility posed a problem (OMB did not have data, however), generating a fair 
amount o f concern.57
Third, agency managers tried to be transparent to their employees about 
FAIR lists. To be viewed as commercial was “an emotional issue - a stigma. 
Commercial equals bad; inherently governmental equals good,” according to a 
survey (PSC 2004,13). At Interior, employees appealed thinking “that the mere 
presence o f their positions on the FAIR Act Inventory meant that they were going to
55 Interview with Raymona Stickell, September 10,2004.
56 Interview with Ron Lentz, October 6, 2004.
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lose their jobs.”58 Some therefore developed their own codes and definitions and 
internal “crosswalks” to identify exactly what position or function was being coded, 
and to minimize employee uncertainty.
If you go to the OMB web site and you look at each agency’s FAIR list, it’s 
not very understandable... I would not have enough information looking at 
the list to determine if my job was on the list or not. It is that vague and it is 
not very particular. So that gave birth to the term ‘crosswalk’ document 
where each agency is changing these big definitions and identifying where in 
their agencies that function and that position exists.”59
Fourth, if  staff had to be cut, agencies minimized harm by cutting vacant 
positions or removing budget lines. Slack as an adaptation tool re-emerges here. As 
mentioned earlier, some agencies were able to accumulate commercial FTEs 
through the years. Slack averted job losses and helped MEOs win by reducing the 
in-house cost estimates. A source revealed that some agencies cut “FTEs that had 
been vacant for a number o f years but were still on the records -  positions that they 
had never filled and really didn’t have any intention o f filling.”60 The source added 
that their agency could have “played the same game” but their agency did not have 
such vacancies. Similarly situated agencies therefore lost a means to avoid 
reductions in force. Agencies with slack were in a better position to weather the 
threat from competitive sourcing.
57 Interview with Adrienne Erbach, September 10,2004.
58 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
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Additionally, the strategy was a proven one from DoD experience. Robbert 
and colleagues (1997, 39) found that “the practice o f stockpiling vacancies” allowed 
DoD civilian personnel offices in the 1990s “to prepare for eventual displacements 
prior to an outsourcing action.” In the literature slack serves “to produce 'win-win' 
consensus-building solutions and to provide side payments to overcome resistance 
to change” (Levine 1978, 317). If resistance to contests could be overcome by slack, 
it might have influenced the response of those who over-complied or complied with 
A-76 (Chapter 6 examines the determinants o f response).
Tying up the themes o f slack and ability to manage or game A-76, a 
manager concluded that size meant power and clout. Speaking o f other agencies, the 
manager thought that the larger civil service staff meant “power and clout.. .so they 
just liked to keep everything in-house,”61 which now served them in meeting the 
White House goals.
Adapting A-76 to agency mission and needs
“Adaptation from within” is what some theorists call the strategy to gain 
control o f threatening factors in the environment, versus “adaptation from without” 
when the organization is so powerless that the environment dictates the changes and
59 Interview with Dale Yielding, November 8, 2004.
60 Interview, name withheld by request, November 4, 2004.
61 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6,2004.
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choices (see Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985, 338). At this level, agencies try to adapt A- 
76 to suit their mission, rather than have their activities suit the goals o f A-76.
Managers insisted that A-76 could be a good management tool given 
adequate funding, thought, time, flexibility, and fair rules of competition, to address 
human resource and financial shortfalls. Under Bush, however, A-76 drifted toward 
procurement rather than a management program. As David Childs, a key player in 
shaping the 2003 A-76, remarked in an interview, the 1996 version still treated A-76 
as a management-decision based system but the new version made it more 
procurement based.62 Most interviewees agreed that certain work could and should 
be outsourced. Agencies’ FY 2004 annual reports all mentioned conceptually tying 
in human resource management with A-76. But the tie-in with agency missions did 
not seem to be fully appreciated by OMB. A GAO A-76 task force panelist 
criticized the White House target for “a specific number o f jo b s .. .without regard to 
the agency’s strategic plan, annual operating plan, or current budget.”63
Several interviewees pointed out that if  efficiency were truly the goal, then 
agencies needed some flexibility with A-76 and to pursue alternative methods that 
could save. Managers disliked the connotation that A-76 was a response to the 
bureaucracy’s lazy, monopolistic image. According to a source from one agency 
that completed zero competition from 2001 to 2004:
62 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
63 Interview with Robert Tobias, August 31, 2004.
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Every manager o f an organization has that responsibility to manage that 
organization both effectively and efficiently.. .to get the job done 
efficiently with the least amount o f resources since we’re working with the 
taxpayers’ money. And we are all cognizant of that on a daily basis despite 
what you might read on the newspapers...Efficiency wasn’t invented four 
years ago.64
To make A-76 fit, agencies adjusted their arguments to emphasize efficiency 
using various routes, and downplayed the competitive requirement. The concept of 
High Performing Organizations (HPO) was a case in point. HPO is a level of 
performance at which in-house teams are exempted from competition or re­
competition (in 2002, OMB was threatening recompetitions for in-house providers). 
An HPO status would have given the agencies greater freedom to manage their 
human and financial resources in exchange for better performance and 
accountability. DFAS was one o f the few agencies allowed to use it. Its Director o f 
Accounting Services said they could reduce their costs without conducting an A-76 
competition using HPO (Hubbard 2004).
OMB, however, did not include GAO's recommendations on HPOs when the 
Circular was being revised. A GAO Panelist on competitive sourcing remarked that 
adopting HPOs would have proven that A-76 was not politically motivated: “If the 
goal was indeed to create high performing organizations.. .then you needed to have 
some experiments o f what would work.. .to track it and see what the results are.”65
64 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15,2004.
65 Interview with Robert Tobias, August 31,2004.
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OMB took a long time developing the guidelines on HPOs, preferring to 
approve individual requests instead. An OMB source described how some argued 
their case for HPO: for example, some agencies asked for HPO status from doing 
human capital reorganization that required restructuring, eliminating layers and 
having a better ratio between management and support, and looking at the match 
between agency mission and skills:
Some agencies are saying, “I went out there and I restructured this 
organization. And I’ve eliminated 200 positions. And I have increased my 
management-staff ratio from 1:5 to 1:15. And I am now a High Performing 
Organization so I shouldn’t have to compete, even though I have 700 
commercial positions” . . .There’s another.. .organization that is commercial 
in nature but they don’t want to compete for mission-related reasons. They 
want to come in and establish performance-related goals that they want to 
hold on to and metrics that they can measure against to see whether or not 
the organization meets those goals. And the agency wants to come in and 
say, “W e’ve done this, so you should call us an HPO. And if we don’t meet 
these, then you can yank it and then we’ll have to compete.”66
From the agencies’ perspective, DoE’s A-76 director Dennis O’Brien 
described their appeal to OMB. He said that along with the DHHS officials, he 
proposed some criteria for HPOs and gave one o f DoE’s organizations as an 
example. O’Brien said he knew it would be “a tough sell” at OMB:
I think that they think that it's a scam to get around doing A-76 
studies.. .They think it's a game that you're doing to get out o f a study. I'm 
very confident that's what they feel. I wrote them a letter.. .telling them why 
there are wrong.. .OMB feels that games were played for years at the 
Department o f Defense, where they said, “Don’t ask us to do a competition,
66 Interview with Cynthia Vallina, September 10, 2004.
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we'll reorganize this and that,” but we didn’t do any o f it. So OMB has got 
history on their side. So I think HPO is extremely difficult for OMB to 
approve.67
As the 2003 Circular pre-empted agency plans for direct conversions and 
HPOs proved hard to push, agencies offered alternative ideas within the framework 
o f the Circular. Interior, one o f the first ones to get out o f red, received the go-ahead 
for its so-called express review. Senior official Scott Cameron explained that this 
was a faster and cheaper method that was tailored for groups o f 10 FTEs or less, 
which they used a lot. Interior adopted a policy that would result in the 
development o f the MEO, not competing their organizations “as-is,” as a matter of 
routine for streamlined studies of more than 10 FTEs. This allowed employees to 
defend their jobs and prove their worth. Another approach, perhaps the most 
rational, was to use A-76 to improve the organization’s performance. The IRS 
approach to A-76 was forward-looking, according to Director Stickell:
Many o f the early A-76 studies were small in number... .and it looked as if 
they were competing today’s operations. The step we take at IRS is, we want 
to find a function, a set o f activities that’s end-to-end, so we are using large 
studies and we want to be able to use this competition process to transform 
the organization. We don’t want to compete today’s organization. We want 
to compete where we want to be three years, five years from now.69
67 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13,2004.
68 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13,2004.
69 Interview with Raymona Stickell, September 10, 2004.
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As a former OFPP official explained, the government ought to show that it 
was a good employer by “submitting good offers.. .we seldom submit an ‘as-is’
7florganization.” DoE’s O’Brien stressed that Energy had not done very many 
streamlined studies for a fundamental reason:
I found it very hard to look employees in the face, and say, you cannot do an 
MEO. Most o f them want to do it .. .So they need some time to do that.. .So, 
why should I not do a standard study? The crushing one is - we are 
obviously trying to change this - there is no 10 percent offset for the 
government if  it is streamlined. So... we don't do many streamlined; we do 
standard competitions for very small numbers. We have a standard 
competition for eight FTEs.71
NASA also successfully adapted A-76 to its circumstances. Because NASA 
insisted that its skill needs could not be addressed by the usual competition, OMB 
allowed NASA to conduct science competitions instead and get credit. According to 
a NASA official:
What we have been able to do at NASA is, we do what we call science 
competitions. We have announcements o f opportunity and we have NASA 
research announcements; they are like solicitations. When those go out and 
NASA scientists actually submit proposals, they compete against, usually, 
research centers and universities. Sometimes it is actually a company that 
has somebody doing some research. And if  our scientists win, they get that 
work and it gets funded by the people that put up the competition. We have 
submitted a waiver to the Circular, which OMB approved, allowing us to 
count five competitions o f those in lieu o f standard competitions.72
70 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
71 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
72 Interview with Ron Lentz, October 6, 2004.
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At the USDA-NRCS, where A-76 studies focused on architectural and 
engineering functions, the agency had to reconcile A-76 with the Brooks Act that 
required that work should be competed on the basis o f quality more than cost.
When OMB revised the A-76 Circular, it based the competition on 
cost.. .They said that we should ask for deviation to A-76 in order to utilize 
an approved procedure (Brooks Act). That was what we did. We put together 
a process for the Brooks Act that merged quality and quantity and then sent 
it to OMB for their approval.73
The Department o f Homeland Security was an agency caught by the 
initiative in the middle o f being organized. As discussed in over­
compliance/compliance, the agency drew ire from Congress for going ahead with 
the competition for immigration officers - reportedly under OMB pressure - even as 
DHS consolidated itself. To some, however, the strategy in fact offered the agency a 
good mechanism to develop organizational capacity.
It’s the best time to do A-76. Because remember, when we were organizing 
a lot o f things came over in stovepipes. So we needed to restructure and we 
want to argue that the IIOs needed fundamental restructuring. We knew that 
going in. The only question was, should we restructure and then do an A-76, 
or do we restructure as part of A-76?.. .It's good government initiative. It's 
not about outsourcing, not about reducing the size of federal employment. It 
is about creating the environment to examine and structure needed change.74
73 Interviews with NRCS managers, names withheld by request, October 19,2004.
74 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
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Using A-76 in an agency-friendly way meant using reasoned criteria in 
selecting the functions and grouping them horizontally and vertically. Part o f 
organization development was planning not just what jobs were suitable for contract 
but also how A-76 could lend unity to a set o f activities. For instance, DoE looked at 
the entire geographical context of its activities in planning what to compete out.
Energy also tried to adapt A-76 to its hollowed-out conditions by not doing a 
lot of competitions, apparently with OMB approval, as it received its green ahead of 
many agencies. At the time o f my interview with its A-76 director, it had about 
15,000 federal employees and about 100,000 contractors. It was well over 90 
percent contracted out. No other agency was close and the next was NASA at 56 
percent. Asked how this starting point affected their A-76 plans, the Director 
explained that they would limit their studies.
We have to look very carefully at two issues: one of them is, we have to 
make sure that we’re not going to mess around with contract oversight.
When you have over 100,000 contract employees you need a lot o f 
oversight.. .that we don’t impact our ability to oversee existing contracts.
And the second is, we have to make sure that we are not allowing any of the 
federal functions to move into the commercial, private area.75
DoD, its confidence in doing A-76 borne out o f experience and backed by a 
huge budget and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s political clout, visibly exercised its 
negotiating power with OMB. The DoD early on saw Circular A-76 as too confining
75 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
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and inflexible. It proposed to OMB to use instead its Quadrennial Defense Review 
system in creating efficiencies throughout DoD (see Aldridge 2001). DoD would 
rather follow its “strategic sourcing” plan for future outsourcing decisions, o f which 
A-76 was only one option.
Agencies also used the GSA Schedules for their A-76 studies. The GSA 
schedule was meant for professional services that had been pre-competed, so that 
contractors that provided the service were on the Schedule. It was a shortened way 
to contract for services. What it allowed agencies to do, instead o f their contracting 
officers going out and putting out a contract on the street, explained an OMB 
source, was wait for 90 days and see who comes to the table. Agencies could call up 
three people already on the schedule and decide which vendors they wanted to use. 
Or they could ask four o f them for bids and do it that way, depending on how the 
agencies wished to use the Schedule.76 At Energy, A-76 officials sought and were 
given OMB approval to conduct their own “experiment” to prove which method 
could get results better: open competition, or using the GSA schedule. Director 
O’Brien explained:
I believe that federal supply schedules are an excellent tool for A-76. The 
OMB has allowed the use o f the schedules for streamlined competitions. We 
asked for a waiver from OMB on our IT competition.. .Our research is that 
well over 80 to 90 percent o f all o f the IT contracts and solicitations used 
throughout the government are all GWACs (Government-wide acquisition 
contracts). Almost all o f the people who play in the IT area understand the
76 Interview with Cynthia Vallina, September 10,2004.
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GWAC. So we asked for a waiver to allow us to use GWAC on our IT study. 
OMB turned us down. So then we said, 'Alright guys, let's try this: 'Let's get 
two smaller studies with about 150 FTEs in it, one is Human Resources 
Training, the other is Logistics. So we will do - as a pilot program - the HR 
training as a regular (competition), through an offer, and we will do 
Logistics as a federal supply GSA schedule. When we are done with these 
competitions, we will send you our report.' And OMB approved that.77
Energy evidently dealt with A-76 confidently and proactively, and this might 
have contributed to its green score. According to its A-76 chief:
We are a very aggressive organization. My philosophy to the guys has been, 
“The Circular is new; let us go out and do what we think is right for the 
Department that we think meets the Circular. And if they think we go too 
far, or stray too much, someone will tell us.”78
The Circular also allowed agencies to use contractor FTEs (or contractor 
employees) in their MEO bids. But the inclusion of those FTEs might have 
dampened private sector interest. A long-time observer o f A-76 thought that a 
certain agency used the strategy in less than honest ways:
What (the department) has done that a lot o f agencies haven’t done is 
combined, instead o f having a study on all federal employees in a function, 
they combined with contractor employees.. .they have contractor companies 
on the MEO with the feds. So, who’s left to compete? And who’s going to 
compete when they think that these companies along with (the department) 
have their own act?79
77 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13,2004.
78 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
79 Interview, name withheld by request, September 10, 2004.
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In 2005, a year after the interview, news emerged that a combined federal 
and contractor team won the Energy Department’s IT services competition worth 
about $1 billion for seven years. The winning partnership would cut costs by $300 
million and reduce the staff by 40 percent, or 1,172 positions. DoE workers teamed 
with 1-Source Consulting, RS Information Systems, and several other companies, 
collectively known as Energy Enterprise Solutions (Sarkar 2005). But some 
contractors criticized the “zero competition” that the study generated:
They’ve got good companies that do good work, who did the right business 
thing to join the MEO team, given the circumstances. But we don’t know 
that anything has been optimized, because DoE has deprived itself o f any of 
the benefits o f real competition. We knew this a year ago.. .This is a 
consolidation with existing contractors. (Wait 2005,1)
Energy defended its strategy as “thinking outside the box” and the lack o f 
competition as the result of a business decision by the vendors who thought there 
was “too much risk” in competing (Wait 2005,1). As mentioned earlier, DoE 
already employed a lot o f contractors and the strategy took this under consideration.
In sum, these examples demonstrate how managers made A-76 suit their 
organization’s needs and mission, for example, to address skill imbalances (NASA), 
meet the (re)organizational needs (DHS), meet future demands on the agency or 
improve its performance (Treasury), meet agency needs when it was already hiring 
and supervising a lot o f contractors (Energy), complement the other strategic 
management tools (strategic sourcing for DoD, Brooks Act for USDA-NRCS), and 
meet employee demands to compete on a level playing field with contractors
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(Energy and Dol). No doubt there were many other cases that I was unable to 
research.
Some agencies, however, were not so fortunate to adapt A-76 to their 
mission and needs. The quota-dominated process was described by some informants 
as overpowering agency will to use A-76 in line with their needs. For example, the 
decision of USDA’s Forest Service to conduct hundreds of costly, small-FTE 
studies was made, according to several officials I interviewed, in pursuit o f OMB 
targets (see Chapter 5 for the controversy at the Forest Service).
Failure to use A-76 to suit agency mission could have been hindered by lack 
o f funding, or lack o f leadership commitment to make the initiative work. At 
Homeland Security, “the strategy (was), you do a study, and put the resources into it 
to do it right,” according to its A-76 chief.80 But in one agency, doing A-76 right 
and in line with agency need was hampered by lack o f management support and/or 
funding. Narrated by one frustrated A-76 official in a big agency:
When we first came to this office.. .we were promised that we would have 
four employees supporting us in this office and we would be given $3 
million to do it w ith.. .It just ended up being me and (another A-76 official). 
We did the work of four people. We put in a lot o f extra hours that we didn’t 
need to do, and got no credit for it .. .Case in point, in FY 2004 the (agency) 
asked for $3 million to fund competitive sourcing efforts and we were given 
only $150,000 to execute that effort properly. Even though Management said 
they want to execute a well-run competitive sourcing program, they don’t
80 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
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fund it. And that's their fault. To fund it, they must put it in their program 
management objective and request it from Congress.81
This could point equally to resistance, lack o f political support at the top, as well as 
failure to see how A-76 could meet agency needs. In the next section, resistance 
strategies are described, including thwarting the intents of the policy.
Resistance and Environmental Modification
Definition and Strategies Involved
Resistance calls “for the agency to stand up to its adversaries, dig in its 
heels, mobilize the constituency, and fight” (Lambright 1998,259). It involves what 
Miles (1965) and Rubin (1985) called fighting a rearguard action. At this level of 
response, when merely coping was inadequate, even harmful, organizations 
employed counter-measures against the threat, gaming the rules if  they had to. Here 
agencies protected as much o f their organization from potential outsourcing as they 
could. In theory, those that have power - including the power o f inaction - use it, 
while those that do not seek allies that do. Resistance in competitive sourcing 
involves five types o f action.
81 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6,2004.
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Various forms o f evasion
This meant protecting the FTEs from being classified as outsourceable, 
delaying actual competitions, and discouraging the emergence o f competitors. One 
of the most common signs o f resistance was evasion of A-76 by avoiding the 
classification o f functions as commercial Code B. If this evasion tactic could hold, 
the agency would have spared itself a huge amount o f expenditure, time, and 
internal dissension on A-76. The “battle begins with FAIR Act submissions.”82 
Agencies knew that it was crucial to have sovereignty over their list, but so did 
OMB. “It is important to know,” said an OMB Budget Examiner, “that these 
inventories are the agencies' control valves.”83 In organization theory, controlling 
the inventory may be viewed as an act o f organizational boundary maintenance 
(Evan 1972). This sovereignty over the boundaries was severely threatened when 
OMB fundamentally changed the definition o f inherently governmental functions, 
so that even those that involved “an exercise o f federal discretionary authority 
affecting individual liberty” were deemed commercial (Tiefer 2003,11).
Agencies were mindful o f the OMB view that all FTEs were commercial 
unless justified otherwise (see Dol 2004), so they: (1) tried several arguments to 
protect their functions, (2) carefully guarded their plans for A-76, and (3) sought 
alliance with Congress to shield some functions (Chapter 5 discusses Congress in­
82 This was confirmed by most interviewees with OMB officials, academics, and managers.
83 Interview with Joseph Montoni, September 10, 2004.
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depth). For example, a Budget Examiner explained, agencies would argue that a 
function was exempted if  that position reported directly to a function that was 100 
percent inherently governmental.84 Agencies would also “throw up a lot of 
complexities.. .or make the job more complex.. .Or they (would) say the skills just 
aren't there in the private sector,” said a Bush administration official. Agencies told 
OMB it could not “just come in and make pronouncements” that activities could be 
privatized and that OMB would have to understand that certain jobs were “a very 
unique activity that doesn’t make sense to privatize.”85 Each time inventories were 
submitted OMB would wish to discuss the determination, according to an NSF 
official. “But every agency is different, their situations are different.”86
Two agencies that delayed creating and submitting their inventories were the 
USAID and Smithsonian, according to OMB interviewees. When Smithsonian did 
submit in 2003, it classified most jobs as “inherently Smithsonian,” a category OMB 
tried to convince them to stop using (Peckenpaugh 2003c, 2). An OMB official said 
Smithsonian tried to argue that they were “not really even a federal agency, that 
they were not part o f the Executive Branch. So, they don’t play the game. This is a 
long-standing tension between them and us.”87
84 Interview with Adrienne Erbach, September 10, 2004.
85 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
86 Interview, name withheld by request, November 4, 2004.
87 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9,2004.
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Some agencies tried concealment. A congressional research report warned 
that it would be “difficult for outsiders to the agency to get a complete and accurate 
picture o f the entire portfolio o f activities o f functions performed within each 
agency” (Grasso 2001,16). This might have been the case with some agencies. 
Contractors complained that it was very hard to get information from agencies, such 
as their inventories and A-76 plans. In guarding their A-76 plans and protecting 
their agencies, a logical result was a difference among the agencies in classifying 
functions that appeared similar, indicating that agencies were trying to adapt the 
FAIR Act codes to their mission and resisting OMB imposition. For example, at 
Commerce, early inventories showed contradictory information, “preventing an 
understanding o f whether the activity could be subject to competition or whether 
Commerce considers the activity exempt from competition” (GAO 2000b, 24). 
Interior and Forest Service classified firefighting functions differently, with the 
former classifying them all as inherently governmental and the latter as all 
commercial. Said OMB sources:
They were 180 degrees at odds.. .We had meetings internally with the 
agencies to discuss and figure out what made sense.. .So, we compared notes 
among OMB branches and actually ended with the two competitive sourcing 
heads o f the branches we were talking about. We realized the firefighters 
were different.88
88 Interviews with OMB Budget Examiners for agriculture, September 10, 2004.
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The National Park Service perception at one point “was that Park Rangers 
were going to be outsourced. And it turns out, that was an inherently governmental 
position because they have got some law enforcement responsibilities,” according to 
a Park Service official I interviewed. He said they tried to make OMB listen:
When they can't understand your list, you go talk to them. You attempt to 
reason with them and negotiate with them and bring them to the table. And 
see if  you can explain to them why what they are saying doesn’t make sense 
or doesn’t work. Some o f the time we are successful in doing that, but not 
entirely.89
At the DoE, they successfully insisted to OMB that its power marketing 
administration functions were core commercial, despite earlier determination 
otherwise, according to a key informant.90
The most inconsistent classifications in 2003 occurred in the areas o f 
management and support to research and development; financial and accounting 
services; management headquarters operation, planning and control; and research, 
development, testing, and evaluation (Hill 2005a, 1). This suggests that a lot o f 
protective jockeying occurred for these jobs.
A second form of evasion was delaying the actual studies. Jacques Gansler, 
former DoD Undersecretary, said, “some o f them have been red for a long time
89 Interview, name withheld by request, February 8, 2005.
90 Interview, name withheld by request, September 10, 2004.
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(because) they are going to wait them out.”91 The DHS A-76 chief concurred, “A 
lot of agencies will slow things down and see if a new administration comes in with 
a different plan.” Interviews just before the 2004 presidential election gathered 
expectations o f the policy’s weakening by a Kerry victory. The campaign gave 
agencies a chance to slow down on implementation without getting too much 
attention from OMB, and to present (through unions and political candidates) 
grievances with the policy during the campaign. Delaying competitions was an old 
trick used by military installations in the past:
The Services have exempted more activities from competition than OSD 
would like, and we observed a very prevalent tendency on the part of 
activities that were scheduled to compete to postpone preparing for 
competition as if  hoping that the threat would pass. (Handy and O ’Connor 
1984,4)
OMB sources in 2004 revealed that many agencies, such as the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the USDA’s NRCS, dragged their feet. A former A-76 manager with 
extensive experience who was working for contractors at the time o f my interview 
stressed that it was natural that agencies would “make the competition take as long 
as they can.. .Agencies won’t accelerate the studies unless they are forced to. So 
they will take a regular study and they will take three years.”93 The USD A prepared 
an A-76 plan within the timeframe OMB wanted but it was slow to start, according
91 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8, 2004.
92 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
93 Interview, name withheld by request, September 30,2004.
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to OMB. The NSF wanted its workforce analysis completed before making A-76 
decisions but OMB warned in the President’s Budget for FY 2003 that at the rate 
NSF was going, it would be difficult for NSF to meet its 2003 goals and that NSF 
must develop and submit a competitive sourcing plan. How noticeable were these 
delays and what message did they convey? Noted AFGE's John Threlkeld:
I don’t think there is any question that agencies are resisting OMB’s 
pressure, and they are going as slow as they can. And that to the extent that 
they can go slow without incurring wrath as well, I mean, there have been 
stories about agencies having their budgets cut in retaliation for not doing 
enough competitive sourcing.94
Delaying was a successful strategy for some. Agencies and bureaus that hunkered 
down and kept a less visible approach from 2001 to 2003 realized the benefits when 
OMB relaxed the quotas in 2003. According to a knowledgeable source, when the 
OMB removed the quotas, “some were further on at that point than others. And 
those who weren’t as far along.. .backed off a little into the more careful and go- 
slow approach...in a little less visible manner.95
As a final note about the delays, the President o f the service contractors 
association, Stan Soloway, made a curious observation during his interview. Their 
group had just branded A-76 resistance as not much more than union membership 
dilemmas. Soloway claimed it was only a matter o f time until contractors got the 
bulk o f public services from federal employees, and that unions were trying their
94 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23,2004.
95 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25,2005.
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best to delay that from happening.96 But such pronouncements merely stressed the 
threat as something that went beyond unions and focused on institutional relations in 
public administration.
The third form o f evasion was going through A-76 with the least amount of 
competition. Agencies did this by preferring the streamlined competition format 
and, if  they had to conduct full-blown competitions, using tactics that implicitly 
discouraged contractors. OMB reported that civilian agencies used streamlined a lot 
more than standard competitions (Table 13). DoD, with its size and A-76 
experience, relied on the standard method for more than 95 percent o f the FTEs 
studied in 2003. When streamlined studies involved the creation o f in-house MEOs, 
the agencies won virtually all contests.
Table 13
Type o f Competition Used bv Civilian Agencies fFY 2003-FY 2004)
Type o f Competition FY 2003 FY 2004
• Streamlined Competitions (for 65 FTEs and under, 
no solicitation required)
63% 21%
• Standard Competitions (full competitive bidding for 
competitions of more than 65 FTEs)
37% 79%
Total 100% 100%
Source: Data from OMB 2005a, 2.
96 Interview with Stan Soloway, September 9, 2004.
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OMB explained that the prevalence of streamlined studies in 2003 was a 
way for agencies “to acclimate themselves to public-private competition in general 
and the new procedures in the revised Circular in particular” (OMB 2004a, 7). But it 
appeared that streamlined competitions not only enabled agencies to discourage 
competitions but also to save money (by shortening the process and studying only 
small FTEs) and maximize their control over A-76. In an apparent dismay with the 
way agencies used the rules to their advantage, an OMB official noted:
A lot o f this is just playing games. That is the way it was done before 1979. 
Before 1979, it was done that way no matter the size o f the study. Prior to 
1979, the process was, the agencies could run A-76 studies based on a back- 
of-the-napkin market study. And it did not make any difference whether it 
was 500 people or 2 people. But that way, agencies were able to say, ‘Well, I 
am having a manpower cut by Congress so therefore I want to contract this 
out. Or, if  not, I’m having one (market comparison) and keeping it in-house.’ 
And they could play games with it. Because you don't get a formal bid.97
Contractors cited the extensive use of streamlined competition and high government 
victories in FY 2003 to bolster their claim that A-76 was flawed and that unions’ 
charge o f a biased playing field was hollow. Streamlined studies were in fact 
nothing more than research, said an official at the Labor Department:
You know, the other mistake that OMB made with the Circular, is that they 
call streamlined 'competitions.' They are NOT competitions. All they are is a
97 Interview with David Muzio, September 13, 2004.
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market comparison. Market comparison is NOT a competition. It does not 
become a competition unless you put out a solicitation.98
The standard type prevented the tactic o f competing onesies and twosies so 
that streamlined studies became the “competition” of choice for agencies struggling 
to meet OMB targets (Table 14). Managers knew that the streamlined type gave 
them a tool to survive in the turbulent environment o f competitive sourcing. 
According to a long-time career official and observer o f A-76, “there are all kinds of 
ways you can manipulate the system under the streamlined process to w in.. .and that 
is why industry is not interested in streamlined competitions.99
Contractors did not like the way the streamlined competitions were done.
The AFGE union, meanwhile, observed that “for a lot o f agencies, competition was 
just a bureaucratic exercise.”100 Note that under the scanning strategy, A-76 as an 
“exercise” was first mentioned by an agency informant.
Another way the agencies tried to win competitions was by lowering the 
chances o f getting competitive bids in standard contests. The type o f positions up 
for competition, the location of those activities, size, and the way the agencies 
grouped the functions could all discourage contractors. In-house teams could also 
lower their cost estimates using techniques other than cutting staff. And then there 
were political factors that could go into decisions whether or not to award contracts.
98 Interview with Robert Knauer, September 24, 2004.
99 Interview, name withheld by request, September 24,2004.
100 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23, 2004.
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Table 14
Number and Type o f Completed Competitions (FY 2003- FY 2004")
Agency FY 2003 
No. & Type of Completed 
Competitions
FY 2004 




Total Streamlined Standard Direct
Conversion
Total
DoD 7 71 56 134 4 54 12 70
VA 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Treas 16 1 18 35 1 5 0 6
DoJ 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 3
DHS 0 0 2 2 0 3 0 3
USD A 398 2 17 417 12 4 0 16
Dol 84 0 511 595 5 3 0 8
HHS 44 8 69 121 33 5 0 38
DoT 4 2 28 34 5 1 0 6
SSA 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2
DoC 3 2 5 10 1 0 0 1
NASA 1 0 26 27 0 20 0 20
EPA 3 0 3 6 1 0 0 1
DoL 0 0 28 28 5 1 0 6
DoE 1 2 0 3 1 1 0 2
GSA 4 1 12 17 28 1 0 29
State 1 0 0 1 5 0 0 5
OPM 0 1 1 2 9 0 0 9
ED 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
SBA 3 0 0 3 1 0 0 1
ACE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HUD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OMB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NSF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sources: Data from OMB 2004a, Appendix A- for FY 2003; OMB 2005b,
Appendix A -l for FY 2004.
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OMB expectedly criticized the small-FTEs studies and their outcomes. The 
most glaring example in FY 2003 was when Forest Service conducted 169 
competitions, o f which 78 involved three FTEs or less, and 36 of which involved 
only a fraction o f an FTE.101 Contractors' interest declined because the agency 
“grouped activities in ways that work would not normally be provided by the private 
sector” (OMB 2004a, 16).
The tenacious resistance by some sectors to the policy brought about intense 
involvement by congressional appropriators around the FY 2004 budget hearings 
(see Chapter 5). The House o f Representatives found that “Forest 
Service...decisions to conduct studies involving few FTEs made it impossible for 
private sector providers to effectively compete and contributed to unrealistic 
competitions” (House Report 2004, 5). Forest Service eventually won 95 percent o f 
its competitions for FY 2003. A senior bureau official said he “did not believe there 
was any malice aforethought in conducting such small studies, but noted, 'By slicing 
and bundling the way we did, nobody could beat us'” (House Report 2004, iii). 
Beside the numbers game, the methodologies for calculating estimated agency and 
private-sector costs contributed to the unusually high percentage o f Forest Service’s 
wins. Bundling and splitting of FTEs was probably common. “Everybody is doing 
that now. Every agency, it’s not just the Forest Service, even DoD got in on it,”
101 OMB had said it was coming up with new rules that would affect competition o f  fractional FTEs.
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according to an A-76 official.102 Individual agency data were hard to obtain but 
OMB released government-wide figures on the level o f competition received by the 
agencies in 2004, which were supposed to be better than the 2003 figures, whatever 
they might have been (Table 15).
Table 15
Level o f Competition Obtained from Industry (FY 20041
Government-wide Bids Received TotalCompetitions
Two or more One Zero
% of Standard Competitions 47% 24% 29% 75
% of FTEs Competed 45% 31% 24% 9,925
Source: D ata from OMB 2()05b, 25.
John Hanlin, a former DoD A-76 official, thought that the in-house win rate 
was only going to get bigger “because it’s impossible for contractors to effectively 
compete.. .The new A-76 version is more beneficial than the old one to government 
workers.”103 But most people, especially OMB, speculated that in-house victories 
would taper off and stabilize to a more realistic level o f 60 percent as soon as 
civilian agencies get used to competitions. OMB’s prediction proved inaccurate, 
however. OMB's FY 2004 report (OMB 2005b) revealed that agency victories 
climbed to more than 90 percent despite shifting to larger competitions (Table 16), 
confirming Hanlin’s predictions and the agencies’ adaptive success.
102 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
103 Interview with John Hanlin, September 30, 2004.
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Table 16
Performance Decisions in Favor o f In-House Teams (FY 2003 and FY 2004)






Average Wins Score as of 
December 2004
OPM 100 100 100 Green
DoT 100 100 100 Green
DHS N/a 100 100 Yellow
ED N/a 100 100 Yellow
DoC 100 100 100 Yellow
NASA 100 ** 100 Yellow
Dol 99 100 99.5 Yellow
DoE 96 100 98 Green
HHS 99 96 97.5 Green
USDA 100 94 97 Yellow
SSA 88 100 94 Yellow
Treasury 91 93 92 Green
DoL N/a 88 88 Yellow
DoD 81 90 85.5 Yellow
SBA 58 100 79 Yellow
DoJ 100 55 77.5 Yellow
GSA 100 23 61.5 Green
EPA 100 0 50 Yellow
State 0 87 43.5 Yellow
VA 0 N/a 0 Red
Sources: Data from OMB 2004a, Appendix C for FY 2003; OMB 2005b, Appendix 
D for FY 2004.
Note: “N/a” means the Agency did not report any competition that year; ** NASA 
competitions completed in FY 2004 were science competitions awarded under a 
deviation to multiple providers in both the public and private sectors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
Non-implementation
Foot-dragging,104 or simply withholding effort, according to Rosabeth Moss, 
is “the one ‘weapon’ even the most powerless people possess” (Kelman 2005,28). 
The same may be said o f organizations. Administrators can use their discretion to 
not implement policies they consider problematic (Sharkansky 2002). In A-76, a 
few agencies defied OMB by not preparing FAIR Act lists, A-76 plans, and if  some 
agencies did, by not conducting competitions as planned.
As the battle began with the inventories, their absence deprived OMB of the 
tool to hammer down the targets. Smithsonian’s early reluctance to code their 
commercial inventories according to the guidelines and to submit A-76 plans invited 
the attention o f OMB and agencies. The agency was thus dubbed the “black sheep 
o f the President’s Management Agenda” (Palmer 2005a, 1) because o f its tenacious 
stance not just in A-76 but in all aspects o f the agenda.
In terms of conducting competitions, Table 17 shows that 6 out o f 26 
agencies did not conduct or complete any competitions throughout the first term of 
President Bush. HUD and Army Corps each announced one standard competition in 
FY 2004 but neither one completed that fiscal year.
104 The duration o f  agency decisions is not always at the center o f analysis o f  bureaucratic behavior, “an 
unfortunate theoretical and empirical imbalance in the bureaucratic politics literature.” Carpenter observed that 
studies “all but ignore the critical question of the timing and rapidity o f  bureaucratic decisions. The speed with 
which agencies make decisions is an instrument o f  power over private sector actors and a source o f  immense 
agency discretion” (Carpenter, 2001, 26, italics in the original).
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Table 17
Red Badge o f Courage
Agencies with zero competitions or remained 
red in Scorecard from 2001 to 2004
OMB Estimate of FTEs for A-76 in 2002 
as % o f Total Personnel







Source: OMB 2003a, 5.
Note: *Smithsonian did not declare a single FTEs as available for A-76; OMB was 
not included in its baseline report that estimated the size o f outsourceable 
FTEs.
“Red” in the Scorecard obviously meant difficulties in policy 
implementation that could have been borne out o f statutes, inadequate funds and/or 
expertise, a protective organizational culture, a structure that encouraged autonomy 
in the field, or lack of political will to counter resistance to A-76. VA could not, by 
law, get to green. OMB itself reasoned its office was too small and busy to do A-76. 
But in big agencies like HUD and Army Corps that seemed to have had the funds to 
hire A-76 experts, and medium-sized ones like NSF and AID, red could be 
construed as resistance rather than incapacity. What I heard from sources in some of 
these agencies were: they would not indiscriminately alter their inventories; OMB 
did not understand their mission; and a certainty in the voice o f some that they 
would hold out as long as they could against doing competitions for the sake o f their 
organization.
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Debate reframing
If reality is framed according to one’s perspective, one gains more traction in 
advancing particular strategies and defending its chosen response in a hostile 
environment. When put on the defense and portrayed as fighting a “good 
government” initiative -  as an OMB source dubbed the policy - how did agencies 
fight back? One, they cast doubts on the policy’s motive and goals, instead of 
lauding the policy. Informants from a few agencies raised doubts on OMB’s savings 
report because some o f their time and effort, especially before a contest is 
announced, were left out o f the formula. A former A-76 manager said:
You have to look at both sides o f the coin; it’s costly, too...They are 
fictitious because they are projections and they are based on what a function 
would cost if  we continued to do it the old way. Theoretically this is what it 
should cost with the lower number o f people -  and it truly does lower the 
people (count) and it truly does save money over a period o f years -  but 
what they don’t put into that equation ever is the cost o f conducting A-76 
studies and how long it takes.
Another agency informant said, “I can say, ‘Here’s my savings.’ A lot o f it is smoke 
and mirrors. So, if  you want, you can come up with paper savings.”106 A 
competitive sourcing officer whose agency consolidated some functions that it 
eventually put under competition pointed out that a lot o f their savings was
105 Interview, name withheld by request, September 30, 2004.
106 Interview, name withheld by request, November 4, 2004.
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attributable more to the consolidation than the competition.107 The A-76 manager o f 
the Army Corps, Ray Navidi, explained that the A-76 goal to produce efficiency 
narrowly restricts public service goals and drives people to economize at the 
expense o f effectiveness. “To go into a process with a goal o f 10 percent savings 
affects the mind-set o f the team, and the only things they’re going to be trying to do 
is cut comers or cut numbers,” he said (Castelli 2007,1). Savings should only be a 
by-product o f high performance, not its goal, Navidi said. Because o f the difficulty 
o f estimating costs and savings from A-76, an official from an agriculture agency 
conveyed doubts on OMB's figures from FY 2003:
based on how we do work and the fact that we have trouble keeping track of 
costs and everything like that, you know I think probably, the savings 
numbers, they're going to have to be proved before I jumped on that 
bandwagon. I'm a little bit o f a doubting Thomas on the $1 billion figure.108
This view reflected GAO’s findings that most studies up to 2002 took an average of 
22 months for single-function studies and 31 months for multifunction studies, 
therefore costing a lot. GAO told agencies “to keep those timeframes in mind when 
projecting resources required to support those studies and timeframes when savings 
are realized” (DoD 2003, 14). The savings could even be less than the money spent 
conducting the review, according to a former DoD official, based on his experience:
107 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6,2004.
108 Interview, name withheld by request, November 1, 2004.
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Let’s say you are doing a 15-person competition. That competition is going 
to cost you roughly $1.5 million, upfront.... So they will take a regular 
study, and they will take, three years. And it’s going to cost them $1.5 
million minimum. And on a 15-FTE study, it is going to take them 10 years 
to make that $1.5 million back. But OMB will say, ‘well the cost was 
reduced by $200,000’ let’s say, ‘and over a five-year period the contract will 
save $1 million.’ Well, it cost you a $1.5 million to do the study. Give me a 
break; you just wasted half a million bucks.109
Beside runaway costs, agencies tried to avoid congressional ire over reprogramming 
to cover A-76 expenses. Having these questions deprived the policy some of its 
merit and enabled those resisting to argue against funding a lengthy and 
demoralizing process. While A-76 could lead to some short-term savings, the 
amount may not have been enough to compensate for the morale and institutional 
problems that could result from extensive contracting.
Two, some argued that all OMB wanted was to fill the Scorecard with 
greens instead o f creating real efficiencies. One o f the Strategic Adaptation 
responses identified earlier was adapting A-76 to agency needs and conditions. The 
argument that considered an agency’s starting point was not only used in seeking 
wiggle room but also in going slow and refraining the issues. To illustrate, an 
informant from one agency suggested that the Scorecard was political. The starting 
point for all in 2001 was red, connoting that the 26 agencies and bureaus must all 
start from scratch in competitive sourcing. The source claimed that they had done 
similar activities to A-76 before, but OMB ignored the agencies’ starting points. The
109 Interview, name withheld by request, September 30, 2004.
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result was resentment that OMB was portraying all agencies as equally inefficient, a 
“naive” picture that was cultivated in public. As a kind o f refraining, the informant 
described the Scorecard as “about having everybody go from red to green” 
throughout Bush’s term, which was “as much a political motivation as the agencies’ 
motivation” to get to green.110 A former OMB procurement chief also said that in 
the run-up to the 2004 election, the Bush administration wanted the Scorecard to 
look as green as possible.111
Other critics stressed that instead o f pushing the quotas, OMB should have 
devoted some effort to experiment with alternatives like HPOs. Like GAO, some 
managers shared the belief that A-76, rather than help solving the human capital 
crisis that threatened national security (Voinovich 2000), actually made it worse. As 
an agency official shared, competitive sourcing’s role
in alleviating our budget problems and our issues with our human resources, 
in all honesty we don’t see much of a help. For one thing, if  you are hiring 
people, and in a few years your job may be competed, then it's not a real 
positive help in hiring.. .a lot of these competitive sourcing (rules), from our 
standpoint, is somewhat o f a handicap in implementing our human resources 
activity.112
Framing the debate meant using the press. Some agencies used it more than 
others to defend their position, to reduce uncertainty, especially among field 
employees, and to create and mobilize constituents and interest groups. Office
110 Interview with an agency manager, name withheld by request, October 15,2004.
111 Interview with Steven Kelman, October 15, 2004.
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memoranda, internal emails, minutes o f meetings, legal opinions, internal review 
documents, and other reports and goings on had somehow found their way into the 
media, lawmakers’ hands, and industry or union websites. According to a Park 
Service official, unions might have been vocal about A-76, but employees more so. 
They did not hear as much directly from the union as they did from individual
1 1 0
employees who were outspoken in the press.
The most vocal critics in the press came from agencies that had anticipated 
trouble moving out o f the red or yellow columns, for reasons discussed above. The 
vocal defendants came from those that immediately achieved “green” such as 
Health and Human Services, OPM, Defense, Energy, and Interior, whose leaders 
were loyal to the White House and whose top A-76 officials helped in crafting the 
2003 Circular, according to one o f them that I talked to (further discussed in the 
next chapters). This suggests that some of the reasons behind low or non- 
compliance -  agency structure, for example -  may not always be the exact opposite 
o f the reasons behind compliance, such as political loyalty.
Guerilla tactics and environmental modification
Resistance involves working for a reversal or modification o f policy. The 
environment may appear to be a constant, but in the long run, it also becomes a
112 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6, 2004.
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variable and organizations consider how it may be changed (Riggs 1980).When the 
feds lost the battles in the rule-making process in 2002-2003, they shifted toward 
changing the new rules little by little through Congress. What better way to counter­
act and re-shape an Executive branch initiative than to take advantage o f its 
unpopularity in the Hill? Interest groups, even a local government unit, which asked 
OMB to exempt Forest Service employees in California from A-76 (Peckenpaugh 
2003d), lent agencies their voices.
Agencies informed Congress o f the effects on missions and constituents, 
and cooperated with congressional committee investigations and audits by 
Inspectors General. These served as the basis for congressional attempts to block 
OMB control, and push for more favorable A-76 rules. Contractors labeled this 
move by the agencies and their congressional allies “guerilla fighting” as Congress 
chipped at the A-76 Circular provisions little by little, one provision after another.
Off the debating floor, employees also gained from the sympathies of 
auditing bodies. The GAO actively pursued Members’ requests to examine 
problems at different agencies. From 2001 up to 2005, GAO issued at least 17 
major Reports on A-76 and the FAIR Act inventory, delineating management 
problems, costs, and accountability issues in defense agencies. Their findings in turn 
bolstered arguments versus OMB’s approach and guidelines.
1,3 Interview, name withheld by request, February 8, 2005.
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Thwarting the intents o f the policy
Rubin (1985, 25) wrote about the tactic o f thwarting the intent o f an 
undesirable policy and making it less cost-effective or at least giving the appearance 
that it is less cost-effective. Since agencies have varying potentials to resist, even 
those that are powerless could in theory resist by undermining a directive. Some of 
the adaptive responses mentioned earlier, including playing games, evidently 
produced less than optimal dollar results (“smoke and mirrors”) from A-76. Could 
poor implementation o f A-76 -  not doing enough feasibility reviews before 
conducting a contest, not making the offer interesting or not working hard to get 
competition, not using agency funds for A-76 carefully - be interpreted as thwarting 
the policy’s intent? Here the research speculates on the possibility o f policy 
resistance being disguised as compliance. For example, according to a confidential 
source, one agency (or its A-76 manager)
went out and fulfilled the letter o f what they were required to do .. .as poorly 
and in almost as closed-minded manner as possible, it seems. It seems that 
they were trying to make it not work in a number of instances.. .Some 
agencies approached it more methodically than others.114
One o f the early low points o f the initiative occurred when an agency like 
the USDA reported that A-76 proved to be very expensive, resulting in deficits. 
USDA did not paper over the loss but showed all, including A-76 opponents in
114 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25,2005.
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Congress that A-76 could be very costly. Whatever the reason for the USDA net 
loss in FY 2003 (see case study in Chapter 5), the consequence was to give critics 
evidence that the quota-driven initiative was flawed.
Contrast the VA’s case with that o f the USDA. The VA - in a lengthy 
exchange in July 2003 with the House Committee on Veterans Affairs - originally 
reported that 35 percent of all of the agency's outsourced contracts (not in pursuit of 
A-76) lost money, while 27 percent achieved no savings at all. VA officials wanted 
to retract the report and show that they actually saved from contracting out. “I think 
we never should have released this report until we went back and identified the 
significant input errors,” said Dennis Duffy, principal Deputy Assistant for Policy 
and Planning at the VA, in an interview with Government Executive (Peckenpaugh 
2003c, 2). Although the flawed report was about contracts outside o f A-76, the 
debate arose in the course o f a hearing on VA’s appeal to Congress to let it conduct 
A-76. The tales o f USDA and VA showed how appearances were significant and 
that two agencies could respond differently in reporting the merits o f A-76 or 
contracting.
Yet another strategy to be able to conduct competition, lower the MEO bid, 
and eventually prevail over the contractors was inter-agency alliance, particularly by 
units that were geographically in the same area and had similar types o f activities.
To keep the anonymity in the following account, two agencies that were described 
by a key informant who had a lot o f experience managing A-76 in a big agency are 
dubbed Bureau X and Bureau Y:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
155
And so Bureau X and Bureau Y get together, and Bureau X says, ‘Listen, 
we’re going to set up this competition under A-76. We’re going to get the 
bids in on it, but in order to win we have to cut our FTE count by 54 percent’ 
- and that’s a great number, by the way -  ‘but we have to cut to win on our 
MEO.’ So, they say, ‘We can’t possibly do that unless you guys take over 
some o f our functions that we currently do. You have extra people and 
you’re not going through an A-76 right now. And you take over this stuff 
that we normally do, and we’re just not going to take it out o f the bid, the 
REP, but we’re not going to bid FTE count to do these particular functions 
because we know you’re going to help us out and do those for us.’ And 
Bureau Y says, ‘Sure, we’ll do that, and then when we go up for A-76, you 
do that for us. You do us a favor and you take over some stuff that we can’t 
do.’ And that is what they do. And of course they win - their MEO wins. 
Gosh, that’s surprising; both cut 54 percent o f their FTE count, which a 
government could never function on. EVER. But that’s what they had to bid
115to win.
Such tactics demonstrates how big the threat was perceived in that agency and how 
collective strategies evolve among like-minded agencies to protect their capacities.
A Multiplicity o f Responses
The federal agencies’ adaptive politics shows various responses ranging 
from making appropriate, compliant responses as Executive Branch agents, or 
“saluting Bush,”116 as a bureau informant described it, utilizing techniques to 
minimize organizational losses, disruption and uncertainties or “going slow without 
incurring wrath,” as AFGE observed,117 and modifying their environment through 
alliances and “guerilla tactics.” To review this chapter, what has the research added 
to the knowledge o f bureaucratic adaptation?
1,5 Interview, name withheld by request, September 30,2004.
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One, bureaucracy does not always resist a threatening policy. They could 
over-comply and cut themselves to obey and go through bidding contests with the 
private sector. This finding follows from newer studies that show bureaucracy does 
not always act like the resisting, unchangeable behemoth it is often made out to be.
Two, the chapter begins to suggest that the loyalty o f political appointees 
and higher echelons to the White House and their need to make no enemies o f the 
rest o f the agency in doing A-76 required a compromise tool like direct conversion. 
Direct conversion as a strategy met the outsourcing targets in small numbers but 
avoided the turbulent effects o f full-blown competitions.
Three, the chapter shows what kind of resources were useful for different 
types o f strategies, or what factors could hinder certain strategies. For instance, 
slack was useful in minimizing RIFs and meeting A-76 quotas; closeness to OMB 
was useful in proposing alternative approaches; and political allies were useful in 
standing one’s ground or fixing A-76 rules, as Chapter 5 will show. On the other 
hand, a bad historical image could hinder chances of seeking wiggle rooms, whether 
the image was out o f an agency’s own managerial weaknesses or, as the case of 
HPOs showed, DoD’s previous history o f breaking promises in exchange for 
competitions created bad repercussions for civilian agencies now needing the HPO
1,6 Interview with Dale Yielding, November 8,2004.
117 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23, 2004.
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option. This suggests a dilemma for civilian agency adaptation, as OMB had 
learned from DoD’s “tricks” in A-76. (Chapter 6 elaborates on DoD’s role 
modeling).
Four, scanning was a key to adaptation, and perceptions o f threat did 
condition some o f the responses. Some stood their ground because they saw the 
policy as nothing more than a bureaucratic exercise; some obeyed because their 
perceptions were that budget penalties could be imposed. One particular view that 
A-76 was politically motivated is noteworthy: did it work to magnify or lessen the 
threat? My conclusion is that for one particular agency, which should remain 
anonymous, it lessened the threat, or at least pointed the agency to rely on political 
resources, like congressional allies, to counter a political threat, rather than to rely 
only on technical argumentations with OMB or seek wiggle room. Tactics reflected 
the perceptions o f threat. It was possible that the more overt or dangerous the A-76 
tactics, the bigger the threat perceived. These nuances o f organizational behavior 
and adaptation were certainly complex; pegging just one strategy to an agency was 
neither useful nor accurate, even if 20 out of the 26 agencies in the Scorecard looked 
like they simply complied.
Five, this chapter alludes to the institutional implications o f A-76. Even in 
the eyes o f contractors, the threat to civil service as we know it was real. They were 
preparing themselves to take over most of the work o f government, and they
118 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
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believed that the unions could not stop the evolution. Chapter 8 will comment on 
this theme.
Chapter 5 will elaborate on the dynamics o f bureaucratic resistance and 
environmental modification, and Chapter 6 will examine the role of agency strength 
in compliance, so it bears here to make a comment on the middle strategy o f seeking 
wiggle room. How had seeking flexibility or asking OMB for some wiggle room 
worked? Had it supported or undermined the competitive sourcing policy?
Based on my interviews, the agency informants and their allies did not sound 
like their requests for more resources, credit in the Scorecard, or fitting A-76 rules 
to their agencies’ needs were in fact undermining the initiative. They argued about 
them in such a way as to obey within existing organizational constraints, as Energy 
already employed a huge number o f contractors, for example, or NASA was 
anticipating skill imbalances in the near future.
Negotiating some space was a proactive type o f implementation; a 
considered response that heeded the principal’s policy while minimizing turbulence 
or protecting the agency’s internal capacities. The middle ground o f bureaucratic 
adaptation was a gray area that theories o f implementation, bureaucratic politics, or 
organizational behavior, alone, had not examined enough. This gray area was most 
likely those “disparate processes” that to opponents of bureaucracy, such as 
contractors, interpreted as plain disobedience to OMB, but those processes were in 
fact the vigorous motions that carried agency strategizing forward.
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OMB officials, on the other hand, sounded like they saw the wiggle room 
appeals as tending toward undermining the policy, as efforts to avoid, delay, or 
discourage competitions, especially during the first year when the quotas were in 
force. They sounded like they thought that the agencies’ right hands were asking for 
more room while their left hands were lobbying Congress to thwart the policy.
OMB saw Congress’s moves to create some space for agencies as undermining the 
policy.
Finally, OMB let agencies know its intentions to keep a firm hand. In terms 
of evaluating the agencies’ performance, when agencies started asking for flexible 
scoring criteria to take their uniqueness into consideration, OMB’s Deputy Director 
replied to them publicly that they were “controlling what the definition o f success is, 
but shame on us if  that’s a bad idea” (Singer 2005,4).
The next chapters will illustrate how controlling the definition of “success” 
in competitive sourcing policy implementation could lead to disaster and that 
bureaucracy’s adaptive “success” was more complex than the colors could suggest.
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CONGRESS AND BUREAUCRATIC ADAPTATION
Pro-A-76 groups liked the fact that not only was competitive sourcing 
President George W. Bush’s priority, it was also an Executive program that could be 
put in place without a moment’s debate in Congress (Maggs 2003). What happened 
during implementation, however, was different. Bureau power and politics fills in 
the gaps in the implementation literature by looking at mandates as potential 
organizational threats and by describing different mechanisms of response. This 
chapter focuses on the critical role o f Congress in agency efforts, collectively and 
individually, to strategically adapt to A-76 and to change their environment. Two 
cases illustrate the agency dynamics o f resistance, adaptation, and compliance when 
Congress acts as a countervailing force to the Executive’s bureaucratic reform 
agenda.
Congress, Budgeting, and Competitive Sourcing
Agency adaptation to the requirements o f an Executive initiative such as 
competitive sourcing entails adjusting to the demands of other stakeholders, 
primarily Members o f Congress. But could Congress, in turn, be a powerful tool for
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the bureaucracy to create space and discretion for itself? The 20th century119 concept 
of a legislative-centered administration describes an arrangement wherein Congress 
supervises, intervenes in decision making, and treats agencies as extensions for 
legislative functions (Rosenbloom 2001; see also Schick 1976). In an effort to 
control bureaucratic behavior lawmakers could “penetrate to the smallest 
administrative detail” (Schick 1976, 517). Some scholars believe OMB is o f no 
match to Congress in terms of oversight. “The closer one looks at the way agencies 
behave, the more their behavior seems the product o f congressional action” (Dilulio 
Jr., et al. 1993,21).
As agencies carried out competitive sourcing, many actions from the Hill 
appeared to have been the product o f bureaucratic anxiety. Throughout Bush’s 
presidency, Congress served as an ally o f employees. Agencies took cues from 
Congress; but Congress also relied on agency signals to act on competitive sourcing. 
Observed an OMB staff member: “agencies may even go up and lobby the 
Congress: they’ll get an appointment with a Congressman on the Committee and go 
up and talk about competitive sourcing.”120 A GAO A-76 Panel member remarked 
in an interview that if  a powerful agency asked for some flexibility, they might have 
been able to get it, especially if the agency was a politically well-connected
119 The Legislative Reorganization Act o f  1946 enabled “continuous watchfulness” o f  agencies by organizing 
congressional committees after the organizational structure o f the federal administration.
120 Interview, name withheld by request, September 13,2004.
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organization “to the Administration, but more importantly, to Congress. Because 
that is the real issue.”121
Agencies relied on Congress’s traditional roles, namely: monitoring agency 
progress in the implementation o f A-76 and FAIR, watching the level of 
competitions since there was no law that agencies must conduct them, granting 
federal agencies the authority to explore alternatives to A-76 (Grasso 2001, i), and 
the perennial process o f budgeting, as a vehicle to fight A-76. Congress’s power of 
the purse enabled the agencies to make budgeting a central tool to create some space 
in A-76 or overturn it, even if gradually. The authorization and appropriation 
processes allowed Congress to attach specific conditions as to their use, making the 
budget an effective platform to modify any Executive agenda. This dynamics was in 
full display in A-76; it became the main venue for agencies to engage in the policy 
debate.
Countervailing Measures in Favor o f the Agencies
Policy dissensus between Congress and the White House regarding A-76 
helped a few agencies resist. Congress had generally been lukewarm to A-76 since 
Reagan’s presidency. According to an OMB staff, agency resistance re-enacted the 
mid-1980s when a lot o f lawmakers tried to protect the workers. “A coalition of 
them tried to block it, as the Reagan Administration was very supportive o f
121 Interview with Robert Tobias, August 31, 2004.
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privatization. The industry people were all geared up to try and get more 
competition out there.”122
Legislative constraints from the late 1980s to 1995 contributed to the lull, 
and later, a moratorium, on awarding contracts based on A-76 (GAO 2003b, 6). 
Critics o f A-76 would rather see a “legislative rather than a pure policy approach to 
public-private competitions” (Hamey 1998, 57, 60). In Reagan’s time, Congress 
was ambivalent between passing specific authorizing legislation and just providing 
direction to agencies during the course o f oversight and appropriation hearings 
(CBO 1987, ix).
Now, as in the previous decades, lawmakers worried about the impact on 
agency mission and resources, doubted the promised savings, and resisted potential 
RIFs in their districts. During confirmation hearings for Bush’s OMB Director 
Joshua Bolten, for instance, Senator Daniel Akaka used the occasion to condemn the 
A-76 pressure at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH employees were being 
asked to sign a form that included the FY 2003 A-76 goal in their performance 
contract. This created fear among the employees, according to the Senator, and
raises a question as to why there are such missteps at a time when NIH is 
seeking to hire young researchers and scientists.. .The insistence on 
numerical targets for contracting out work regardless o f an agency’s needs 
does not evoke an employee-friendly work environment. (Akaka 2003, 2)
122 Interview with Cynthia Vallina, September 10, 2004.
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Because A-76 was not funded by OMB, agencies had to fund the process out 
o f existing budgets, a bone of contention between the White House and Congress. 
The unfunded mandate in turn hampered mission performance. As NIH’s A-76 
chief observed, they pulled some o f the best people off their programs because they 
knew the work best, but that meant that the mission suffered (Phinney 2003).
Congressional resistance also stemmed from the threat to employment in the 
lawmakers’ districts. Many Republicans were just as likely as Democrats to oppose 
Bush’s agenda if it could lead to unemployment among constituents or loss o f 
electoral support from workers’ unions. For these reasons, the Bush 
administration’s directive was met with overt resistance on the House and Senate 
floors as well as covert support and arm-twisting inside budget committee 
chambers. Hill measures offered well-connected agencies and employee unions the 
chance to ease the pressure and put OMB on defense. Thus anti-A-76 language and 
amendments emerged with congressional authorization and appropriation, a 
conducive venue to exercise congressional alliance with the agencies, or with unions 
that represented agency views.
How much actual opposition was there? Appendix F lists the laws and 
amendments (some were dropped in conference) regarding A-76 in the FY 2004 
spending bills. Appendix G lists the same for FY 2005, which re-enacted the same 
dynamics. Employee unions like the AFGE and groups allied with particular 
agencies coalesced to back most o f these measures.
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To contractors, agency alliance with Congress was succeeding in blocking 
the initiative:
It’s been an issue that is heavily pushed by the Bush administration, but 
basically in words only, and not in fact: they have let Congress kind o f push 
them around on the process, so there have been some recent re-writes to the 
A-76 process to make it less likely for civilian contractors to want to
. T 123participate.
But while a few perennial lobs through the spending bills passed, the 
Administration’s veto threats and last-minute arm-twisting during conferences and 
veto threats thwarted many others. Below I elaborate on the Hill’s actions on A-76.
Outlawing the Administration’s Numerical Targets
As soon as OMB announced the goal to have 15 percent o f commercial 
FTEs competed in 2003, Congress reacted to nullify the quotas. The 2003 budget 
resolution Section 647 stated:
none o f the funds made available in this Act may be used.. .to establish, 
apply, or enforce any numerical goal, target, or quota for.. .public-private 
competitions or for converting such employees or the work performed by 
such employees to private contractor performance...unless the .. .quota is 
based on considered research.. .and is consistent with the stated mission of
i • 124the executive agency.
123 Interview with Stan Soloway, September 9, 2004.
124 108th Cong, Joint Resolution, Making consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
2003, and for other purposes, H.J. Res 2, February 20, 2003,474.
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The Comptroller General stressed that any arbitrary numerical goal would be 
inconsistent with their findings and recommendations (GAO 2002b). Section 647 
was already a mild compromise amendment from Senator Craig Thomas to replace 
the more stringent amendment from Senator Barbara Mikulski outlawing any OMB 
targets. OMB fought Mikulski’s amendment, threatening an all-or-nothing action: 
“Critics and those that are fighting 15 percent should be careful what they are asking 
for, because making it 100 percent is the other option,” according to an OFPP 
official (Peckenpaugh 2002e, 1). As OFPP Administrator Angela Styles protested in 
the press,
If I can’t set a goal I don’t know what else I can do .. .It puts us in a difficult 
situation because Congress is telling us that we can't manage. The problem 
with that legislation is it restricts us from being able to sit down and come up 
with any plan unless we make a bold policy statement that everything 
commercial has to be competed, and I’m not sure that’s the right answer. 
(Peckenpaugh 2002e,l)
Eventually, the official guidance did not put out any more across-the-board quotas; 
but NIH A-76 Director Tim Wheeles said that the requirements had not gone away. 
“We have been instructed by both the OMB and our department to continue with 
NIH's 04 requirements even while renegotiations continue” (Garnett, 2003,1). 
AFGE also claimed that the agencies were still held to targets individually in the 
form o f “milestones” that the agencies must meet quarterly.
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Banning Competitions. Defunding, or Capping A-76 Funding
During the Clinton Administration Congress through authorization 
prohibited DoD from outsourcing from October 1992 to April 1994. Under Bush, 
lawmakers had sought to block competition by barring the use o f funds throughout 
the government or limiting the money that could be spent by specific agencies. 
Representative Lane Evans fought the Bush administration in 2003 from using the 
Veterans Health Administration funds for A-76. Government-wide, Senator Harry 
Reid futilely attempted to block all kinds o f contests in 2003; but they passed 
Section 109 o f the 2003 Omnibus that none o f the funds could be used to privatize, 
divest, or transfer any o f the Army Corps functions.125
The succeeding years, Representative Chris Van Hollen and Senator Barbara 
Mikulski successfully introduced amendments in their chambers - Mikulski on the 
2003 Treasury-Postal Bill and Van Hollen on the 2004 Transportation-Treasury Bill 
- to block contests under the 2003 Circular, which they deemed unfair compared to 
earlier versions. But the White House successfully pressed for their removal during 
conferences, and in both instances an Omnibus measure was passed. A more limited 
action, capping the A-76 budgets, met success in the Interior and Related Agencies
125 However, the Army General Counsel provided opinion that the language does not preclude the transfer o f 
certain tasks to the private sector as long as the Army retains control and oversight o f  the function. See 
“Omnibus Addresses USACE privatization.”
http://comDetitivesourcing.usace.armv.mil/docs/Omnibus Bill addresses USACF. privatization.pdf (accessed 
on May 5, 2005).
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Appropriations Acts in FYs 2004 and 2005. Any amount beyond the limit would 
have had to go through a reprogramming request with justification requirements.
Stopping Contests from Being Completed
Lawmakers successfully stopped contests at the National Park Service in 
2003, courtesy of Representative Doug Bereuter. At the Department o f Homeland 
Security, lawmakers and OMB had a long-running dispute about A-76 for some 
1,100 immigration jobs. The contest was halted by Senator Patrick Leahy’s 
amendment to the 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations bill. The year before, on 
September 3, 2003, 30 Senators wrote the DHS Secretary about the 
inappropriateness of having the contest while DHS reorganizing. According to the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Documents obtained from DHS and other evidence showed that officials o f 
the Bureau o f Citizenship and Immigration Services determined the 
competition should not be held while the department and the immigration 
services agency were undergoing major reorganizations. BCIS officials also 
determined the competition would not lead to greater efficiency, and that the 
job functions o f the information officers had not been properly classified for 
possible privatization. (Lieberman 2004b, 1)
The senators believed that OMB’s quota and the impending November elections 
were behind the push. But a DHS official maintained that A-76 was better used as 
DHS completed its reorganization, despite protests.126 Industry, on the other hand,
126 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
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viewed the lawmakers’ act as “micro-management.. .the number one tactic with this 
functional protection battle.” Interest groups127 sent similar letters arguing that a lot 
o f Bureau o f Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) had already been 
outsourced (Gruber 2003a, 1).
Congress also tried delaying the implementation o f A-76 awards. For 
instance, in what was billed as the largest and most complex competition ever, the 
Federal Aviation Administration Automated Flight Service Stations System contest 
involving 2,300 FTEs resulted in a decision for a contractor in February 2005. In 
June 2005, Representative Bemie Sanders pushed for an amendment to H.R. 3058, 
the FY 2006 Transportation, Treasury and Housing and Urban Development 
Appropriations bill to stop the award. Lawmakers also tried to halt transitions at the 
Army’s Walter Reed hospital, USDA, and the NIST, where contractors won the 
contests. The Walter Reed competition would later come under criticism in 2007 for 
the decline in its level and quality o f services.
Shielding Jobs as Inherently Governmental
To avoid the problems o f A-76, the best option for the agencies was to 
exempt certain functions, with congressional backing. In the past, Congress and the 
courts were unwilling to venture much into this territory o f defining inherently 
governmental functions (Leman 2002,61). Some exceptions made in the 1980s
127 For example, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and a group o f more than 50 national and local
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were for functions supporting health-care facilities at VA, messengers, guards, 
elevator operators, and custodians at the General Services Administration (GSA), 
and certain functions at Interior (CBO 1987).
However, Congress stepped up its efforts in this direction. “It’s like a 
guerilla war,” according to contractors, when agencies fought to have Congress 
shield their jobs.128 As an Administration Official revealed, some agencies became 
too confident at resisting OMB’s call for FAIR list because o f their Hill ties. The 
agency would say: “You don’t want to talk about outsourcing these jobs because 
you're going to have the congressional delegation get extremely angry at you.”129
With the country at war, workers performing border protection measures 
stressed their importance to national security as reason for exemption, and Congress 
agreed. In 2003, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association convinced 
Congress, led by Senator Frank Lautenberg, to amend the FAA Reauthorization Bill 
to prohibit privatization o f air traffic separation and control functions and related 
services. After weeks o f negotiation and under a threat o f a veto,130 the White 
House compromised for a one-year moratorium on privatization o f any air traffic 
function. In 2005, a competition resulted in a win for a contractor, but amendments
organizations, including the American Immigration Lawyers Association.
128 Interview with Stan Soloway, September 9, 2004.
129 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9,2004.
130 See Statement o f  Administrative Policy on FAA Reauthorization online at
httn://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/saD/108-l/hr2115sap-h.pdf (accessed on May 15, 2005).
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in the House (H.R. 1474) and Senate (S. 776) were again introduced to the FY 2006 
Transportation, Treasury and Housing and Urban Development Appropriations bill 
to declare the jobs inherently governmental. A former DoD Undersecretary noted 
that a large number o f air traffic controllers in smaller airports were contractors, but 
Congress had chosen to protect even repairmen because the largest employers in 
those districts were military maintenance facilities. It was “electoral logic,” he 
said.131
Also in 2003, at the Commerce Department’s National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, seafood inspectors collected signatures from 19 
Senators and 20 Representatives to urge a reclassification o f their functions to 
inherently governmental from Commercial Code A. According to the House letter to 
the Secretary in June 2003,
the work o f the federal seafood inspectors clearly fit within the “inherently 
governmental” definition in both the FAIR Act and OMB Circular A-76: 
significantly affecting the “life, liberty or property of private persons...” By 
its very nature, the work o f federal seafood inspectors involves substantial 
discretion. (Frank et al. 2003,1)
The following month, Commerce reclassified the positions as inherently 
governmental, a victory for the NOAA.
At the NIH, firefighters considered for competition also received similar 
protectionist stance from members o f Congress. Senator Mikulski argued in 2003
131 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8, 2004.
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that firefighters in Bethesda, Maryland who received special training in handling 
chemical, biological, and radiological materials were vital to security and should not 
be outsourced (Phinney 2003). NIH also petitioned OMB to reclassify scientists 
who received one- to three-year fellowships as “core” to the agency’s mission after 
the bureau’s legal counsel ruled that those jobs could not be outsourced.
The complexity o f adaptation when more than one principal is involved 
showed in the case o f the Immigration Information Officers (IIOs) at the DHS. The 
Local AFGE had called the IIOs the “very lifeblood of the agency” (Gruber 2003b, 
1) and should therefore be exempted from A-76. BCIS officials reportedly argued 
against the DHS leadership about meeting the OMB numerical target They argued 
for aligning A-76 with their strategic mission. According to Senate Committee 
documents, Michael Yates, the Director o f Office o f Information and Customer 
Service revealed that in 2001, OMB directed the Justice Department - to which 
Immigration previously belonged before coming under DHS -  to
identify 1200 jobs...pursuant to the Administration’s numerical quotas. The 
Department delayed making a decision, arguing that it should be credited for 
jobs converted in the previous year. The OMB rejected that argument, and 
DoJ was given hours to identity 1200 positions in order to satisfy an OMB 
deadline. Then-INS Commissioner James Ziglar was informed by DoJ 
management of the decision to subject the IIO positions to a competition. 
There was no consultation with INS officials below Ziglar, and no 
opportunity to review and discuss the appropriateness o f the competition. 
(Lieberman 2004a, 1)
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Senate investigation showed that although the DoJ subsequently went through the 
re-evaluation, the widespread perception within the agency was that the decision 
would be difficult to reverse.
Another strategy to shield functions was to cite the privileges accorded 
veterans and special groups. Veterans Affairs leaders wished to protect the agency’s 
doctors and health care professionals and wanted to craft an alternative approach to 
public-private competition. OMB rejected VA’s request at first but they reached a 
compromise in March 2003: VA could use an alternative process132 and shield its 
health care professionals but it would have to conduct competitions for its support 
workforce (Peckenpaugh 2003e, 3). However, a GAO Report two years after 
(2005a, 3) conducted upon request o f Representative Lane Evans stated that “VA 
violated the Title 38 cost comparison funding prohibition and, consequently, the 
purpose statute.” VA improperly charged to the VHA medical appropriations 
amounts used in connection with cost comparison studies.133 But the agency 
defended its action by saying it interpreted the funding prohibition as applying only 
to “formal” (standard) competitions.
For disabled constituents, Representative Van Hollen in October 2004 filed 
H.R. 5276 stating that outsourcing may not result in the loss o f employment o f any
132 The alternative consists o f  the agency doing market research to see if  a function could be performed more 
efficiently in the private sector. I f  it is cheaper outside, the department would issue a request for proposals.
133 However, GAO was unable to determine the exact time and expense associated with V A ’s cost comparison 
studies carried out as part o f  Directive 7100 issued by the agency in August 2002. The agency did not 
adequately track the costs.
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federal worker with a severe disability. The lawmaker successfully petitioned 
President Bush to stop the competition at Bethesda's National Naval Medical Center 
which would have involved 12 severely disabled scullery workers (Palmer 2004a).
Oversight: Demanding Pertinent Information
President Bush’s initiative meant added monitoring for Congress. Where 
could Congress get its information? Not only was monitoring o f A-76 contests and 
spending very contentious issues, but the policy also pit Congress against 
constituents who all relied on federal paychecks. Both sides supplied Congress with 
ideas and arguments. Some Administration officials and pro-competition groups 
blamed employee unions for feeding Congress anti-A-76 information. With strong 
arguments from all sides, Congress needed an impartial body to aggregate the 
concerns outside its halls, according to A-76 expert Robert Tobias:
Members of Congress were getting a lot of heat about A-76. The contractors 
said that it had favored internal candidates for the competitions, and of 
course, the unions said just the opposite. So Congress said... we’ve had a 
litany of complaints over the years; what should we do?134
Congress therefore created the Commercial Activities Panel in 2001 amid concerns 
o f “organizational turbulence” that accompanied A-76 studies in agencies (GAO
134 Interview with Robert Tobias, August 31,2004.
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2002c, 4). The Panel submitted its recommendations in 2002, as Chapter 1 
discussed, but OMB ignored most o f its important recommendations.
As A-76 kicked in gear, opponents in Congress put in place annual detailed 
reporting requirements in several appropriations bills for FY 2004 and the Omnibus 
budgets since. This was a reaction to information coming from many places. An 
informant from Congress revealed:
What you have to understand about the studies is, they are very time- 
consuming and put additional burdens on the employees in the studies. They 
were documenting things about how they do the work. And so it’s a broad 
hassle for the person whose job is being studied. It’s a real pain. Not to 
mention you are worried that “they are studying my job; they are going to 
get rid o f me and hire some private people.” You have morale problems, too. 
So we started hearing from people in the field.135
To beef up monitoring, lawmakers asked agency Inspectors General to 
provide reports on particular agencies like the US DA and congressional committees, 
and the GAO to look into funding and implementation issues at the DoT, DHS, and 
Dol. Employees were willing to provide Congress with internal agency information 
as auditors acted on the Members’ requests.
Modifying the A-76 Circular and Guidelines
Some legislators agreed with the agencies that the 2003 Circular was biased 
for outsourcing. Key among the criticized provisions were the arbitrary deadlines set
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by OMB to complete the competitions, which 35 Senate Democrats protested with 
OMB, and the lack o f employee standing to protest A-76 decisions to GAO. 
Employees’ right to protest was a focal point in the power game between OMB and 
Congress. OMB’s rewrite o f A-76 replaced the old rules unique to A-76 with FAR 
Subpart 33-103. Affected employees could now appeal internally, but they could not 
lodge protests regarding standard contest decisions with the GAO or Federal Courts. 
The 2003 Treasury-Transportation spending bill contained language by the 
conference committee granting these rights to employees, reportedly vetted by 
lawmakers with OMB (Gruber 2003c). However, to unions and lawmakers’ 
surprise, the committee report was delayed for days to accommodate the last-minute 
objections from the White House. The White House convinced the conference 
committee members to drop it entirely. Even some Republicans supportive o f the 
Bush administration criticized the move. To clear his name, Senator Patrick Murray 
blamed the White House for its “relentless campaign” to undermine the conference 
committee’s agreement:
I want to emphasize that it is not the fault o f any o f the members o f the 
Transportation-Treasury conference committee.. .This attack on federal 
workers, on fairness and on taxpayers has only one source -  the 
Administration o f George Bush. (Murray 2003, 1)
135 Interview, name withheld upon request, January 27,2005.
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A lesser known, narrowly rejected amendment to the 2004 Transportation- 
Treasury Bill intended to re-emphasize the FAIR Act o f 1998 and overrule OMB’s 
2003 Circular. Representative Alcee Hastings’s amendment would have prohibited 
the use o f funds to develop inventories o f inherently governmental functions, which 
OMB added on top o f the FAIR Act requirements.
Congress also backed alternatives to create savings, such as the concept of 
High Performing Organizations that GAO had proposed. But OMB was lukewarm 
to the idea, believing some agencies would use it to deviate from the 
Administration’s goals. Although HPO was briefly mentioned in the 2003 Circular, 
no guidelines were released for years. There were instances, however, when OMB 
gave nods to particularly powerful agencies to use it, such as DFAS (Hubbard
2004).
Congress and the agencies achieved victory in some areas, such as: 
nullifying the provision to re-compete MEO work every five years and to limit the 
Letters o f Obligations to a maximum of five years’ performance; removing the 
arbitrary numerical FTE targets for competition; and counting direct conversions at 
the DoD toward A-76 goals. It was the first attempt to modify OMB’s criteria for 
the Scorecard (Peckenpaugh 2003g) that was subsequently followed by other 
agencies.
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Other Initiatives in Congress
Beyond inserting language in the bills, legislators also employed other 
strategies. In 2004 Senator Robert Byrd held up the nomination o f David Safavian 
to replace Angela Styles at OFPP in exchange for Safavian’s commitment to look 
into the standing o f employees to contest decisions and to revive direct conversions. 
The year before, Clay Johnson’s nomination as deputy director was held up for five 
months over Senators’ objections to the A-76 quotas (Maggs 2003). Senator Byrd 
also used the same tactic, putting a hold on the nomination o f OMB Director Joshua 
Bolten to replace Mitch Daniels in 2003, in order to delay the release of the revised 
Circular A-76 (Peckenpaugh 2003h).
The following case studies illustrate these actions by Congress on behalf of 
agencies and the dynamics o f organizational adaptation in a multi-principal setting.
Bureaucratic Adaptation in the Middle:
The USDA-Forest Service
The downsizing o f the 1990s left the Forest Service short on skilled staff 
(Gansler 2003). There was a steady increase in its budget overall during the George 
H. W. Bush administration, but in 1993 downsizing began as the Clinton 
Administration’s cuts in the timber-sales program reduced Forest Service money for 
salary. Thousands o f employees took buyouts and concerns mounted about the 
heavy loss o f experience jeopardizing the agency’s mission (Walsh 1994).
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Probably no agency more than the Forest Service bore the pressures of 
having to adapt in the middle o f OMB and Congress in A-76. The agency was 
“weak” to begin with, saddled with a contradicting mission - selling timber while 
protecting the nation’s forests - and unwieldy financial management system.
Besides the traditional checking-and-balancing between the two branches, 
client/interest groups also kept an eye on the agency’s A-76 program. Add to these, 
the Forest Service had to contend with the wishes o f its parent agency, the USDA, 
one o f the biggest and therefore most conspicuous agencies monitored in the OMB 
Scorecard.
While many civilian agencies were careful not to jump headlong into A-76, 
Forest Service and USDA behaved otherwise. Inevitably, the increased media 
attention raised issues about the pressuring tactics o f OMB and the merits o f A-76 
itself.
In FY 2003 Forest Service had an authorized 35,500 FTEs, o f which 78.6 
percent, or almost 27,900 FTEs, were deemed commercial and all o f them suitable 
for competition (House Report 2004,2). The remaining 7,600 FTEs were 
determined to be inherently governmental functions. David Heerwagen, the Deputy 
Chief for Business Operations, would later admit that management wanted to 
protect some commercial jobs from outsourcing, but “ran out o f time” to justify 
exemptions after waiting for OMB guidelines on completing FAIR Act inventories 
(Gruber 2004b, 1). The haste with which OMB pushed A-76 evidently caught many 
flat-footed.
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Spending Scrutiny
In June 2003, news came that the Forest Service planned to compete up to 
10,000 firefighter jobs and 2,000 accountants (Peckenpaugh 2003i). According to a 
draft proposal by the National Leadership Team -  60 senior executives in the 
agency -  the Forest Service wanted to meet the OMB targets with the minimum 
disruption on their activities. The strategy was: in FY 2004 Forest Service would 
study “smaller, separable work activities” with “a significant likelihood to increase 
cost effectiveness without disrupting associated programs” while larger, more 
integrated work activities would be studied in FY 2005 and beyond (Forest Service 
2003,1). Reports surfaced immediately that thousands of workers were being drawn 
away from their regular duties to work on A-76 (Lee 2003).
The plan leaked just as lawmakers looked into slowing down A-76 at the 
National Park Service (NPS). The Forest Service and the NPS both received their 
appropriations under the Interior Bill. What made the Forest Service a foster case 
for resistance or compliance and the congressional role in organizational adaptation 
was the dynamics surrounding the limits, first put in the FY 2004 budget, on the 
amount o f money Interior could spend on A-76. The Interior Bill, one o f 13 
appropriations bills that Congress must pass every year, is personnel-intensive and 
has a rural focus where federal employees are significant contributors to the local 
economies. The Interior subcommittee was at the forefront o f the debate; the matter 
was put in their laps because the spending controversies erupted just as their Bill
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
181
was moving in both chambers. The Interior Bill was the first venue to challenge the 
entire policy when Senator Reid proposed to stop Interior-funded agencies from 
initiating contests for FY 2004.
At the root o f the scrutiny was the fact the Forest Service did not request, nor 
had Congress appropriated, funds for A-76 activities before 2004. Forest Service 
officials were reportedly reprogramming money without approval (Hardy and Boren
2005). During the deliberations, appropriators gathered that by the end o f FY 2003, 
the Service had spent around $18 million on A-76, but lawmakers suspected it to be 
more than that. In fact, the USDA -  whose management score from by OMB 
reflected the performance o f all o f its component agencies, including the Forest 
Service and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)136 -  stood out 
starkly in OMB’s first annual report (2004a, 12) as having gone in the red with a net 
loss o f $3,596,000 while other agencies posted net savings from A-76. Lawmakers 
wondered how much was being spent and where the money was coming from, 
shared a congressional staffer,
because in most cases it was not explicitly budgeted for. And from oversight 
perspective, that really —  Forest Service, for example, I don’t remember 
what the final tally was of what they were spending but it was a significant 
sum o f money that was detracting from something else.137
136 Like the Forest Service, NRCS spent more than the savings it generated in 2003.
137 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25, 2005.
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On September 5, 2003, the House Committee on Appropriations directed an 
investigation of the Forest Service. While the investigation unfolded, Congress 
passed Public Law 108-108, the Interior Bill with a cap in Section 340 on Forest 
Service A-76 spending at $5 million despite OMB’s objection in the Statement of
1 38Administration Policy (SAP). With the hard caps on spending, an observer 
remarked that it was like a slap on the face o f OMB:
OMB went ballistic. Because the appropriators were insulting them by 
capping, because it was their presidential initiative.. .OMB and the Forest 
Service may do what they are going to do, but at least if  the cap was on, then 
the appropriators will have won.139
Coincidentally, at the height o f congressional scrutiny in 2003, the OMB 
Administrator in charge o f competitive sourcing, Angela Styles, resigned her post to 
go back to private law practice. She left even as some of the key staff o f OMB for 
the President’s Management Agenda also departed one by one.
The House Report
In March 2004, the House Surveys and Investigation Staff released its report 
to the Appropriations Committee on the Forest Service. According to a key 
informant, “the report was quite damning, to say the least” and “shocking” in terms 
o f the gargantuan flaws the Service had committed in pursuit o f OMB’s directives.
138 Congress renewed the ban for FY 2005; Forest Service was limited to $2 million.
139 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9,2004.
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“This is the stuff that everyone wanted to find out; and it was a lot worse than was 
depicted.”140 But OMB’s May 2004 government-wide report to Congress 
mentioned Forest Service shortcomings only within the context of encouraging 
more contractor interest in future competitions. Apparently, the Service took 
advantage o f A-76 rules to favor its in-house personnel’s bids.
The House report revealed some details. One, the Forest Service conducted 
a record 171 competitions in FY 2002 and FY 2003 combined, consisting o f 3,694 
FTEs, mostly in maintenance functions. Two, the unusual number o f competitions 
and rate o f in-house wins (95%) resulted from the Service’s strategy o f conducting 
studies o f small numbers o f FTEs. According to the investigators,
More than 46% of the 169 completed studies, or 78 studies, involved 3 FTEs 
or fewer, 36 o f which involved only a fraction o f an FTE.. .Because o f the 
prevalence o f multi-tasking in the Forest Service, the Forest Service allowed 
single FTEs to be divided into as many as 20 function codes on its FAIR and 
inherently governmental inventories. (House Report 2004, iii)
Three, the methodologies used for calculating costs contributed to the in-house 
wins. Finally, it appeared that the agency was unable to manage the program costs. 
Because the agency did not have appropriations for A-76,
the Forest Service has had to absorb competitive sourcing initiative (CSI) 
costs within its existing budget limitations. Rather than centrally earmarking 
funds for CSI, the Forest Service directed each Forest Service office 
involved in CSI to absorb the costs it incurred, such as consultant contracts 
and employee travel and training, within its existing budget. A Forest
140 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8 4
Service regional office, for example, would use its facilities maintenance 
account to fund a facilities maintenance study. (House Report 2004,4)
In addition to using unappropriated funds, according to investigators, the agency 
could not give an accurate amount o f the funds they used, just estimates:
They were compiled ‘after the fact’.. .There are some organizations, such as 
the Forest Service National Federation of Federal Employees union, that 
believe the .. .costs.. .are currently underestimated. (House Report 2004, 5)
Employees and Congress therefore found some evidence for the earlier criticism of 
OMB’s reported savings and the OMB pressures on agencies that were 
inexperienced with public-private competition.
Pressures and Weaknesses
Sources in Congress believed that if  A-76 could go awry, the Forest Service 
experience best exemplified it. They believed that the Service had already 
contracted out a lot o f functions and what “got things off to a bad start” was the 
arbitrary nature o f the A-76 targets, according to a source knowledgeable about the 
Forest Service:
There wasn’t enough thought put in up front to figure out how many, what 
kind o f positions to look at, what should we study. It was more of, we have
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got to study at least 5,000 positions this year and 5,000 next year, so that is 
what they did.141
Along with the quota, Congress disapproved of an OMB proposal in USDA’s FY 
2003 budget to cut some 500 jobs at the Forest Service headquarters and 250 more 
in the regional headquarters. As a key informant narrated, the OMB proposal was 
completely unattainable:
We like the concept if  it works.. .in some cases it works, in some cases it 
doesn’t. Agencies like the Forest Service have already contracted out most 
o f their work. They have contracted out vast quantities.. .outside this strict 
A-76 framework. Their budgets are not increasing at all. If  you look at a map 
of the country, there is a lot of work to be done and you have to have federal 
officials out there on all those lands... .So (for OMB) to take an agency that 
is already doing contracting, and say that you have to get rid o f 20 percent o f 
your staff, is ridiculous!142
Critics believed that the vast tracts o f real estate (192 million acres) managed by the 
agency required the presence of federal employees. House investigators also noted 
that the agency’s FAIR Act inventory of competable activities jumped from 59 
percent in 2000 to 70 percent in 2003 o f the total FTEs. However,
Forest Service employees involved in preparing the FY 2003 FAIR 
inventories o f commercial activities do not believe they accurately reflect 
Forest Service activities.. .Moreover, the employees noted the Forest 
Service’s decision not to identify any o f the commercial activities as 
unsuitable for competition (Reason Code A) had resulted in commercial 
activities they considered “core” to the agency’s mission being subject to 
competition. (House Report 2004, ii)
141 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27,2005.
142 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
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Why the Service scrambled to meet OMB expectations, unlike others, and 
why Congress had to intervene at the Forest Service may be explained by a couple 
o f theories, both confirmed in my interviews. The first has to do with the weak 
power o f the Forest Service vis-a-vis OMB, giving the former few options but to 
comply with A-76 targets. The second lies with the institutional animosity between 
OMB/White House and Congress and how bureaucracy strategically adapts in such 
a situation.
Since the 1990s, the GAO had taken the Forest Service to task for its 
inability to put its accounting and financial house in order. In January 1999, GAO 
designated the Service’s financial management as a high-risk area. Twice, according 
to GAO, Congress in the 1990s gave discretion to the Forest Service in deciding 
where to spend appropriated funds after it had promised to become more 
accountable, but the Forest Service failed to deliver both times (GAO 2000c).
In May 2003, when spending on A-76 became a hot-button issue among 
budget committees mindful o f the national deficit, the GAO once again reported 
how little progress was likely at the Forest Service. Forest Service officials did not 
deny their problem, in an interview for this study in 2004. The Chief of Business 
Operations acknowledged that:
In the budget/finance side o f the house, for example, we had a series o f
failures to be able to produce a clean audit going back to when the CFO Act
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requires that we obtain clean audit. Until 2002 we have not been able to do 
that.143
Such conditions made the Forest Service a “bad boy” in government. According to a 
long-time observer, it did not even matter which party held power; OMB simply 
looked down on the Forest Service for its inability to keep its books in order. This 
weakness then met great internal pressure in an organization whose culture partly 
consisted of doing its hardest when committed. As an insider explained:
So when the OMB came up with targets for competitive sourcing, the 
agency thought, ‘My god, we have to meet this.’ They were in such a 
weakened position that they had got to take OMB seriously in competitive 
sourcing.. .If  they didn’t they would get (pressured) even more by the 
Administration.144
Institutional animosity between the agencies and OMB, and OMB and the 
congressional committees, reared its head in A-76, which worked to the advantage 
o f resisting agencies. Bush’s first OMB Director, Mitchell Daniels, did not endear 
himself to appropriators during his term.145 This hostility was an issue as Forest 
Service tried to find ways to adapt to the tightening scrutiny from both sides.
Interest groups also dogged the issue o f a huge tab the agency ran for A-76 
consultants.
143 Interview with Chris Pyron, November 1, 2005.
144 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
145 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
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Information started trickling in from the field about the huge A-76 expenses, 
prompting congressional investigation. Informants privy to the investigation said 
they were not even sure if  the appropriators received “the full answer as to how 
much (Forest Service) were spending,” but it was more than was reported. “They 
never requested a specific amount for A-76. They just later on said, ‘We are doing 
this,’ and they slowly gave us numbers over time,” according to one o f the 
sources.146 Lawmakers were upset because they thought that the Forest Service was 
reprogramming without approval. The amount spent on A-76 “kept ratcheting up, 
and up, and up” as lawmakers pushed the Service for information.147 One 
knowledgeable informant who did not wish to be identified by position or date of 
interview believed that Forest Service spent at least $60 million. Tom Mills, the 
Deputy Chief for Business Operations during the raging controversy, had earlier 
told the Washington Post that “anytime you try to get more cost-effective, it’s going 
to cost you money. That means you had to give up something that you would have 
done with that money” (Lee 2003, A l l ) .  This displeased the lawmakers.
Information: The Name o f the Game
Early in the competitive sourcing initiative, the press complained that USD A 
A-76 data were harder to obtain compared to other agencies (Peckenpaugh 2004a). 
Representative Marcy Kaptur, seeking to limit competitions at the Farm Services
146 Interview, name withheld by request, January 24, 2005.
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Agency and the Rural Development Agency, sought information but received 
nothing. “We’re telling that if  you don’t give it to us, there’ll be consequences,” in 
the form o f no funding, Kaptur’s camp warned as they asked for information once 
more (Peckenpaugh 2003j, 1). At the Forest Service, officials were in a very tight 
situation during a particular meeting as described by a source: as Forest Service 
officials started revealing to lawmakers what they were spending on A-76, there 
were people from OMB “watching what they were saying,” according to a very 
confidential source.
Keeping secrets is next to impossible in the American political system (see 
Wilson 1989,252). When DoD, for example, decided to hire consultants to manage 
the publicity for its A-76 activities and get the word out that A-76 was fair, the 
AFGE’s Jacqueline Simon remarked in the press that
What it really is, is an attempt to squelch officers or officials on the local 
level from (telling reporters) about how (competitive sourcing) quotas are 
wreaking havoc on the department's ability to fulfill its mission...In 
Washington, you can spin it and spin it but when you get out there . . .  the 
people on the local level are speaking the truth. (Gruber 2004c, 2)
Information on the Forest Service got fed to congressional committees 
through channels. The spotlight shone as the information built up and employees 
and former employees spoke to the press. As one congressional staffer said:
147 Interviews, names withheld by request, January 25, 2005, December 9, 2004, January 27, 2005.
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When that first House vote on the Interior Bill came about, frankly this issue 
wasn’t very large on our radar screen. Until.. .those studies started hitting the 
papers and the possible impacts started getting back to the Members.148
Interest groups such as the National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE) 
lobbied Forest Service to scale back its plans because union leaders did not believe 
the agency had enough resources to do a good job o f studying that many FTEs in 
one fiscal year (Peckenpaugh 2003h). Union members played a big role in focusing 
congressional attention to the staffing consequences and consulting costs o f A-76. 
One source remarked that A-76 was like a gift by the Bush administration to the 
business and consulting industry.149
The Forest Service itself did not lobby Congress but information still came 
through. According to a source, lawmakers started hearing bits and pieces and 
phone calls from people saying things that were going on: “They really made sense. 
You don’t want to be wasting this kind o f money just because somebody at OMB 
thinks this is cool target to check it off on their list. You want something to come 
out of it.”150 The House Report consequently generated disdain for the Forest 
Service’s A-76 methods and USDA’s weak oversight, conveyed congressional 
displeasure, and focused the spotlight on OMB’s approaches.
“Information is the name o f the game in budget control,” Senator Lee 
Metcalf observed in 1974 (Bimber 1991, 585). Congress, OMB, and the agencies all
148 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25,2005.
149 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
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play the game. The reporting requirement that the Interior Bill Appropriators first 
attached (other committees followed) required agencies to submit detailed plans for 
competitions, locations, and costs, among others. OMB at first objected to the 
requirement but an Administration official saw the value of the reports:
They (lawmakers) have far more information than we see. It always interests 
me when Congress asks agencies for information. Agencies would usually 
present a whole lot more data than they would give us. So it's really 
convenient when Congress would ask them the right questions that we've 
been asking.151
Who Knew What? When?
Forest Service, OMB, and Congress had slightly different versions o f how 
much each party knew of what was going on. Some officials in charge of the 
controversial contests had left at the time of my interviews. Sources for this study 
maintained that while OMB and USDA were aware of the plans, Forest Service 
used its discretion so that the details (such as the small-FTE, splicing strategy) were 
not necessarily known or approved by OMB. According to a Forest Service official,
My recollection is that that was a Forest Service decision. What we were 
trying to do - right, wrong or indifferently - is, we were trying to hit a fairly 
ambitious target o f number o f jobs to be studied. And to show that we could
150 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
151 Interview, September 9, 2004.
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get the work done, we had to do it without the kind of internal oversight that 
obviously tripped us up, as you saw in the Report.152
As explained by Forest Service leaders, what the OMB and the USDA did not know 
of, and what Forest Service officials themselves did not figure out early and 
completely, was the size o f the individual studies in different locations:
For instance, OMB did not know that our Southern region was going to do a 
study o f 0.8 FTEs. They did not know that at that time; they just knew that 
we were doing a study on a particular forest. And when we did it, at the 
national level we were not really cognizant enough about competitive 
sourcing that it waved a red flag in front o f our faces.153
OMB officials, on the other hand, said that while they had an idea of the USDA- 
wide plans, they were not given some o f the details:
At the beginning we were definitely involved. I don’t think we got very 
much information on their plans... with the Forest Service, about a year and 
a half ago, we started to have planning meetings, working with the CFOs at 
USDA, we met at the Forest Service where they laid out a kind of a five-year 
plan, although we were focusing on the next three years (2003-2005). It was 
general planning; it would have a Getting to Green plan in competitive 
sourcing. But overall it was departmental in scope.
Some informants believed that OMB knew about the Forest Service strategy and 
allowed it despite the cost overruns. To them it was proof that OMB was focused on 
quotas rather than efficiency. A Forest Service official remarked that OMB was not
152 Interview with David Heerwagen, November 1, 2005.
153 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1, 2005.
154 Interviews with Adrienne Erbach, Joseph Montoni, Jason Weller, and John Pasquantino, September 10, 2004.
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happy because o f the tone o f the House Report, “but even they could not argue with 
the facts o f the report.”155
Adaptation and Survival at the Forest Service
What this case o f the Forest Service points to, perhaps, are three 
conclusions. One is that an agency may feel it has no other option but to comply, 
but its response may also be laden with a strategy that maximizes agency interest. 
Forest Service was able to keep almost all of the studied jobs in-house, all the while 
meeting its OMB-given target, despite the very public beating it received from 
many sides. According to one observer, the agency in many ways probably 
manipulated the studies:
They chose a lot (of functions) that they knew they were going to win, and 
they could go back and tell OMB, “We hit your target, and by the way, we 
won virtually all o f the competitions.”156
Two, their case shows the unintended and unfortunate consequences o f a quota- 
driven policy on a managerially weak, congressional agency (see Wilson 1989). 
Everybody won, and one could say, but everybody, including taxpayers, also lost. 
OMB may have met its target for the agency; Forest Service wiggled out a little bit 
as OMB and appropriators battled each other over spending caps; and Congress 
used the agency’s missteps as justification to attack the A-76 initiative. But so much
155 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1,2005.
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money and time were spent that could have gone to other activities. As a key 
informant remarked, “I don’t even know how anybody at all could stand up with a 
straight face” with what happened at the Forest Service.157 Congressional 
committees that conducted investigations o f agency activities often kept their 
reports internal. In this case, according to an insider, the report “was ultimately 
disclosed and made public because the Committee felt strongly about it, because it 
clearly showed real problems in how the Forest Service was doing competitive 
sourcing.”158 Groups supporting the Forest Service, however, thought that it might 
not have had a lot o f choice in using small FTE contests. The National Federation o f 
Federal Employees kept insisting that the multi-tasking reputation of the Forest 
Service employees did not fit the A-76 process. It also appeared that the 
congressional findings led to resignations at the Forest Service. Literature and the 
interviews bear evidence o f the delicate relationship between bureaucrats and 
lawmakers and the adverse consequences when the latter senses unfaithfulness in 
funding or program actions.
Three, the case shows that bureaucracy adapts by tapping the traditional 
skepticism it shares with Congress -  despite control by the same party as the one in 
the White House -  in dealing with management reform initiatives. Many managers
156 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27, 2005.
157 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
158 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27, 2005.
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hold the view that changes at the top give new management initiatives little room to 
grow. A competitive sourcing manager I interviewed said that there would always 
be new initiatives that buried the ones at hand:
I think they all go in cycles. For those of us who have been around a while, 
everything gets fast-tracked and something else comes along and you will 
devote your resources to that. Somebody has a wonderful idea and you go 
off and you work full-time devoted to that, and then some other idea comes 
along and you shift toward that, so.159
But when pressured by OMB, agencies could always expect relief from Congress.
As a source in Congress mused about competitive sourcing,
Sometimes I think these kinds o f initiatives sound really good, and when you 
actually start doing it, I think you find that some of the things you thought 
initially to be the case do not turn out that way.160
The House Report, the Interior Bill, and the investigation o f Forest Service 
activities not only slowed down the initiative at the agency, but also forced a re­
examination o f the policy government-wide, benefiting the entire bureaucracy. A 
historical analysis would show that the House investigation, the debate on capping 
A-76 spending, and the departure o f key personnel at OMB could have all “helped 
tip the balance for change.” The events aligned. According to an insider,
at the Forest Service.. .there was this really big push initially and they spent 
all the money. And then the next year, it just seemed to really kind o f (lose)
159 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6, 2004.
160 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1,2005.
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its momentum and (they said), “Well, we're not going to start up anything 
new, we are just going to finish the competitions we have already started.”161
In retrospect, what were the three parties’ thoughts on the experience o f the 
Forest Service? Despite the bruising conflict and drama played out in the press, 
Forest Service officials believed the Forest Service was able to emerge in one piece 
afterward. After the controversy, the media reported that the Service got a partially 
clean slate from OMB (Gruber 2004d). Forest Service officials clarified for this 
study that it only meant that OMB would like to make sure they did not “misuse” A- 
76. They said they had established a good dialogue with OMB, “probably more so 
than most agencies because we have had so many problems with the program.”162 
Soon after, OMB let the agency out of overseeing the in-house teams that won the 
maintenance jobs. Said Forest Service officials:
That is one example o f how they have been willing to work with u s.. .They 
have been a fairly strong advocate o f the competitive sourcing program and 
they are holding our feet to the bar that we do it right, you know, so it’s not 
like they are looking the other way; they just want to make sure the program 
is working out as intended.. .at this point in time OMB is understanding of 
our managerial limits.163
Forest Service officials sounded sanguine that positive things came out of 
their experience: valuable to them as well as other agencies observing what 
happened. “One o f the things that we've learned through this process - and I think
161 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27, 2005.
' “ interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1,2005.
163 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1, 2005.
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OMB appreciates this,” according to an official, “is that once you get this much 
organizational change going, it's hard to be studying a lot of other things while 
you're trying to implement major changes as it is.”164 As mentioned earlier, the 
GAO would like Forest Service to implement the reforms it had promised in 
financial management. Simultaneous with budget and financial system changes, the 
Service was also starting a business process re-engineering in human resources. The 
agency thus tried to meet OMB A-76 targets in their unique way amid these other 
concerns.
Forest Service officials insisted that they were not using congressional 
ammunition against OMB: “They have not interceded on our behalf.” In fact, they 
felt that they were in the middle o f a war between the two parties. “We were seeing 
ourselves getting beat up by both sides.” While OMB pressed them, they felt that 
their appropriators were also against A-76 from the outset. Rather than an alliance 
between the agency and Congress, Forest Service felt pressure from both:
It was almost like we were in the middle between OMB on one side - 
wanting us to push forward but getting to the point where they understand 
we can't push much forward at this time - and the Appropriations Committee 
o f the House saying that we should stop everything immediately.165
Other observers, revealed, however, that the agency could have run to congressional 
allies earlier and gotten some relief. “I don’t know if  they figured that they could
164 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1, 2005.
165 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1, 2005.
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use their contacts on the Hill (to slow down competitions).. .that it would get too 
politically sensitive,” said one informant. The agencies that went slow, according to 
this source, might have figured that if  they were pushed hard on A-76, they would 
simply inform their congressional delegation that OMB wanted contests in their 
electoral districts: “Forest Service should have pushed back. They really didn’t.”166
Nonetheless, as Congress showcased the agency’s failure in A-76, OMB 
upped the USDA score from “red” to “yellow” in September 2003. Administration 
officials believed that the Forest Service actually provided lessons and should be 
applauded. “What we decided is that everybody owes (the Forest Service) 
congratulations” (Gruber 2004e,l), said OMB’s Deputy Director for Management. 
A source in Congress retorted that Forest Service officials ought to have been given 
presidential awards to have done what the White House wanted.
Forest Service officials, looking back at this very public education on A-76, 
remarked that at least they survived the storm:
Obviously the Report pointed out that we had some shortcomings and we 
have acknowledged those shortcomings.. .In terms of political survival, I 
think yes, we have been successful. While I wouldn’t argue that we have 
been successful on all our competitive sourcing studies, I would argue that 
politically, while we got beat up pretty badly, we are still surviving.167
166 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27, 2005.
167 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1, 2005.
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Other agencies probably learned from what happened at the Forest Service, 
especially the decentralized agencies. Decentralization can allow sub-units, where 
the threat to agency mission may be greater, to cope in their own ways, using their 
own strategies. The semi-independent Forest Service monitored its portion of the 
environment and responded to it without greatly affecting the entire USDA (see 
Rubin 1979).
The period o f calm proved to be brief, however. A few months afterward, in 
May 2005, a “Competitive Sourcing Informational Update” from Forest Service 
headquarters to regional heads caused another stir. E-mailed to update field 
managers on the plans, the memo indicated that the OMB was not letting up on the 
initiative in the second term of the Bush administration and that OMB and USDA 
were holding the Forest Service accountable for studying 100 FTEs in FY 2005.
This was unexpected (emphasis in the original) because Agency leadership 
was under the impression that there was OMB and USDA support for the FS 
to and agreement that we would only focus on the .. .initiatives currently 
underway, and we would begin ramping up for new activities in 06 and 
competitions in 07. This is not the case today. OMB recently notified USDA 
that it was highly probable that its previous “Yellow” rating in competitive 
sourcing on the PM A Scorecard would be changed to “Red” for FY 05.. .due 
to the lack o f competitions, and primarily in the Forest Service. (Forest 
Service 2005, 1)
The memo sounded alarmed, as the Forest Service seemed to be losing an ally, the
USDA, in the competitive sourcing battle:
Although the Department has been an advocate for us and, I believe, still are 
supportive so let's be mindful of that, based on the rating change they are not
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in the same position to help us as much as they were previously. (Forest
Service 2005,1)
The pressure was on again, apparently. But the fact that the memo appeared on the 
news indicated that strategic adaptation was once more at play.
Strength and Adaptation: Analysis o f the Case
If strength was based on agency staffing alone, USDA and the Forest 
Service ranked among the oldest and most populous agencies in government and 
therefore would be expected to get their own way if  they insisted on carrying out a 
presidential pet program using a lot o f discretion. The Forest Service was the 
biggest component o f the USDA even with the downsizing it suffered under 
Clinton. But the details of this case show that the response of the Forest Service in 
implementing A-76 was more complicated than the ability or inability o f Forest 
Service to use power based on size to resist the policy. The bizarre combination of 
OMB congratulating Forest Service for A-76 studies that both parties acknowledged 
as flawed and wiping clean the bureau’s slate later can be explained by mapping the 
research themes against the pressures agencies experienced.
The hypothesis that OMB was able to get the Forest Service officials to 
commit to hundreds o f A-76 studies on the grounds that the Service was “weak” in 
stature in Washington, D.C. seems validated. Although huge, the agency was weak 
because no one political party could safeguard its seemingly contradicting mission, 
selling timber while protecting the nation’s forests, using timber sales to fund
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shortfalls in conservation. It was weak because its highly fragmented leadership 
system prevented it from carrying out policies coherently. During the A-76 
controversy in 2003, a GAO Report (GAO 2003c) noted that the Bureau of Land 
Management and the Natural Resources and Conservation Service, unlike the Forest 
Service, developed and implemented performance accountability systems that 
produced multiple benefits. The Forest Service, in comparison, was unable “to 
provide Congress and the public with a clear understanding o f what its 30,000 
employees accomplish with the approximately $5 billion it receives every year” 
(GAO 2003c, 1). But, as Chapter 4 speculates, poor implementation o f a threatening 
mandate, however weak the agency was, could have been deliberate, or could be the 
result o f resistance, especially in this case where, despite the expensive costs o f its 
studies, Forest Service “won” most o f its contests.
Congress as a source of agency strength adds nuance to the picture. Besides 
the “bad boy” image o f the Forest Service, congressional displeasure with the 
downsizing effect o f A-76 in their districts and the old animosity between OMB and 
appropriators led Congress to become a tool for agency adaptation to A-76 and 
redirect the heat toward OMB. Discredited or not, Forest Service, sources indicated, 
could have run to Congress -  and probably did, through channels -  to gain some 
space. The spending caps provided that much-needed breather.
OMB seemed to have rewarded USDA -  and indirectly Forest Service -  
with a move up to yellow in the ensuing period, possibly an effort to emphasize the 
learning rather than the embarrassment on everyone’s part regarding the flawed
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implementation o f an ideological policy. As the Forest Service declared itself a 
political “survivor,” it appeared to have mitigated the effects. I believe that OMB 
successfully controlled the Forest Service leaders, who were compliant and in turn 
rewarded with a progressive score and a waiver on following up on the small-FTE 
contests. But loyalty to the White House could only go so far in producing the 
desired behavior given the structure, culture, and mission of the Forest Service. It 
can be concluded that obedience to OMB targets was pushed as hard as 
headquarters could but the decentralization and the culture o f the Forest Service 
clashed against the pressure, skewing the A-76 implementation. As GAO had found 
in many aspects o f Forest Service management,
the agency’s culture allows field managers significant independence in 
deciding whether to implement headquarters’ guidance. The Forest Service 
culture o f making decisions by agency-wide consensus serves as major 
impediment to more concerted action.. .the agency has a collaborative 
leadership management style...so that progress depends on a collective 
acceptance o f any new proposal. (GAO 2003c, 2-4,15)
As agency officials acknowledged during their interviews:
Competitive sourcing has been a difficult program for the Forest Service for 
a couple of reasons: we've long prided ourselves on our family orientation. 
You know, we take care o f our folks, if  you are a good loyal, Forest Service 
employee you can pretty much count on us to be there for your career. So we 
have an unusually high level o f people working for us who have never 
worked for any other agency but the Forest Service. So when we start talking 
about competitive sourcing and some of the impacts it has on the 
organization, it's fairly difficult for us to embrace the ideas behind
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competitive sourcing and still hold the conflicting values that we do on
family, at the same time.168
Those statements capture the adaptation challenges to competitive sourcing for not 
only the Forest Service, but also other agencies.
Loyalty amid Resistance: The Department o f the Interior and the 
National Park Service
The case o f the National Park Service preceded the Forest Service in terms 
o f the attempts to limit A-76. The NPS was the first battleground in Congress to 
derail the Bush initiative (Gannon 2003). Congress -  with lobbying from a number 
o f interest groups opposed to outsourcing in the parks -  had had more success 
limiting spending (and therefore job contests) in the NPS than the Forest Service. 
Congress ably supported the park rangers under the Bush administration; lawmakers 
from both chambers wrote the White House asking for additional money over the 
president’s budget when they felt it was inadequate (see Environment News Service 
2005). The prestigious NPS was able to call on congressional allies early and use its 
strength in protecting its functions, compared to a weaker Forest Service.
Unlike the NPS, the Department o f Interior, the NPS parent agency, ranked 
among the agencies that OMB cited early for leading in competitive sourcing.
168 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1,2005.
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Despite snags in A-76 at the NPS, Interior’s overall performance was notable in 
pushing the agenda throughout the government.
It was not inconceivable that a resistant bureau should belong under a huge, 
loyal, but decentralized agency. Structure and a decentralized decision-making 
system can enable bureaus to gain autonomy and establish sources o f power apart 
from the mother agencies. This could explain how the NPS behaved carefully while 
the Interior responded to the A-76 policy in a loyal manner.
Embracing Competitive Sourcing at Interior
Interior began communicating and planning for A-76 as soon as OMB 
released the directive in November 2001. The department pegged a “soft” target of 
25 percent o f the department-wide total number o f FTEs identified as commercial in 
nature for competitive review until the end o f FY 2004 (Scarlett 2002,1). Between 
FYs 2002 and 2003, the department intended to review 3,500 positions to fulfill the 
15 percent quota given by OMB (Dol no date). At the outset, the department was 
quick to tell its bureaus that it would be grading them in the same manner that OMB 
had graded Interior. Interior developed a stringent system that graded bureaus with 
red, yellow, or green for their A-76 efforts.
OMB’s nod to Interior’s performance showed early and it probably owed 
more to the agency leaders’ attitude rather than the actual number and size of 
competitions it conducted - - 3000 positions were subjected to competition from 
2002 to 2005 (Cameron 2005,1). While many agencies delayed or resisted, Interior
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leaders formally prepared the required Green Plan, launched competitive sourcing 
campaigns early, talked publicly about the policy in a non-confrontational manner, 
acknowledged the morale and costs problems among employees, lobbied for 
flexibility for all agencies in A-76 implementation, and publicly assuaged the 
concerns o f  lawmakers while emphasizing the merits o f the president’s agenda.
Among the 26 agencies on OMB’s Scorecard, Interior joined a handful that 
promoted A-76 vigorously. Interior’s leadership, particularly Helen Bradwell- 
Lynch, also belonged to an elite crop of executives that gave input to Angela Styles 
at OMB in shaping the 2003 Circular. The appointees supportive o f the president’s 
agenda -  HHS’s Ronald Noonan, Interior’s Helen Bradwell Lynch, OPM’s Kay 
Cole James, Energy’s Dennis O’Brien, and DoD’s Annie Andrews - actually led the 
agencies that achieved green scores faster than the rest. At Interior, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Scott Cameron liaisoned between OMB and other agencies in 
searching for options to carry out the agenda in more palatable ways to federal 
workers.
Controversy at the Parks
Interior gained the attention o f lawmakers because of the Park Service. The 
NPS in 2003 had approximately 26,000 funded positions (19,000 FTEs) at 388 
national parks covering 88 million acres o f land. These figures included year-round 
and seasonal jobs. NPS also used volunteers. O f the bureau’s FTEs, some 1,700 
were classified as subject to competition. In the 1980s, NPS did engage in A-76
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competitions; but from 1987 to 1997, it only prepared commercial inventories 
without doing any competitions (Mainella 2003a, 7). Not surprisingly, with the 
intensification o f A-76 under Bush, the Park Service resisted the enthusiasm of 
Interior’s top leaders. But Park Service employees still felt the pressure from OMB. 
To one informant, Interior leadership’s “allegiance and alliance was more with 
OMB and far less with the Bureaus.” The source opined that the political career o f 
Interior’s leaders hung on how well they performed A-76.169
With opposition to A-76 by groups such as the Public Employees for 
Environmental Responsibility, the Association o f National Park Rangers, and the 
National Parks Conservation Association, Congress paid close attention early in 
2003 when Park Service Director Fran Mainella’s April 4,2003 internal 
memorandum to Interior leaders was leaked (Mainella 2003b). The memo revealed 
that Interior would like NPS to study 1,708 cumulative FTEs by the end o f FY 2004 
to meet OMB’s target, with 900 FTEs to be directly converted to contract positions. 
It mentioned the impact o f contests on the morale o f both federal workers and park 
volunteers, the effect on the diversity of the workforce, the use o f staff for A-76 
work, and funding for A-76 consultants. It raised the need for budget 
reprogramming. The memo hinted at adverse consequences for visitor services and 
seasonal operations if  consultant fees were to be covered by existing appropriations.
169 Interview, name withheld by request, February 8, 2005.
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Likewise, media supplied a human face to employees’ anxiety with A-76. 
One o f the competitions included Douglas Scott, the Interior Department’s 
Distinguished Service Awardee, in September 2002. Skilled in battlefield 
archaeology, Scott was nonetheless included in the Midwest Archaeological Center 
job competition in Nebraska. He said that morale was at the lowest in 28 years he 
had been with the federal service (Peckenpaugh 2003h).
Compared to Forest Service where appropriators were unable to learn o f the 
spending magnitude straight away, the response from Congress to NPS was 
immediate. Representative Jim Moran inserted Section 335 into the Interior 
Appropriations Bill for FY 2004 that blocked funding for competitions, in a 
subcommittee chaired by a Republican, Representative Charles Taylor. Said 
Representative Moran:
The subcommittee simply wants to make sure that we’re not going too far, 
too fast, in terms of outsourcing, so we do not lose professional expertise in 
the land management agencies and Park Service, particularly. (Gannon 2003, 
1)
A hundred eleven House Democrats also sent a letter o f concern to OMB 
Director Josh Bolten. Quoting Mainella’s memo, particularly the threat on diversity, 
the letter warned that “Privatization for the sake o f privatization should never 
become NPS’s mission” (AFGE 2003, 1). In the Senate, Senator Reid proposed a 
moratorium on A-76 at Park Service, a move that ran against the sentiments of 
Senator Craig Thomas who headed the subcommittee on national parks, and the 
author o f the FAIR Act o f 1998. The White House voiced its irritation:
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How is a janitor at the Park Service ‘inherently governmental’? People are 
trying to protect special classes in their state or district and say these really 
aren’t  up for competition, without looking at the broad goals o f what we’re 
trying to achieve. (Peckenpaugh 2003j, 2)
Congress also intervened in particular contests. The House, by a 362 to 57 
vote, passed an amendment to the Interior Bill to halt funding in 2004 for 
competitions at the Midwest Archeological Center and the Southeast Archeological 
Center. The manager was reportedly relieved that their representative stood for them 
(Peckenpaugh 2003f).
But the lower chamber’s effort to stop A-76 in the parks was not matched by 
the Senate, to the dismay o f Park Service allies. The senators opted, by a vote o f 53 
to 43, for the Voinovich-Thomas language that would not limit future competitions, 
but rather require reporting from the Interior Department about its efforts. Similar 
to the case o f the Forest Service, lawmakers finally capped spending at $2.5 million 
for FY 2004 during negotiation. Beyond that, Interior would need permission to 
reprogram funds.170 Even as the debate on limiting A-76 at the Interior repeated 
itself during the FY 2005 and FY 2006 appropriations process, the fact is that the 
Park Service was able to harness its bases o f political support. As a congressional 
staff observed in an interview:
The Park Service got out o f the game. Within the Interior (Dol) the Park 
Service was always one o f the higher-profile agencies.. .that was a case
170 The reporting requirement, however, was later on repealed by Public Law 108-447, the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act for FY 2005, a victory for the White House when the competitive sourcing fight resumed the 
year after.
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where they had commenced the (A-76) study and our Appropriations Bill 
happened to be on the House Floor and a member offered an amendment.. .1 
think it might have caught the White House by surprise.171
Managing Boundaries and Adept Strategizing
Compared to the Forest Service’s ex post facto  explanations o f its difficulties 
in meeting OMB directives, the Interior-NPS people managed their public messages 
and signals more adeptly at the boundaries from the beginning. The events at the 
Interior and NPS show the important role o f information management in adapting to 
delicate situations. Left uncontrolled, information coming out from different sectors 
could multiply uncertainties for the organizations and their employees. However, 
the cases o f this parent agency and its component bureau show how political loyalty 
and compliance at the top could work to cover policy resistance in the field.
Interior and NPS succeeded in controlling the negative publicity, showing 
loyalty to OMB and Congress in the case o f the head office o f the Department, and 
supporting the policy even as it explained its dilemmas in the case o f the Park 
Service. How did this happen? On Interior’s part, as soon as the appropriators 
initiated efforts to stop A-76 the leadership pronounced that the ban would not 
disrupt the agency’s plans, carefully avoiding sounding antagonistic to Congress. 
“We understand and appreciate the fact that Congress has a responsibility to oversee 
federal spending,” Deputy Assistant Secretary Cameron pronounced (Gruber 2003d,
171 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25,2005.
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1). He speculated that the focus on Interior was brought about by the openness of 
the headquarters’ communications with the field, unlike other agencies whose 
activities in A-76 were more concealed. In an interview for this study Cameron 
acknowledged:
Probably the most active expressions o f anxiety were at the National Park 
Service. They had employees believing that since they were listed as 
commercial, they were going to lose their jobs. There was a lack o f 
comprehension about what it really was all about. And having 80,000 people 
scattered all over the country, it was very hard to communicate.172
The department acknowledged the confusion surrounding the position o f park 
rangers, whether or not it stemmed from employees, or the press, or “a combination 
o f the two getting each other pretty excited,” as Cameron continued to explain:
The perception at one point was that Park Rangers were going to be 
outsourced. And it turns out, that was an inherently governmental position 
because they have got some law enforcement responsibilities. And there 
were some concerns that people with all the historical expertise or the 
national resource expertise in the parks were going to be outsourced. And 
some o f those in fact, may be in commercial positions, but most of them are 
not... So there’s a lot o f bad information and this is one o f those situations 
where people share bad information with each other and just get each other 
more scared than they were individually in the first place. And those stories 
tend to multiply and the more you tell them, the less accurate they get.173
172 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13,2004.
173 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
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To address employee anxiety, the department sent all employees a letter from the 
leadership and sent people to talk to some of the bureaus:
We did video conferences; we had articles on employee newspapers. We 
physically went out and talked to groups o f employees and with our Labor- 
Management Council. We talked to them so much about competitive 
sourcing, we probably bored them. 174
To maintain good standing with Congress, Interior tried to quell the heat as 
the Forest Service at the side gained attention for its runaway costs in competitive 
sourcing. Interior was keen to contrast its A-76 management with the Forest 
Service. According to Cameron,
Our friends in the Forest Service, I think, had some real problems the first 
couple o f years and they are the ones, I think, that got the Interior 
Appropriators interested in the topic... We have been very efficient and 
careful about how much money we spend.175
At the time o f the debate to cap the funding, the Interior Department maintained that 
it had spent only $2.1 million until October 2003. The Park Service likewise never 
spent over the $500,000 reprogramming threshold in any given fiscal year since the 
competitive sourcing initiative began (Mainella 2003a, 9).
The Park Service, on the other hand, pronounced support to the president’s 
policy, all the while keeping Congress aware o f what was happening inside NPS. 
Director Mainella later testified that the media coverage of NPS competitive
174 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13,2004.
175 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
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sourcing was “confusing” (Mainella 2003a, 8). In a newspaper article, the Director 
claimed that the media mischaracterized the scope, purpose and effects o f the 
National Park Service’s competitive sourcing efforts (Mainella 2003c). Nonetheless, 
the bureau let the Interior leaders know that it would keep the subcommittee 
informed about reprogramming possibilities (Mainella 2003b), a sign o f the 
bureau’s independent alliance with Congress.
Loyalty. Defiance, and Adaptive Success
How adaptive were the two organizations? In the case o f the Department o f 
Interior, the close collaboration between its leaders and OMB in A-76 appeared to 
have worked to the agency’s advantage. The Park Service, on the other hand, 
managed to parry the OMB club with the help o f Congress and interest groups.
When Interior received its green in competitive sourcing in March 2005, the 
AFGE called the score a “badge o f dishonor” (Palmer 2005b, 2). But Interior’s 
successful adaptation to OMB’s agenda was demonstrated even while the agency 
was in the red and yellow columns. The closeness and loyalty between the Interior 
Department’s leadership and the White House/OMB was evident by the working 
relationship between the two in promoting the agenda. Interior, like the DoD, was 
among the first few agencies that gained OMB’s ears in A-76 implementation. In 
April 2002, when many agencies were still trying to get acquainted with the 
President’s Management Agenda in general and the A-76 Circular in particular, 
Interior quickly received OMB’s green light to use a so-called “express review”
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method whose results should count toward their A-76 goal (Dol 2002). “On the 
morning of December 5, as Washington woke up to its first snowfall o f the 
approaching winter, Interior officials trekked over to OMB to pitch their idea” 
(Peckenpaugh 2003h, 4). The idea was a modified streamlined competition process. 
Under the 2003 Circular, competitions for FTEs under 65 did not require 
reorganization (MEO) before cost estimates were compared to industry, thus 
preventing the in-house team from having a good chance of winning and creating 
savings when the job eventually stayed in-house. Interior leaders convinced OMB to 
allow it in their case:
During the implementation o f the Dol FY 2002/2003 competitive sourcing 
plan, we determined that.. .adding the MEO option to streamlined studies 
would result in more efficiency and more cost savings. Employee morale 
would be increased.. .Dol proposed to OMB that agencies be allowed to 
develop an MEO with a streamlined study. OMB approved D ol’s idea as a 
pilot project, and subsequently wrote it into the revised Circular A-76. (Dol 
2005, 6)
Interior also worked to gain some flexibility on behalf o f all the agencies. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 on strategies, confidence and leadership enabled Interior to 
ask OPM or and Congress for greater buyout authority.
Waiting until a performance decision is made is too late in the process to 
explore and inform employees regarding the availability o f placement 
opportunities, Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (“early-outs”), and 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay programs (“buy-outs”). Dol continues 
to work with OPM and OMB to provide employees with more peace o f mind 
from the onset o f a study with regard to options available to them. (Dol 
2005,11)
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Finally, Interior proudly stated that approximately 50 percent o f their commercial 
competable FTEs would have been studied by the end o f FY 2008, an effort very 
much aligned with President Bush’s agenda (Dol 2005, 14).
In the case of Park Service, OMB gave it and Interior credits for direct 
conversions. It was a strategic move since other agencies were not able to take 
advantage o f the rule in time. According to the NPS Director:
Prior to the cutoff date o f May 29,2003, when the revised OMB Circular 
stipulated that no further direct conversions should occur, the Park Service 
successfully converted 859 positions to contract positions. All 859 positions 
were either vacant or involved new work where the positions contracted out 
were unencumbered. Not one permanent Park Service employee lost his or 
her job due to these direct conversions. (Mainella 2003a, 8)
This practice, however, did not require Park Service to determine the cost 
effectiveness o f using contractors. In public, OFPP’s Angela Styles said that she 
would demand documentation that the decision was cost effective (Peckenpaugh 
2003c).
Finally, Interior’s leadership in competitive sourcing after the Bush re- 
election reflected in Scott Cameron’s role as Subcommittee Chair on competitive 
sourcing o f the Chief Acquisition Officers Council. The subcommittee helped 
OMB-OFPP in developing better guidance to make agencies become more 
forthcoming about outsourceable activities (Hill 2005a). Cameron, along with A-76 
Assistant Director Annie Andrews of DoD, had also led the call for a greater OPM 
role in developing guidance on the role o f human resources officials in A-76 (Hill 
2005b).
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It can be said that NPS adapted strategically, internally and externally. With 
the loyal stance at the headquarters acting like a cover, Park Service successfully 
warded off threats to its employees and mission by playing defense with the help of 
lawmakers. Said a key informant, who drew a distinction between the Forest Service 
and the Park Service, “the Park Service basically blew OMB off; they said ‘We’ll 
do what we can,’ and did a little bit to keep OMB off their backs.”176 Park Service 
successfully halted competitions in selected areas, received credit for direct 
conversions, avoided RIFs, and kept the park rangers’ job inherently governmental. 
Its leadership, as shown during the budgeting debate, balanced successfully its 
alliance with Congress while showing obedience to the president’s agenda. The key 
event was exposing how much A-76 could cost (and the problems at the Forest 
Service). A Park Service official recalled in an interview that
It was very hot. At the time, that (Interior) memo was very controversial 
because it was an attempt to explain to the people in the field that we had to 
participate in this but it's very expensive and it could cost upwards o f $3,000 
an employee that you’re reviewing. That is very expensive.
The press proved crucial in mediating the agency-congressional alliance and 
reporting the sentiments from the field. The Park Service official pointed out that 
even though unions might have carried their agenda to the press, employees 
themselves talked. He said it was rooted in the Park Service’s high profile:
176 Interview, name and date o f  conversation withheld by request.
177 Interview, name withheld by request, February 8, 2005.
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We have a lot o f unions, and they are spread nationwide not just one. And 
they have been very vocal about their opposition to it but sometimes the 
opposition is even stronger in the voice o f Park Service employees because 
Park Service is a high-profile organization. And all manners o f people can 
find the ear o f the press - even the maintenance person can. So even though a 
union may represent them, we didn’t hear as much directly from the union as 
we did from individual employees who are outspoken in the press.178
Organizational Adaptation and the Politics o f Multiple Principals
An essential element that strategically adaptive agencies used to their 
advantage was the divergence between the White House and lawmakers on the 
extent to which A-76 ought to be enforced, and, therefore, appropriated for in terms 
of money and staffing requirements o f agencies. Congressional support as a source 
o f agency strength therefore played a big role in adapting to competitive sourcing. 
Agencies could cope with OMB pressures more effectively by getting lawmakers, 
particularly appropriators, on their side as part o f the “guerilla tactic” for 
organizational survival. A union informant aptly described the lawmakers’ 
resistance to A-76 as an exchange of “cues” between Congress and agencies.
I don’t think there is any question that agencies look at what’s happening in 
Congress. They look at the fights over contracting out, they understand that 
what OMB is doing is a political issue.. .1 think the fights that occur in 
Congress alert agencies that this is a very controversial initiative. And I 
think the agencies respond accordingly.179
178 Interview, name withheld by request, February 8, 2005.
179 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23, 2004.
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In OMB’s view, it was a strategy of resistance for agencies when Congress 
cut the request for A-76 funds of those who were brave enough to ask. “A lot of 
agencies don’t even include it when they know that in the Hill the budget request is 
going to be pulled.”180 The legislators’ actions, whether or not their measures 
passed the chambers, significantly slowed down the White House agenda, inflicting 
what contractors called “death by a thousand cuts” (Emery 2004,1). Without clear 
funding, agencies had an excuse for lackluster implementation.
Agency success in getting Congress to limit outsourcing possibilities proved 
that alliances did not always toe the party line. OMB clearly “didn’t anticipate the 
degree o f ambivalence they would get from the Republican side o f the aisle,”
•  1R1observed a Hill source. Local employment considerations prompted a less-than- 
enthusiastic response from some lawmakers. Since the Interior bill had a sort o f a 
Western focus, the impact of unemployment could be great. As an observer 
remarked:
you have a lot o f members dealing with rural communities where the Forest
Service employees or the Park Service employees are very significant
portions o f the economy... .Having ten or 15 federal jobs contracted out in
Washington, D C .. .doesn’t move the needle. But when that subject comes up
in .. .Western Montana or somewhere like that, it causes a little more
182concern.
180 Interview, name withheld by request, September 10,2004.
181 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25,2005.
182 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25, 2005.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 1 8
Especially during the November 2004 election, most o f the congressional 
delegations were meeting their constituencies in communities where the federal 
employees were found. An industry informant and an OMB official concluded that 
indeed “all politics is local.” Members of Congress were “keenly aware of 
federal presence” in their districts. “They watch them closely,” according to OMB 
sources.184 The criticism that came on the Rural Development farm loan program 
came from a Republican and a supporter for the most part o f President Bush, but,
It definitely wasn’t to try and bash a presidential policy per se . . .But 
certainly the employees unions are mostly Democratic. A lot o f Democrats 
voiced very strong opposition. But it has been an equal opportunity.185
An Administration official noted that it could have even worked to the 
agencies’ advantage that the Republicans controlled both the White House and 
Congress. OMB could not press too much when a district had a Republican 
representative. He said that “sometimes because especially, the agencies would say, 
‘Hey, they are supposed to be our friends, we don't want to piss off our friends.'”186 
This strategy would not have escaped agencies resisting A-76.
183 Interviews with Stan Soloway, September 9 ,2004  and with an OMB official, name withheld by request, 
September 9, 2004.
184 Interviews with Adrienne Erbach, Joseph Montoni, Jason Weller, and John Pasquantino, September 10,2004.
185 Interview with Adrienne Erbach, September 10,2004.
186 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
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OMB’s power has waxed and waned throughout its history (Tomkin 1998; 
Wildavsky 1988) but it remains a potent bargainer with lawmakers. When Congress 
directed its attention to A-76 implementation in their districts and favored agencies, 
the White House began issuing Statements o f Administration Policy (SAP) to 
threaten the passage o f bills (Appendix H). The SAPs repeatedly branded 
congressional attempts to shield agencies as “a step backward.”
However, the absence o f the threatened veto in actuality during the last three 
fiscal years (FY 2003 -  FY 2005) proved that the White House probably pushed 
back as much as it could and was able to minimize its losses. Asked why a veto 
never materialized, an OMB official commented that lawmakers would likely try to 
limit A-76 if  they had a big facility in their State, but:
because this is a Republican Congress, and a Republican President, it would 
be very unseemly for the President to veto a bill. It would look like you 
cannot go along within the family. So they generally manage to avoid that 
kind o f confrontation.187
Added a congressional staffer, “When Congress is the same party as the president, 
we generally try to accommodate the president’s priorities by and large.”188
187 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
188 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27, 2005.
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OMB acknowledged the difficulty o f pushing management reforms in 
general, because, as theory suggests when the benefits appear dispersed and the 
costs concentrated, one could expect more opposition than support for a policy 
(Downs 1957). OMB sources likened A-76 debates to deficit reduction. A-76 was 
difficult because there was no constituency for bureaucratic reform, according to 
them. Congress and agencies, on the other hand, reffamed the A-76 debate against 
OMB’s case for efficiency. An Administration official explained the difference 
between the two sides. He said that the pro-A-76 argument was
sort o f faceless.. .It's the right thing to do, it's good for government, and yes, 
there are private companies out there who could stand to gain if  they took 
over these responsibilities and these jobs. But there is not a compelling —  
it's not a personal interest story. It is personal interest story when 'Here are 
the faces o f the people who have these current jobs. Are you going to put 
these people and their families out o f work?' So it's not unlike deficit 
reduction, where it's the right thing to do, it's good for the economy in 
general, but it's an amorphous, faceless economy in general. When you talk 
about cutting the deficit, though, cutting this program which affects this 
community or these recipients - that side pushes a lot harder that Congress is 
facing and what we face as well. It is easy to be for deficit reduction in the 
abstract. But when you get down to the details of it, it's somebody's program, 
it's somebody's project that you're cutting.189
After being caught flat-footed in the FY 2003 budgeting round, OMB tried 
to surmount the legislative challenge by making the case for good government. 
However, there would always be two sides to the argument, as an expert in 
competitive sourcing revealed:
189 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
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E. J.: You were there when Congress started complaining about the studies 
and the targets. How did that battle go?
Source: Yes. Well, it depends on what your views are. If  your view is, you 
shouldn’t have to compete federal commercial work with the private sector, 
then it’s an arbitrary and capricious thing to say, ‘You should take that work 
that is commercial in nature to be done out o f the yellow pages, and submit 
that to a normal federal procurement process.’ If you don’t believe that 
federal employees should have to compete for that kind o f work, then it was 
an arbitrary management decision to try to force that work into competition. 
But if  you view an inventory with half a million federal employees 
performing work that can be done competitively, and if done competitively 
through the procurement system, then it is a management approach to getting 
that work competed which has never been competed before. And it’s a 
reasonable, rational, ramping up o f the process to a point where it becomes a 
normal, institutionalized thing. The work is commercial; it should be bid on 
by other taxpayers.
E. J.: Is that how you explained it to them?
Source: That’s one way. I think we got caught in the political argument.190
The political argument certainly helped opponents o f A-76 mount counter­
offensives in the media and on the Hill. “The political environment.. .the politicians 
in Congress Me making it more difficult for agencies to manage,” noted the 
president o f the service contractors’ association.191 That “difficulty” Congress gave 
the agencies could very well have worked as a shield to create some space for 
themselves.
190 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
191 Interview with Stan Soloway, September 9, 2004.
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But OMB proved during the saga that it was getting tougher on management 
as much as the budget side o f its mission. Congress’s involvement in the 
competitive sourcing issue seemed to have been, according to William Campbell, 
Assistant Secretary for Management and Chief Financial Officer o f VA,
almost a backhanded compliment to Bush’s management agenda. Attempts 
to introduce legislative language curtailing job contests demonstrate that 
lawmakers are at least aware o f the management reform effort and take the 
initiative seriously. (Gruber 2004a, 2)
OMB sources insisted that unlike the Clinton era, the Bush administration gave top- 
level commitment and follow-through to make A-76 a permanent tool. In addition, 
as a staff member explained, “regardless o f your own politics, when you work at 
OMB, with all the problems you become a fiscal conservative” and A-76 was a 
good technology to use during a budget crunch.192 OMB’s campaign, with the 
strengthened “M” in OMB, could not be said to have relented even with the 
departure o f key people like Angela Styles. As OMB sources explained, when 
Congress started putting limits on the policy, they worked hard to present their case:
We negotiate with them. We try to show them the benefits o f competitive 
sourcing and why it should be done. We also try to discuss the fact that 
never does a federal employee lose a job because they can put affected 
federal employees on other jobs. And there's a requirement for the 
contractors to offer federal employees that don’t get the job the right o f first 
refusal. In fact, federal employees sometimes opt to work for contractors and 
turn down another federal job. So there is protection. So we try to talk the 
benefits o f why it's there. And then it depends on how big the study is in
192 Interviews with Adrienne Erbach, Joseph Montoni, Jason Weller, and John Pasquantino, September 10,2004.
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some congressman's districts and whether they think it will cost them 
votes.193
This was a significant departure from the past, when GAO challenged OMB to show 
strong leadership so that civilian agencies could have an incentive to use A-76 
(GAO 1998a).
As the second term of the Bush administration began, OMB continued its A- 
76 pressure on agencies. It called for removing the “legislative constraints” that 
persisted (as o f 2005) despite the growing success o f competitive sourcing. The 
White House firmly believed that these initiatives were mandating a bureaucratic 
monopoly that burdened the taxpayers.
Learning and Adaptation
With victories came defeats and both the agencies and unions were learning. 
Competitive sourcing was a presidential reform agenda and Congress could “only 
limit” an executive branch initiative.194 In AFGE’s view, the Bush administration 
was very successful in threatening to veto entire bills or to strip lawmakers o f pork 
(Perera 2004c) if they opposed the agenda. The record reflects the White House 
strategy o f diluting some o f the harsher language that passed on the floor from 
vigorous union lobbying, but were maimed or entirely dropped at conference. While 
the unions successfully convinced lawmakers at the subcommittee level, the
193 Interviews with Omar Nasashibi and David Muzio, September 13,2004.
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Omnibus process often stole their hard-won victories. The compromise agreement 
made by the Transportation-Treasury conference committee in November 2003 was 
dropped upon the Administration’s insistence, for example. In a press release 
Senator Patrick Murray recalled:
When I left the Capitol building late in the evening o f Wednesday, 
November 12th, all the conferees expected that compromise to be 
incorporated into the conference agreement on the Transportation/Treasury 
bill that was to be filed the next day. Each and every Senator, Republican 
and Democrat, that participated in that conference agreement was content 
with the compromise and signed the conference report. What has happened 
since then.. .has been one o f the most astonishing and deplorable process 
that I have ever witnessed in my eleven years in the Senate. When the Bush 
White House learned that the conferees decided to insist upon a level- 
playing field and some demonstration o f taxpayer benefits for federal jobs to 
be contracted out, they began a quiet but relentless campaign to gut the 
compromise. Despite the fact that the conference committee adjourned well 
over a week and a half.. .the White House has seen to it that the bipartisan 
conference agreement has not been filed in either the House or Senate while 
they work to emasculate the compromise. (Murray 2003, 1)
An informant recounted that during the F Y 2005 negotiations there was 
agreement to keep the Interior Bill-specific funding caps in exchange for deferring 
all reporting requirements and any other limitations to the government-wide 
provisions in the Transportation Bill. OMB was said to have argued that it did not 
make sense to have two separate reporting requirements and two separate rules, and 
so urged the removal o f the provision. However, the source revealed:
194 Interview with Robert Tobias, August 31,2004.
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in the end, I gathered this was really in the end, ten minutes before the 
Omnibus was filed, all that stuff got yanked out o f the Transportation Bill. I 
don’t even think there are official reporting requirements for FY 2005. But 
the caps are still there in the Interior Bill. OMB was, I think in the wake of 
the (November 2004) election, in a much stronger position.. .and so all that 
stuff got pulled out o f the Transportation.195
If agencies could use the budgeting process as a vehicle to change their 
environments, pro-A-76 groups also knew how to use it to block resistance. 
Observed AFGE’s John Threlkeld: “The smaller the appropriations bill in question, 
the more likely we are to prevail” (Perera 2004c, 4). After Bush got re-elected, 
unions declared they would focus more on allies in Congress, which proved to be 
more amenable to employees’ concerns (Palmer 2004b).
In sum, adaptation depended significantly on the extent to which an 
organization mobilized its congressional allies and interest groups, but it also 
depended on how it managed the relationship balance between competing principals 
and learned along the way. The Forest Service was unable to capitalize on 
congressional ties because of internal management weaknesses although its initial 
approach to implementing the A-76 rules resulted in the most number o f wins by 
any government bureau. It remains speculative whether or not doing A-76 in this 
less-than-ideal manner served any party’s (OMB, Forest Service, consultants) 
purpose, and whether or not it was policy resistance masquerading as blind 
compliance. The Park Service allies in and out o f Congress were alerted
195 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25,2005.
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immediately, preventing competition in specific districts. As for other parts o f the 
bureaucracy where there was some resistance, they benefited from the strong 
congressional attention during the FY 2004 budget deliberations. Collectively, 
agencies observed the cues from the Hill. Those that were going too fast on A-76 
slowed down; those hesitant from the beginning and invisible in their A-76 effort 
were able to delay a little bit longer during the first term of the Bush administration. 
Chapter 6 examines the role o f agency strength in A-76 policy implementation.
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CHAPTER 6
THE DETERMINANTS OF ADAPTIVE RESPONSE
This chapter identifies the determinants o f response and bureaucratic 
adaptation to the competitive sourcing policy. First, it looks at the overall threat and 
response levels for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 for all the 26 agencies on OMB’s 
Scorecard and establishes a baseline o f compliance, using a scatter plot technique. 
The chapter then proceeds to uncover the possible reasons behind the behavior of 
the groups o f agencies above, below, or on the line.
The chapter’s goal is to demonstrate the link between power and 
bureaucratic adaptation. The research explores whether agency power can predict 
compliance levels where agency power is indicated by a history o f cutbacks in 
budget and personnel prior to the George W. Bush presidency. During the deficit- 
minded Clinton years, many agencies had their budgets and staffing reduced in 
varying degrees. These cuts are assumed to reflect the agencies’ prior lack of 
power, and hence suggest an inability to resist future threatening Executive Office 
initiatives such as competitive sourcing. With A-76 implementation, the study 
assumed that weak agencies would yield to the White House (comply or over­
comply) while strong ones would have had more capacity to resist (under-comply).
In the study, some agencies did not respond as expected; they competed 
fewer than expected or no FTEs when they appeared to be weak based on previous
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cutbacks, and competed many FTEs when they appeared to be strong enough to 
resist an initiative perceived to be antagonistic to staff and mission. If  agency 
strength was not a good predictor o f response, what additional organizational or 
political factors influenced the degree o f agency compliance?196
Briefly, simple statistical analysis plus case study analysis o f selected 
agencies reveal the following conclusions:
1. Statistical analysis confirms the relationship between agency compliance with 
the competitive sourcing initiative and the size o f the threat as indicated by their 
A-76 workforce inventories. The more commercial positions and potentially 
competable FTEs, the more positions were actually competed. The higher the 
threat, the greater the response.
2. Agency compliance is correlated with strength (or weakness) measured by 
previous staffing levels, but not as measured by the agencies’ budget history. 
Cuts in personnel were a better indicator o f prior political weakness than budget 
cuts. When agency weakness is measured by personnel as opposed to budgets, 
the weaker the agency, the greater the response to A-76.
3. Some agencies that were budgetarily weak resisted A-76 while some budgetarily 
strong ones complied. This may be explained by other factors, such as
196 Some agencies are stronger in Democratic administrations and weaker in Republican ones. One would 
expect, for example, that HUD would be stronger in Democratic administrations and weaker in Republican ones 
because it provides housing for the poor and economic development money for redevelopment o f  cities, which 
are primarily Democratic. This study’s argument does not deal with the change in party and the departments or 
programs that are considered more vulnerable to such shifts.
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congressional sentiments regarding A-76, previous agency contracting history, 
and advocacy by the political appointees.
4. Leadership emerged as a major determinant of agency compliance. Agencies 
where political appointees were loyal to the president and his agenda carried out 
A-76 more vigorously than the rest. The influence o f agency power seemed to 
have to work through and be modified by or used by agency leaders.
Threat-Response Relationship
To find out which agencies conducted A-76 with more or less restraint, I ran 
a scatter plot o f the independent variable, the FTEs suitable for A-76 based on the 
OMB’s baseline (2002) estimate, and the dependent variable measured by the 
percentage o f those FTEs actually competed. A Pearson correlation yielded a 
correlation o f 0.955 significant at the 0.01 level. The scatter plot is shown in Figure 
6. (Appendices I and J show the values and statistical outputs.) The result confirms 
the threat-response theme that in general, the more commercially defined the 
functions o f the agency the more the agency had subjected its employees to public- 
private competitions. This is evident among the DoD, USDA, HHS, Commerce, 
Interior, and Treasury. This indicates that the way a bureaucratic organization 
defines its mission, and how leaders define positions in terms o f whether they were 
potentially commercial or inherently governmental, makes it more or less vulnerable 
to market-driven forces in politics. Influencing the size and shape o f the inventory 
o f potentially competable positions was thus one area where leadership counted.
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Figure 6. Threat versus Compliance in A-76 (FTEs are in thousands)
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Continuing with Figure 6, while agencies in general responded according to 
the level o f the threat, some agencies behaved in peculiar ways, competing more, or 
less, than expected. Their peculiar response was corroborated by another indicator 
o f compliance, OMB’s Scorecard at the end o f 2004. The 26 agencies could 
therefore be divided into:
1. Under-compliers - The VA and the Army Corps were the farthest below the line 
and had “red” scores from OMB. Other outliers included the Department o f 
Transportation, the Department o f Housing and Urban Development, The 
National Science Foundation, and the Smithsonian. The latter three had not 
completed a single competition by the end of FY 2004 and carried the bottom of 
OMB’s Scorecard.
2. Over-compliers - Some subjected more FTEs to competition than would be 
expected based on the size o f their inventory o f competable positions, and were 
far above the line, led by the U. S. Department o f Agriculture and Health and 
Human Services. They were either “green” or “yellow” as rated by OMB during 
the same grading period. These “over-compliers” were followed, respectively, 
by the General Services Administration, National Aeronautic and Space 
Administration, and the Office o f Personnel Management.
3. Middle compilers - In the middle were the DoD, Interior, and Treasury that were 
stepping on the line. Like the over-compliers, these compliers had all achieved 
“yellow” or “green” scores at some point by December 2004.
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Strength of the Response
A simple quantitative analysis found that strength (weakness) measured by 
changes in staffing levels was a more accurate predictor o f response to A-76 than 
prior history o f budgetary gains and losses. A finer-grained analysis suggests a 
stronger case for prior budget cuts as an indicator of agency weakness, and also 
points to the importance o f the actions o f political appointees and lawmakers in 
certain agencies in determining the response to A-76.
The degree o f response, the competed positions as a percentage o f the 
competable FTEs in the agency’s inventory, was correlated with agency strength. I 
measured strength during the Clinton years (1993-2000) by the growth rate o f the 
agencies’ budget authority and personnel. The result o f a Pearson correlation for the 
26 agencies on OMB’s Scorecard was minus 0.390 for staffing history and response, 
significant at the 0.05 level. On the other hand, correlating budget history and 
response turned up a non-significant value o f 0.083. This difference could be 
inferred from the fact that most o f the 26 agencies’ budgets were flat, but their 
staffing levels showed variability.
To examine how the relationship between strength and compliance worked, I 
conducted mini-case analyses o f selected over-compliers, compliers, and under- 
compliers (Table 18). These agencies represent a mixture of sizes and structures, 
vulnerabilities to A-76, and contracting out experiences, to generate a better picture 
o f policy implementation. The budget figures account for inflation.
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Table 18
Selected Agencies: Varying Threats. Strengths, and Responses
Threat Historical Strength Current Response
A-76 FTEs 









in FY 03-04 






OPM 600 (20%) 0.08% -43.20% 366 (61%) Green by 3/2004
NASA 3,400 (18%) -0.25% -25.20% 602 (17.7%) Yellow by 12/2003
USD A 35,600 (36%) -0.06% -15.00% 5,416(15.21%) Yellow by 9/2003
Compliers
DoD 270,600 (45%) -0.09% -30.30% 18,366 (6.78%) Green by 6/2004
DoE 4,700 (31%) -0.37% -24.40% 402 (8.55%) Green by 3/2004
Dol 23,000 (33%) 0.03% -12.80% 1,641 (7.13%) Yellow by 9/2003
Treas. 18,400 (12.42%) 0.09% -13.40% 1,351 (7.34%) Green by 12/2004
Under-compliers
ACE 16,500 (59%) -0.10% -0.20% 0 Red up to 12/2004
NSF 200 (17%) 0.18% 0.01% 0 Red up to 12/2004
SI 0 (0%) 0.08% 0.00% 0 Red up to 12/2004
VA 52,600 (23%) 0.06% -15.40% 276 (3.63%) Red up to 12/2004
HUD 3,600 (39%) -0.29% -22.40% 0 Red up to 12/2004
Sources: F 'E data calculatec from OMB 2003a, 01MB 2004a, and OMB 2005b;
budget data from OMB 2004b; staffing date from OPM, 2001.
The Under-Compliers
The under-compliers in the sample all had red (unsatisfactory) scores from 
OMB and, except for the Veterans Affairs that had one competition in 2003, 
avoided competitive sourcing during Bush’s first term. As a group these agencies’ 
leaders publicly raised issues about the fit between competitive sourcing and their 
missions and capacities. Most had congressional roadblocks (at VA, Army Corps) 
or alliances (NSF, Smithsonian) to help them resist A-76.
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Smithsonian Institution
The reddest on OMB’s Scorecard was the Smithsonian Institution. OMB 
estimated in 2002 that 1,300 o f its FTEs were commercial while 4,500 were
107inherently governmental. However, the Smithsonian itself did not declare a 
single one o f these commercial FTEs as suitable for A-76, an illustration o f the 
leadership protecting the organization. The Smithsonian, whose organization was 
unique, did not suffer from the downsizing moves o f the previous era (Table 18). It 
could be considered strong enough to resist A-76, which it did. It was the only unit 
that, from 2001 to at least June 2005, never moved to yellow - despite the bad 
publicity red agencies were getting - because it never planned, announced, or 
conducted any competitions. The same red was pinned on to Smithsonian in e- 
govemment, budget and performance integration, financial management, and human 
capital. The Smithsonian’s defiance created tension between the agency and 
OMB.198 The Smithsonian leadership stood by its argument that the organization 
was “a trust establishment.. .not specifically covered by Public Law 105-270,” the 
FAIR Act, according to Secretary Lawrence Small (2004,1). In a report to 
Congress, officials at the Smithsonian said competitive sourcing would simply “be 
included as one method” to look for efficiency. A-76 was a different ballgame for 
an organization that managed 16 museums and galleries; moreover, only about half
197 OFPP data courtesy o f  Miss Renee Courtland o f the Office o f Management and Budget.
198 Interview with an OMB official, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
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of the 6,000 employees in 2004 were federal workers while the rest were trust fund 
workers.199
Interviewees from different parties acknowledged that the smaller the 
organization, the fewer opportunities there were for A-76. The larger agencies 
therefore felt most o f the pressure to compete. Still, OMB decided to grade 
Smithsonian on A-76 along with the 25 others. The OMB decision bewildered 
Smithsonian employees (Palmer 2005a). The tension with OMB, a source from 
Smithsonian claimed, had something to do with attitude and lack o f understanding 
of what the Smithsonian role was. According to the informant, “OMB knows the 
specifics o f our function -  but knowledge does not always mean understanding of 
our role or mission.”200
A former official from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (which 
oversees the A-76 process) tried to tone down the conflict, arguing that the 
Smithsonian’s refusal to categorize any FTE as suitable for A-76 should not be 
dubbed “resistance,” but rather “a difference o f opinions.”201 Regardless o f what its 
response is called, the Smithsonian Institution did not conduct a single competition.
In sum, the leadership’s belief in the uniqueness o f the agency’s mission, 
coupled with agency strength (and outside sources of funds) allowed the
199 According to O M B’s FY 2005 Budget request, approximately 70 percent o f the Smithsonian’s funding was 
from direct Federal appropriations; the remainder comes from its endowment fund, private donations, business 
activities, and grants from other Federal agencies (OMB 2004b).
200 Interview, name withheld by request, February 14,2005.
201 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
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Smithsonian to defy an Executive agenda. OMB did not seem to have penalized the 
Smithsonian for its stance; indeed, its budget authority grew by 20.76 percent 
between FY 2001 and FY 2004, even as OMB urged the Smithsonian to “seek out 
innovative cost-saving mechanisms” (OMB 2005c, 339). It may be that the 
popularity o f this highly visible agency prevented OMB from cutting it: an advocate 
argued at a 2006 hearing, “Penalizing the Smithsonian’s hardworking 
professionals.. .with budget cuts will also punish the public that needs the 
Smithsonian’s services and programs” (Aufderheide 2006, 60). Cutting the 
museums was likely to create a massive public outcry.
National Science Foundation
An agency that had very low numbers o f competable FTEs (estimated by 
OMB at 200) was the National Science Foundation. NSF staffing did not suffer as 
severely as other agencies during the cutback years. Congress had also been 
generally supportive o f science and technology. NSF, in addition, was regarded as 
by OMB (2003d) as efficient and effective in using its funding; it therefore could be 
viewed as “strong” and able to resist the pressures in A-76, which it did.
Despite the small number o f positions involved and the overall high 
efficiency o f the agency, OMB still expressed unhappiness with the NSF’s 
resistance to A-76. OMB in the FY 2004 budget request said it had downgraded the 
progress score of NSF because it had “not committed to competing any o f its 
commercial positions” and had “not developed a competitive sourcing plan.” “The
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best that could be said for NSF,” according to an OMB official,202 was that its 
officers “attended a symposium” on A-76, while the official acknowledged that 
good grants administrators might be hard to get from the outside. In 2004, NSF 
announced a 22-FTE streamlined competition but did not complete the study within 
the fiscal year.
Officials at NSF maintained that they deserved more consideration because 
it was the first agency to reach “green” in the e-govemment and financial 
management components o f the President’s Management Agenda, an appeal to a 
more holistic evaluation o f federal agency performance. NSF was one o f the 
outspoken agencies that requested OMB to “adapt the scoring standards to the 
reality o f  the agency” (Perera 2004b, 1). NSF was also in the middle o f a multi-year 
analysis o f its business processes and workforce planning and needed to see the 
results before conducting any competition.203
A small agency, NSF was able to resist competitive sourcing in part because 
o f its political strength, not just in the administration but also in Congress. NSF’s 
budget authority grew by 16.79 percent from FY 2001 to FY 2004, after adjusting 
for inflation, proving support o f NSF’s mission. The administration did not penalize 
NSF budgetarily for resisting A-76, at least not during Bush’s first term. NSF was in
202 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9,2004.
203 Interview with Donna Fortunat, November 4, 2004.
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fact a winner in FY 2004 when OMB asked for a 10 percent increase over FY 2003 
levels for NSF while others were being cut, such as the Army Corps o f Engineers.
OMB’s budget projections tell a somewhat different story. Projections in 
2004 for NSF’s budget in the out years beginning in FY 2006 showed a diminishing 
budget, negating any gains in FY 2004 and FY 2005, not reaching the original level 
prescribed in the NSF Reauthorization Act o f 2002 (Sponberg 2004). I interpret this 
kind o f budget projection as an implicit threat by the administration -  echoed in the 
case o f the Energy Department, as mentioned in Chapter 4 - for the NSF to look for 
ways to cut its budget, competitive sourcing being the favored approach.
Army Corps o f  Engineers
Among the agencies with the biggest pool of FTEs (16,500) for A-76, the 
Army Corps resisted putting one FTE to competition or direct conversion. The 
Corps was a complex organization with a civil works and military mission. While it 
was part o f the Army, the Corps did not follow DoD’s footsteps in A-76, earning it a 
“red.” The Corps was cut only slightly under Clinton, suggesting that it was 
politically strong coming in to the Bush presidency, despite criticisms by GAO 
auditors in 1999 and 2002 (GAO 2002d) o f its financial management. The Corps is 
regarded widely as Congress’s perennial spending machine for local capital 
projects, with an annual budget around $10 billion.
In 2002, the Corps was contracting about 60 percent o f its total workload 
(OMB 2002, 300) but OMB noted that federal employees were still performing a
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significant amount o f commercial work. OMB saw more opportunities for A-76 and 
said that the agency agreed to complete its assessment and A-76 plan by September 
2002, to achieve the 15 percent goal by 2003 (OMB 2002, 300), but the Corps did 
not announce any contests until 2004. The agency promised OMB next that it would 
compete 37 percent instead o f its commercial FTEs by 2008 but it lagged in 
determining exactly which positions they would be (OMB 2003d, 260). OMB 
wanted the Corps to expand the number o f positions for competition.
Congress came to the aid o f Corps employees during the Reagan era A-76 
and did it again under President George W. Bush. Lawmakers added Section 109 to 
the 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, specifying that none o f the funds could be 
used to privatize, divest, or transfer any of the Civil Works functions. However, the 
provision was killed by the conference committee. Corps employees were 
nonetheless covered by a one-year moratorium on public-private competitions that 
Congress imposed on DoD agencies in 2003. Later, in 2005 Congress successfully 
limited the administration’s request for A-76 funding at the department, to prevent 
the contest for some 2,300 lock and dam operators. With congressional relief, 
therefore, the agency successfully put off competitions during the first term of 
President Bush. At the start of Bush’s second term, Congress was still delaying the 
lock and dam operators’ contest. In June 2006, AFGE and engineers’ federations 
lobbied Congress to exempt those positions as inherently governmental.
Immediately after the November 2006 elections saw control o f Congress shifting to 
Democrats, the Army Corps called off the contest, preferring to constitute a High
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Performing Organization (HPO) instead. To become an HPO, an organization or 
unit of an agency would have to submit to OMB a plan to achieve higher metrics or 
level o f performance within a particular time frame, with freedom to manage human 
and financial resources in exchange for higher accountability and exemption from 
competition. The competitive sourcing program manager, Ray Navidi, explained 
that this choice would put no employees at risk o f losing their jobs, unlike A-76 
(Navidi 2006). Competitive sourcing was not always the right answer to restructure 
the Army Corps, according to Navidi. In an interview, he said, “Just because you are 
efficient doesn’t mean you are effective,” to emphasize their strategic sourcing 
approach beyond A-76 (Castelli 2007,1).
But while Congress had been blocking contests to save Corps employees, 
Congress failed to protect the agency’s budget, as the Bush administration fought 
hard to cut it. In 2004 the White House adopted a “no new starts” policy, citing the 
agency’s backlog o f projects. The Corps and the White House had been publicly 
tussling since 2002, when budget battles led to the resignation o f ACE head Mike 
Parker during budget deliberations. He was allegedly “punished for telling the 
truth” to Congress (Baumann 2002,1) about the inadequacy o f OMB’s FY 2003 
budget request. OMB Director Mitch Daniels was viewed as instrumental in 
Parker’s departure afterward (Caruso 2002), straining the relationship o f OMB with 
some appropriators.
Congress kept adding to the White House budget requests but perennial 
concerns about the frequency o f the Corps’ reprogramming requests, the wasteful
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results of the reprogramming and the agency’s multi-year contracts dogged the 
debates regarding its budget (Carter et al. 2005; GAO 2005b). The congressional 
protection for the agency weakened. Already a target o f the Bush administration 
from the beginning, and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina flooding in New Orleans was 
cited by many as the effect o f repeated under-funding by the White House, the 
Corps’s resistance to competitive sourcing did not help its cause. Its budget 
authority under Bush declined by 7.81 percent between 2001 and 2004, inflation 
considered.
OMB may have let NSF and Smithsonian get away with their strategy of 
resistance partly because of their smaller inventories. The Corps’s resistance was 
more important to OMB because the agency had a lot more commercial FTEs that 
the White House wanted to see competed. By 2005, the conservative Cato Institute 
was calling for the privatization o f the Army Corps (Edwards 2005).
In its Strategic Plan (ACE 2004, 56-57), Corps officials noted that the 
privatization and A-76 push, coupled with flat budget projections for the next few 
years, would “exacerbate competing demands on available resources and affect 
decisions about investment in water resources solutions.” While partly a bid to 
Congress for more resources, the statement also suggested that the budget 
constraints were having an impact. The Army Corps may have been able to defy 
competitive sourcing for a few years with the help of Congress but its budget 
eventually shrunk under Bush. There may have been other reasons to cut the
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Corps’s budget besides lack o f compliance with A-76, but aggravated relations 
between OMB and the Army Corps did not help.
Department o f Housing and Urban Development
Among the cases in this chapter, HUD’s is the most counter-intuitive. 
Although the agency was politically weak as it began the Bush years, the agency 
was still able to mount some resistance to the A-76 process, as indicated by its “red” 
score and zero FTEs competed. HUD’s prior weakness was indicated by the deep 
personnel and budget authorization cuts in the 1990s and its “high-risk” 
management reputation. Though NASA and DoE were also considered high-risk 
agencies, those agencies performed a lot o f competitions. Like NASA, DoE, OPM, 
and DoD, the housing department had had extensive contracting history, yet those 
other agencies were among the strongest adherents o f President Bush’s competitive 
sourcing agenda while HUD was a resister.
But rather than political defiance by its leaders or some level o f agency 
strength regained under the Bush administration, the reason behind HUD’s lack of 
A-76 contests was its lack o f capacity to conduct any public-private competition for 
the period under study, as voiced by HUD’s leaders as well as by OMB (HUD 
2004). This incapacity was in turn a result o f the downsizing years and the inability 
o f HUD to curtail the “boutique programs” that were created in exchange for 
congressional support to avoid HUD’s extinction (Rubin 2003).
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In the 1980s and the 1990s, as downsizing and government reinvention took 
place, HUD was overwhelmed by personnel and budget reductions but was unable 
to simplify its programs in accordance with the cuts. The increased program 
responsibilities that HUD received from Congress without corresponding resources 
pushed the agency into playing budget games and into contracting. HUD reduced its 
budget authorization for its rental assistance program to make it appear it was being 
cut, but the agency continued to maintain or increase its outlays as obligations got 
pushed into the future. As the cuts went on, HUD became more vulnerable to 
political pressures. Earmarks created more “boutique programs” HUD was already 
too shrunken to provide, pushing HUD to rely on contractors even though its 
oversight expertise continued to dwindle (Rubin 2003). From FY 1997 to FY 2000, 
HUD’s reliance on contractors grew by more than 62 percent but oversight and 
monitoring o f contracts was unsystematic (GAO 2002e, 14).
When Bush arrived in 2001, HUD already had one o f the highest rates o f 
contracting out, spending almost $1.3 billion in FY 2000, according to GAO 
(2002f). The department lacked a strategic workforce plan and at least half o f the 
workforce was eligible to retire in 2003 (GAO 2002f). The management system’s 
weaknesses, first reported in 1984, still affected HUD’s ability to monitor and 
ensure the integrity o f its rental assistance programs in 2002.
With this poor staffing and management background, HUD’s leaders 
convinced OMB throughout the first term o f the Bush administration that A-76 
would not serve HUD well. In 2002 when OMB called for a 15 percent target, HUD
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said it would plan to conduct a feasibility analysis only, because o f its poor staffing. 
HUD officials estimated that the total number o f contractual staff assisting in 
delivering HUD services might nearly equal its own (GAO 2002e, 3). They 
mentioned in-sourcing o f contracted-out jobs as an option they would consider 
(HUD 2002, 37). They said almost the same thing in their FY 2003 budget request 
(HUD 2003). Secretary Mel Martinez (2003) told Congress that HUD and OMB 
were assessing A-76 in the light o f HUD’s previous downsizing. The next year, 
Martinez (2004) testified that they planned to enhance their contracting capacity 
first. The agency argued on the one hand that there did not seem to be much more 
work to contract out and on the other that HUD was in fact obtaining more staff and 
improving its hiring (Jackson 2005). Presumably that additional staff would 
improve contractual oversight and make some competitions possible.
OMB echoed HUD’s views. OMB’s director o f Procurement Policy, Angela 
Styles (2003, 71), revealed that with HUD’s contract dollars and high-risk 
management problems, they had to “be very cautious” in their approach to 
competitive sourcing. She said that there had been “a clear recognition.. .that there 
may have been too much” contracting out at HUD (Peckenpaugh 2003k, 3). A 
HUD official added that the Bush administration was more sympathetic to HUD’s 
problems than the previous administration. HUD’s 2004 Results Report suggests 
that it put more effort on the other components o f the President’s Agenda while it 
ignored A-76.
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HUD’s inability to mount a competition during these years, as a 
consequence, became its strength, giving the agency leverage to avoid A-76. 
However, HUD still tried to assuage the administration by doing more o f what it 
could do, simple contracting out (Figure 7). HUD did not have the staff or ability to 
compete with the private sector, so competitions were difficult to mount, but the 
agency could continue to contract out its functions. HUD’s contract obligations 
steadily increased from 2001 to 2004 (Figure 7), according to the database 
fedspending.org. a project o f OMB Watch, a non-profit organization that tracks 
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Figure 7. Growth of HUD Contract Obligations versus Staffing Level
This continued outsourcing was criticized by the AFGE, which charged that 
the HUD officials kept invoking exceptions that allowed contractors to acquire work 
without competition (Hamage 2002). HUD leaders bitterly fought A-76, and 
outsourced without using the process (Facha 2001), even though it would have been
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cheaper to use federal employees in contracted-out Section 8 jobs (Peckenpaugh 
2003h).
If more contracting out was the White House goal, then HUD was in fact 
complying with White House intention, if  not with the A-76 process. With this 
strategy, the agency avoided OMB’s ire. HUD’s budget authority between FY 2001 
and FY 2004 grew slowly under Bush by 1.37 percent after accounting for inflation, 
less severe compared to an agency that truly under-complied, the Army Corps. 
Under Bush, HUD staffing appeared to go up but gradually went down again to the 
pre-Bush level, according to OPM’s database (Figure 7). To the extent that the 
union charge is correct, the administration was giving lip service to management or 
contract supervision problems, and using the agency’s weakness to force continued 
contracting, without giving HUD employees an opportunity to compete for the jobs. 
The strategy o f publicly resisting A-76, if  agencies used it at all, might also have 
deflected congressional opposition or concern, if  it led to more outsourcing “under 
the radar” that is, contracting out in a manner that was less visible than A-76 
competitions. By June 2006,1 also had found no evidence that HUD actually 
planned or conducted any contests to bring back a function in-house, or taken any 
contracts back in-house without competition.
The second term of the Bush administration saw HUD finally engaging in A- 
76, perhaps a response to the pressures from the unions as well as from OMB. A 
standard competition launched in April 2004 involving 394 FTEs (OMB 2005b, 7) 
was supposed to determine the appropriate level o f resources and best available
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sources for adequately administering and overseeing HUD’s rental assistance 
program (Barth 2004). Ten private contractors unsuccessfully bid against the agency 
team, which won the contest, in January 2006 (HUD 2006). Subsequent contests in 
2005 and 2006 involving the agency’s financial management systems compliance 
reviews, financial reporting services, Spanish-language translation, and website 
services all resulted in favor o f the in-house team. Like many agencies, HUD 
seemed to have strategized successfully to win the contests, all o f them.
In sum, HUD would have been a case entirely o f weakness turning into 
strength in A-76, except for the stark evidence o f its continued contracting outside 
o f the A-76 framework. Instead it looks like a case o f belated compliance or 
compliance in a different form, with its political leaders striving to obey the White 
House signal that was clearly in favor o f contracting out.
The late turn-around to A-76 might simply have been the fruit o f a long 
preparation, or a result o f having run out o f excuses to avoid A-76. The long 
preparation might explain the agency’s winning streak, extremely crucial with their 
flat staffing trend. Alternatively, the pressure to conduct A-76 simply intensified 
after Bush was re-elected, as interviewees from government, unions, and academe 
anticipated. An informant from an agency that was still “red” in A-76 during the 
2004 election season told me that as soon as they felt that Bush was going to get a 
second term, they had “an internal meeting on competitive sourcing,” saying that
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“Okay, guys, we have to get energized about this because it’s not going away.”204 A 
Forest Service official told me that his understanding in talking to OMB was that if  
Bush was re-elected there would be changes in A-76 to reflect the lessons learned, 
but A-76 would remain a top priority. Also, a source who was knowledgeable 
about the clashes between the appropriators and OMB regarding A-76 said the issue 
was “not going to go away” with Bush’s re-election. The source said it would 
“depend on how clever” they were at OMB or “what sort o f success” OMB could 
document but A-76 would probably stay, the informant said, because the Bush 
administration was picking up Senate votes in favor o f A-76 (at the time o f the 
interview).206
Like the Army Corps that did not conduct contests during the first four years 
but later did, what was happening at HUD could suggest that agencies that were 
able to evade during the first term of the administration could only resist for so long. 
Looking back, in those years that HUD was not conducting A-76, more and more of 
the agency’s FTEs were being classified as commercial. Its A-76 FTEs jumped 
from 35.16 percent in 2002 to a remarkable 58.29 percent in 2004 of the workforce. 
Conversely, from 13.14 percent in 2002, the agency’s proportion o f inherently 
governmental FTEs went down to only 11.48 percent in 2004. This trend is
204 Interview with an agency manager, name withheld by request, November 4, 2004.
205 Interview with David Heerwagen, November 1,2004.
206 Interview, name withheld by request, January 25,2005.
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additional evidence that HUD was complying with the pressure, just slowly, under 
the radar.
Department o f Veterans Affairs
The Department o f Veterans Affairs suffered cuts during the Clinton 
Administration but it joined the defiant (NSF and Smithsonian Institution, Army 
Corps) and deviant (HUD) agencies in the “red” column to the end of 2004. This 
score however, may have owed less to internal agency resistance or budget strength 
than to a prohibition harking back to the Reagan era. Its leaders could not withstand 
the pressures from OMB. In essence, the under-compliance o f this agency was due 
to congressional protection of the agency that neutralized the compliant attitude of 
its leaders.
With a total workforce o f more than 220,000 in 2002, the VA joined the 
USD A and Interior among the big civilian agencies that OMB appeared to have 
targeted for competitive sourcing. Its Veterans Health Administration was called “a 
major quarry for the outsourcing hunt”:
Currently, the VHA has more than 206,000 employees, with over 50,000 
considered candidates for privatization. So, since OMB wants to meet high 
government-wide numerical targets for outsourcing, the VA offers a 
tempting opportunity. (Tiefer 2003, 8-9)
VA leaders planned in 2002 to study 52,000 positions but only managed to 
study 276 FTEs until its legal counsel’s opinion in 2003 halted all competitions. The 
law prohibited the VA from conducting A-76 unless funds were legally available for
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the purpose. The permanent law, which was enacted in FY 1982 and is now 
codified as Title 38, U.S. Code 8110(a)(5), states:
Notwithstanding any other provision o f this title or o f any other law, funds 
appropriated for the Department under the appropriation accounts for 
medical care, medical and prosthetic research, and medical administration 
and miscellaneous operating expenses may not be used for, and no employee 
compensated from such funds may carry out any activity in connection with, 
the conduct o f any study comparing the cost o f the provision by private 
contractors with the cost o f the provision by the Department o f commercial 
or industrial products and services for the Veterans Health Administration 
unless such funds have been specifically appropriated for that purpose.
Political support for the president’s agenda existed at the top echelons of the 
VA but with reluctance to subject their employees to A-76. Gary Steinberg, the 
VA's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, said in 2002 that they 
“wanted to come up with a process that would provide an opportunity for public- 
private competition” (Peckenpaugh 2002f, 2). Indeed the agency sought ways to be 
able to please OMB. Its leaders allowed OMB to “choose the jobs” that should face 
competition (Peckenpaugh 2003e, 3). In August 2002 VA issued its Directive 7100, 
putting in place a three-tiered process that tried to wiggle out o f the legal 
prohibition. For instance, the Tier 2 process would entail a “cost-benefit analysis” 
that was intended to provide a streamlined, A-76-like process (GAO 2005a) yet 
supposedly not under the OMB Circular A-76. The agency leaders also sided with 
the White House in calling on Congress to repeal the ban and appropriate funds for 
A-76 in the VA. The Senate Veterans Affairs Committee in 2004 had tried to lift 
the ban. VA officials also repeatedly asked for funding for competitive sourcing and
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were denied by Congress. According to GAO, in FY 2001 VA officials asked for 
$16 million, in FY 2003 for $25 million, and in FY 2004 for $50 million to conduct 
A-76 competitions.207
A few years later a GAO Report (2005a) requested by Representative Lane 
Evans discovered that VA had indeed violated the funding prohibition. VA officials 
denied the violation by claiming that the ban only covered standard competitions 
and not market research to compare costs. GAO continued to disagree with VA’s 
interpretation as o f June 2006. The Government Accountability Office 
recommended de-obligating the amount but the VA admitted that it did not have a 
reliable estimate o f how much they spent for the cost comparisons. This confession 
was especially notable because many of my interviewees said that OMB’s annual 
savings estimates from A-76 should have been lower because o f the agencies’ 
inability to report their entire dollar and staff time costs (see “Debate Refraining” in 
Chapter 4).
In sum, VA was prohibited by law from engaging in A-76 without explicit 
congressional approval, which it did not get. Nevertheless, top management still 
desired to comply with OMB. This willingness to comply, and the Iraq war, could 
have been reflected by the increase in VA’s budget authority between FY 2001 and 
FY 2004 o f 20.15 percent after inflation. At the behest o f OMB, the VA leaders
207 See, respectively, Budget o f the United States Government— Appendix, Fiscal Year 2001, p. 1; and Budget 
o f  the United States Government— Fiscal Year 2003 Appropriation Law Change and Fiscal Year 2004 Budget 
Amendment, pp. 4-5. Congress did not accept these requests, as reflected in the fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 
2004 appropriations for VA.
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worked to have the prohibition repealed, without success, against the wishes of 
groups like the Vietnam Veterans o f America and Disabled American Veterans and 
the VA employees. Overall, Congress was able to rescue VA personnel from A-76 
despite the leaders’ intent to compete. The VA’s “red” score from OMB and low 
number o f competed FTEs did not describe how hard its leaders tried to steer the 
agency to competitive sourcing under pressure from the top.
The Over-Compliers
The over-compliers in this study are some o f the most hollowed-out agencies 
in the federal government, such as the OPM and NASA. OPM and NASA have the 
second and third highest declines in staffing among the agencies in this study (after 
DoD), making them dependent on contractors to carry out their missions. The other 
over-complier, the USD A, suffered less severely under the Clinton Administration.
NASA and OPM’s prior experiences with contracting likely helped them 
embrace competitive sourcing. Congress also had minimal intervention in their 
implementation, but played more o f a role in the case o f USD A whose mission is of 
a distributive nature and highly controlled by Congress. Despite the congressional 
influence, however, USD A still competed the second highest number o f positions 
(after DoD) for the period under study. What tied the three over-compliers together 
was the presence o f loyal Bush supporters in these agencies.
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Office o f Personnel Management
This agency’s weakness coming into the Bush years was illustrated by a 
history o f massive downsizing and personnel cuts, and a major increase in 
contracting out. Termination o f the OPM was widely discussed. In the 1990s,
OPM outsourced even some core activities because its survival was being 
threatened (Rubin 2003,286). With Director Kay Cole James at the helm, OPM 
vigorously carried out A-76 under Bush, despite the fact that a lot o f its functions 
had already been contracted out. James was strongly loyal to the president and a 
strong advocate o f A-76. Before joining OPM, James worked at the Heritage 
Foundation, the Family Research Council, and the Health and Human Services as 
Assistant Secretary under President George H. W. Bush. James also sat on GAO’s 
task force on improving A-76 guidelines.
Apart from evident personal loyalty, there were other reasons for OPM’s 
over-compliance in competitive sourcing. Since the initiative went hand in hand 
with human capital management, another Bush management initiative that James 
headed, OPM had to lead by example in A-76, according to OMB.208 OPM in 2002 
had an estimated 600 FTEs available for A-76. Remarkably, it conducted 
competition for 61 percent o f these FTEs during the first term of President Bush, 
besting the rest o f the agencies on the Scorecard. Its “green” rating arrived early as a 
result. Such an aggressive series o f competitions led OPM’s Chief Financial Officer
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 5 4
to say that OPM was running low on commercial positions available for contests 
(Gruber 2005a, 1). The combination of loyalty to the president and his agenda, 
coupled with the weakened status of an organization whose mission did not grant it 
powerful clients to mobilize, also allowed OPM to become a high performer in 
competitive sourcing. Perhaps as a reward, OPM’s budget authority under Bush 
grew by 7.72 percent.
The picture is incomplete, however, without noting that OPM’s workers won 
100 percent o f its completed competitions in FY 2003 and FY 2004, most o f them 
streamlined. OPM did not lose a single competition until 2005. The use o f the 
streamlined type, as discussed in Chapter 4, was a successful strategy across the 
government in terms of winning A-76 contests, because it lessened the level of 
industry interest with the high transaction cost involved in competing for small 
contracts, according to managers, contractors, OMB staff, Hill staffers, and former 
federal managers that I interviewed.209 According to OPM’s FY 2004 report to 
Congress, small competitions were conducted in occupational health, building 
services, network management, mail services, employee benefits, and financial 
systems support. One contest that OPM won was so small it involved only a nurse
208 Interview with an Administration official, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
209 This point was made by several named and anonymous sources, for example: OMB sources on September 9, 
10, and 13,2004, Stan Soloway on September 9 ,2004, Jacques Gansler on September 8 ,2004, a  former DoD A- 
76 manager on September 30 ,2004, Robert Knauer on September 24, 2004, unnamed congressional sources, 
Robert Tobias on August 31,2004, Denis O ’Brien on October 13, 2004, a few agency managers on October 19, 
2004, November 4, 2004, October 15, 2004, September 16, 2004.
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and three blue-collar employees. OPM maximized it chances o f winning the 
competitions and kept most o f the jobs in-house. In order to do that however, they 
sometimes had to lower staffing levels in the functions being competed or reduce 
their salary levels.
In Chapter 4, the strategy o f over-compliance/compliance involved 
obedience to the point o f cutting the organization. A prime example was a 2004 
competition that OPM won involving building management and computer 
assistance. OPM secured voluntary separation incentive payment authority when its 
Most Effective Organization (MEO) plan reduced the number o f positions from 22 
to 18 and changed a number o f the position descriptions and grades, according to 
the agency’s report to Congress (OPM 2005).
It is not clear if  OPM could have done more to protect its employees. A 
union pointed out that some functions, such as advising federal employees on 
retirement benefits, should have been inherently governmental and excluded from a 
2004 contest (Gruber 2004f, 2). Supporters o f A-76 argued that on the contrary, 
OPM’s core functions were essentially protected despite the number o f contests it 
launched. According to them, “OPM directly competes with the private-sector 
vendors in providing human resource services, and it has not opened those functions 
to competition” (Segal 2004,2).
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National Aeronautics Space Administration
With some 3,400 FTEs identified as outsourceable in 2002, NASA was 
another agency whose weakness coming into the Bush administration encouraged it 
to yield to the president’s agenda. However, the level o f contracting in NASA was 
already so high its ability to oversee existing contracts was in question. GAO 
(2003d, 8) had listed NASA, along with DoE and HUD, as “high-risk” areas in 
terms o f contract management. With flattened budgets and less than 13 percent of 
its authorized funding expended on its civil service (NASA 2002, 1) NASA needed 
to continue to contract, but did not necessarily have the staff or the resources to 
mount real competitions under the A-76 procedures.
NASA was headed by Administrator Sean O’Keefe who, much like the 
OPM chief, was loyal to the president. O’Keefe was Mitchell Daniels’ Deputy 
Director for Management at OMB and was the one who issued the OMB 2001 
memo setting the minimum five percent goal for agencies to compete for FY 2002. 
Like OPM’s James and DoD’s Undersecretary Peter Aldridge, O ’Keefe also served 
on GAO’s Commercial Activities Panel that recommended changes to Circular A- 
76. O’Keefe was once President George H. W. Bush’s Secretary o f the Navy and 
chief financial officer for DoD. On his sixth day on the job at NASA, O ’Keefe was 
quoted as saying that competitive sourcing was “fascinating” because it would 
“liberate any entity from a particular means to accomplish a result” (Peckenpaugh
2002g, 2).
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During Reagan’s time, NASA was tenaciously non-compliant with A-76 
(GAO 1985a). Under the current President Bush, NASA met the 15 percent goal 
that OMB set for FY 2003 and reported that it made a lot of direct conversions 
before using that process was disallowed (Forsgren 2004,1), but NASA ably 
avoided involuntary separations (Gansler and Lucyshyn 2004). O ’Keefe (2002,1) 
had assured employees that A-76 was not about downsizing or across-the-board 
outsourcing. According to OMB annual reports, NASA made a total o f 26 direct 
conversions in FY 2003 involving 152 FTEs and in FY 2004 NASA shifted to 
standard competitions (20 competitions involving 443 FTEs).
NASA had to tailor A-76 to its purposes. One problem for the agency was 
A-76 would not allow NASA to hire workers with particular skills.
Under the Old Circular.. .we were able to use our discretion as to whether 
we want contractors or civil servants... We can't do that under the new 
Circular. It limits our flexibility. We need a new set o f skills; we need to 
redeploy our workforce more toward exploration.210
NASA eventually received a concession from OMB to use “science competitions” 
in which NASA scientists competed with those from academia, government, and 
industry for research opportunities. Proposals were evaluated through a peer or 
scientific review process and awards made based on best value rather than lowest 
cost. Awards could also be made to a combination of in-house scientists and private- 
sector sources. The science competitions probably spared the agency from losing
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more in-house skills. This alternative approach became one o f the recipients o f the 
President’s Quality Award for Innovation and Exemplary Practices for competitive 
sourcing in 2004. The deviation might have delayed NASA its green score, but it 
got to green eventually, in June 2005.
NASA was recasting the process to help protect its employees and its 
knowledge base, but at the same time, it was complying with pressures to engage in 
more contests. A number o f positions that had not been considered competable 
were reclassified, increasing from eight percent o f the workforce in 2002 to 23 
percent in 2003 or 1,549 to 4,380 FTES (NASA 2003a, 1). NASA also moved from 
smaller to larger competitions, like the Shared Services Center contest in FY 
2005,211
In a presentation titled “Why NASA Was Successful” that officials made in 
an A-76 forum, NASA identified “strong, visible support” from the leadership as the 
main factor (NASA 2003b, 20). It also attributed its strong showing to having done 
a bottom-up review of its inventory and building a totally new, not updated, 
inventory.
210 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6,2004.
211 In FY 2004, NASA announced a competition to consolidate human resources, procurement, financial 
management and IT activities currently performed by a combination o f  federal employees and contractors in a 
highly decentralized fashion at each NASA center and headquarters. The study involved 200 civil servants and 
228 contractor FTEs. In May 2005, NASA selected a contractor based on overall cost and technical merit (OMB 
2005b, 7).
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NASA’s case illustrates not only the importance o f the support o f top-level 
executives, but also the influence o f hollowing out on policy compliance. Prior 
contracting out and difficulty managing those contracts did not seem to limit 
compliance at NASA as it did at HUD. NASA complied as demonstrated by the 
number o f positions defined or redefined as commercial and competable, and by the 
shift in the size o f the competitions. There was some resistance in the sense of 
adapting the rules to the agency’s needs, but not much. It may be that agencies like 
NASA and OPM that had a lot o f experience with contracting did not see any 
substantial threat to contracting out some more that could arise from A-76. The 
nature o f these organizations was already changed, becoming a kind of a holding 
agency, managing a series o f contractors, more or less well.
Department o f Agriculture
In the case o f the USDA’s implementation o f A-76, Congress gave the 
White House a tough time. USDA is a congressional-type agency (Wilson 1989, 
204) whose mission has great distributional effects and whose principal source of 
power is its constituency. But in spite of this, USDA conducted the second most 
number o f competitions in the period under study. Mitch Daniels, Bush’s first OMB 
Director, made it clear that USDA and Interior were especially targeted for A-76 
(Peckenpaugh 2001c). The high number of competitions at the USDA was partly 
the consequence o f having a huge inventory o f competable positions, but it was also 
the result o f leadership.
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A Bush campaign organizer from California, Ann Veneman, was appointed 
as Secretary o f Agriculture. Veneman rose from the career ranks and knew much 
about the agency’s work. She was immediately engulfed in the 2002 Farm Bill, 
which some Republicans and farmers voiced displeasure about. With A-76, the 
OMB people I talked to remarked that Veneman was “definitely committed to get to 
green,” holding weekly sub-cabinet level meetings on A-76. Veneman was at the 
other end o f the spectrum, with a high level o f policy commitment, unlike 
Smithsonian leaders, they noted.212
OMB sources said that Veneman had bigger challenges in A-76 that smaller 
agencies such as EPA or some other new departments did not face. USDA had 
“diverse, powerful bureaus” that made it hard to carry out policy in the same way, 
according to my interviewees.213 Veneman presided during the tumultuous A-76 
studies at the Forest Service and Natural Resources Conservation Service while the 
Rural Development and farm loan programs were shielded by Congress (see 
Chapter 5 on congressional criticism of OMB’s quotas).
Problems also emerged at the NRCS, where a series o f reorganizations had 
reshuffled hundreds o f career personnel and put political appointees in place of 
regional managers (Singer 2005). NRCS A-76 studies occurred amidst fear among 
employees -  and managers -  who felt they were being targeted for cuts, according
212 Interviews, names withheld by request, September 10,2004.
213 Interviews, names withheld by request, September 10, 2004.
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to agency sources.214 OMB had told NRCS to shift to bigger competitions to engage 
some o f the large engineering contractor firms. In its budget request for 2004, OMB 
noted that USDA had yet to allow the private sector to deliver a significant share of 
conservation technical assistance, a core function o f the NRCS, which had become 
more critical after the 2002 Farm Bill devoted a significant share o f funding to 
environmental stewardship.
A close-knit organization with strong community ties, NRCS, according to 
sources inside the agency, had staff that had mostly worked for an average o f 20 
years at the agency. The A-76 mandate could complicate these community ties and 
the work o f the District Conservationists whose administrative support was supplied 
by the local districts. There were concerns that NRCS was going to lose much of its 
ability to get conservation applied on the ground if  A-76 led to outsourcing. A 
manager’s comment offers a glimpse into the clash between perceived mission and 
the contracting initiative:
If we were going to possibly compete these positions out, then...The local 
district could withhold the support that they used to provide NRCS 
conservationists.. .(Outsourcing could) jeopardize our long relationship with 
the local government agencies tremendously because they are used to 
dealing with us and not contractors (and) the history would be pretty much 
broken... We have 60-plus years o f working together...There is a high level 
o f trust between the agency and our districts.2
214 Interviews, names withheld by request, October 19, 2004.
215 Interviews, names withheld by request, October 19,2004.
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NRCS Chief Bruce Knight (2003) also remarked that the A-76 numbers 
tended to mask the disruption of the process. Yet NRCS actually exceeded the OMB 
15 percent goal by competing 25 percent by 2004, according to some managers who
7 1 ( \talked to me. But USDA, unlike the other over-compliers in the set, OPM and 
NASA, came from a position o f greater strength despite having downsized 15 
percent under Clinton. It had gradually sprung back in budget and staffing, growing
9 1 7a little under Bush, its mission remaining important to Congress. With its large 
size and congressional support, the USDA could probably have resisted A-76 
without undue harm, but loyalty to the president’s agenda prevailed at the 
department in the early years. The implementation literature tends to regard all of 
bureaucracy as undermining and resistant to the agenda o f its principals (Peters and 
Savoie 1994; Aberbach and Rockman 1988) but USDA followed Bush and allowed 
OMB to control its bureaucracy, despite misgivings in some parts o f the 
organization about the effects o f A-76 on their ability to achieve their mission.
The Middle Compliers
In-between the under-performers and the over-achievers were agencies that 
generally complied with competitive sourcing. This group differed from the under- 
compliers in their more vocal support o f the president’s agenda, but they also 
differed from the over-compliers in terms of the middle compliers’ proactive
216 Interviews, names withheld by request, October 19,2004.
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attempts to tailor A-76 to their needs (see Chapter 4 on “Strategic Adaptation: 
creativity within the limits”). The agencies representing the middle compliers in the 
study are defined by their leaders’ strategic obedience. They signed on to the White 
House agenda earlier than many other agencies because o f their leaders’ loyalty to 
the president. Their A-76 managers were some o f the architects o f the revised A-76 
rules; they knew them well and were able to adapt those rules to the organization’s 
needs. This middle group also had extensive histories o f contracting: they were not 
fearful o f contracting and had a superstructure in place to manage the process. 
However, prior contracting may have reduced the number o f competable positions 
in these agencies. In some departments, leaders’ desire to comply with A-76 was 
tempered by congressional opposition and intervention. Moreover, leaders were 
curtailed somewhat by the decentralization o f their departments. What secretaries 
chose to do was not necessarily what the more or less independent agencies in the 
departments wanted to and were willing to do.
Department o f Energy
The Department o f Energy looked as if it should have been an over- 
complier. Congress had shown no interest in curtailing A-76, and there was strong 
management support o f the A-76 agenda. The department had an extensive prior 
history of contracting. Nevertheless, DoE did not compete many FTEs in FY 2003
217 USDA’s budget authority between 2001 and 2004 increased by 1.57 percent after inflation.
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and FY 2004 (less than nine percent o f its total Commercial Code B FTEs). One 
reason is that the agency’s already extensive use o f contracts left the agency with 
fewer outsourceable positions, depleting the ability to do more competitive 
sourcing.
Like NASA and OPM, DoE suffered downsizing under Clinton although its 
contract workforce and dollars had grown. For example, from 1997 to 2001, it spent 
an average o f 73 percent o f its discretionary resources on contracts (GAO 2003e,
79). Like NASA, DoE’s reliance on contract personnel to support its mission was 
not without significant concerns, as GAO had repeatedly warned (see GAO 2003d). 
The nation’s largest civilian contracting agency, DoE spent around 90 percent, or 
$18.2 billion, o f its FY 2001 budget on contracts to operate its laboratories, 
production facilities, and environmental restoration sites. It is not only that DoE had 
few positions left to compete, but that it needed a core inherently governmental staff 
to oversee all those contracts. DoE’s A-76 Director Denis O ’Brien emphasized that 
they tried not to compromise their contract management capability in pursuing A-
01 ft76. The department was already beyond its ability to oversee those contracts 
well. GAO found recently that many o f DoE’s major projects experienced 
substantial cost and schedule overruns, largely because o f contract management 
problems. DoE’s contract management improvements were impeded by insufficient
218 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13,2004.
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support for training and inadequate numbers o f DoE project managers to oversee 
contractors’ performance (GAO 2005c).
DoE was an intermediate complier in part because its leadership insisted on 
both active and creative A-76 implementation. What could have led DoE to pursue 
A-76 despite the risk o f losing more jobs to contractors? According to Director 
O’Brien,219 DoE took OMB’s signals seriously. OMB threatened decremental 
budgets during the out years, so the agency tried to find a source o f extra money. 
Interviewees outside DoE explained that the “budget threat” attached to A-76 meant 
that agencies could not come to OMB and ask for more money if  the agency could 
not prove first that it looked for resources using A-76.220 Faced with the prospect of 
declining budgets, DoE’s management decided to show OMB that it could make 
some cuts on its own to decide ahead of OMB where the cuts ought to be made with 
the least amount o f employee resistance, work disruption, or harm to agency 
mission.
Having decided to engage in competitive contracting, top management 
strongly endorsed the process, putting in place a good A-76 team.221 The A-76 team 
put out guidelines to employees quickly and communicated via town hall meetings 
in the field. The President’s Agenda was “taken very, very seriously” at the 
department.
219 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
220 Interviews with DHS A-76 chief David Childs on September 13, 2004 and Steven Kelman, former OFPP 
Administrator on October 15, 2004. However, Robert Tobias, a GAO A-76 Panelist, said that the agency 
budgets could be cut as a  penalty from OMB in A-76, in an interview on August 31, 2004.
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The top leaders’ public commitment, similar to the cases o f Interior and 
Defense, allowed DoE to approach OMB confidently with its deviation requests in 
A-76, such as creating in-house teams composed o f government and existing 
contract personnel and using the federal supply schedules to invite vendors. Such 
variations allowed DoE to comply with the A-76 mandate without seriously risking 
more o f its contract management capability, a mid-level response that OMB 
approved of.
Department o f the Interior
The Department o f the Interior is an example o f a congressionally backed 
agency that nonetheless supported the competitive sourcing agenda. In Chapter 5 I 
discussed the dynamic where some A-76 resistance existed at the national parks but 
political support for the president reigned at the headquarters. The decentralized 
structure gave the National Park Service autonomous sources o f power within the 
Interior Department and Congress gave it some breathing room. When 
congressional backing is put alongside the prestige of Interior’s Park Service and 
Interior’s stable budget compared to downsized agencies in the study, Interior could 
be considered powerful, yet it did not use that power to resist competitive sourcing. 
With a third o f its workforce classified at the beginning as A-76-suitable, Interior 
conducted the highest (603) total number of contests for 2003 and 2004, involving
221 Interview with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004.
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1,614 FTEs, but more than 80 percent o f these 603 contests were direct conversions 
(before they were banned).
The White House had a lot o f influence at Interior, where trusted 
conservatives and industry friends populated the ranks (Barnes 2005). As Secretary, 
Gale Norton ably advanced the Bush agenda despite stem opposition from Interior’s 
largely Democratic constituents and some civil servants. The “world’s biggest lawn 
care provider,” in former OMB Director Daniels’ view (Peckenpaugh 2001c, 1), 
vocally supported the president’s agenda. Top leadership commitment also allowed 
Interior to influence key rules in the revised Circular that favored in-house workers’ 
chances o f winning, such as conducting contests of small numbers of positions 
using an improved staffing plan (MEOs). OMB’s Styles had admitted that they 
allowed the Interior’s deviation request because the agency signed on early to A-76 
(Peckenpaugh 2003k). This demonstrates that the agency leaders’ political loyalty 
could exist side by side with concern for personnel. As some interviewees observed, 
the political executives had a challenge: they wanted “to satisfy their boss,” but they 
also wanted to keep “their employees happy in their agency.”222 To be able to do 
so, Interior and similarly large and decentralized agencies adopted strategic 
compliance and created wiggle room for themselves.
222 Interviews with Jacques Gansler on September 8 ,2004 and Dale Yielding on November 8,2004.
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Department o f the Treasury
Treasury started with a lot o f positions classified suitable for A-76 (18,400) 
but it only competed 7.13 percent o f this number in FYs 2003 and 2004. The agency 
competed the third highest number o f positions among the civilian agencies in this 
study, after the USDA and Interior. Through the end o f 2004, Treasury completed 
60 contests, at least one in every bureau (Treasury 2005).While many agencies were 
still undecided about A-76, Treasury budgeted $1.9 million in 2002 in contract 
support to manage A-76 (GAO 2004a, 8) and led in conducting department-wide 
courses to familiarize its employees with the rules.
Treasury’s budget was relatively stable throughout the Clinton years 
although its workforce declined first, and then stabilized from 1997 to 2001 (GAO 
2003e, 109). Treasury therefore could not be considered weak. Its high level o f A- 
76 compliance appeared to have been due to its political leaders’ commitment to 
follow the White House agenda. During Paul O’Neil’s stint as Secretary, observers 
noted that O ’Neil wanted to “build a strong and influential agency,” but he failed 
(National Journal 2003,2). The agency’s influence instead waned because o f a 
steady stream of problems regarding his hierarchical and non-participative 
management style, leading to morale problems in the agency, at a time when a lot of 
Treasury’s units were being transferred to the new Department o f Homeland 
Security.
If not for the contests at the Internal Revenue Services, Treasury might have 
been a less-than-average compiler. IRS was led by Mark Everson who, like Sean
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O’Keefe who went to lead NASA, previously worked at OMB helping OFPP 
Administrator Angela Styles launch the President’s Management Agenda in 2001. 
The White House had lauded the IRS, whose A-76 team came with a lot o f 
experience, for using business case analysis in A-76. In 2004 the White House gave 
IRS a Presidential Award for Innovation.
The IRS contests for document handling, publications distribution, and IT 
jobs, however, were won by the government teams at the expense o f hundreds of 
layoffs, and in pursuit o f OMB’s “unstated quotas,” according to the National 
Treasury Employees Union (Gruber 2004g, 1). Some informants observed that 
Treasury’s “green,” like those o f Energy and HHS, were given by OMB in part 
because the competitions by these agencies ably revived the interest o f contractors 
to bid for government jobs under the rules o f A-76. Industry appetite was said to 
have sagged during the previous years because most contests were small, and the 
Bush administration wanted to stimulate it.223
Overall, Treasury’s middle position in competitive sourcing is demonstrated 
in its ongoing tension with OMB, as evidenced by a contest at the U.S. Mint for 
forklift operators. The job was awarded to the government but the acting Assistant 
Secretary for Management, upon OMB’s direction, reportedly reversed the decision 
and directed that the Mint re-open the competition, on the grounds that no private 
contractor submitted a competing bid by the close o f solicitation in September 2004.
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The contracting officer involved actually investigated the lack o f interest and 
determined that none o f the four potential vendors were suitable because they only 
rented equipment but did not provide operators with the equipment. The officer 
therefore recommended accepting the in-house bid (Govexec.com 2005). The 
employee union, AFGE, pointed out that OMB should have only ensured that rules 
were followed in this case rather than overturn a decision. A Mint official joined the 
argument with what seems to be an in-between position, saying that although 
neither OMB nor the Treasury Department should intervene in the procurement 
process o f an agency, they may “provide guidance” on how an agency can best 
comply with A-76 (Palmer 2005c, 2). What is unclear is whether the Mint official 
thought overturning the decision was more than providing guidance on how to 
comply.
Department o f Defense
I had expected DoD to be an over-complier because o f its leaders’ support of 
the president and his agenda and its prior history o f contracting, but over­
compliance did not occur. OMB downgraded DoD’s early “green” score to “yellow” 
by the end of 2004. The total number o f commercial activities at DoD was so huge 
that even though DoD accounted for almost half o f the total number o f FTEs in the
223 Interviews with Stan Soloway on September 9, 2004, an OMB Budget Examiner on September 10, 2004, 
Denis O ’Brien on October 13, 2004, and a  former DoD official on September 30, 2004.
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completed competitions for the entire federal bureaucracy from FY 2003 to FY 
2004, that number was still small as a percentage o f DoD’s own Commercial Code 
B FTEs (less than 7 percent). The volume slowed the agency’s pace. Compared to 
the civilian agencies, it would take DoD a lot more time to be able to complete 
public-private competition for 50 percent o f its inventory, the overall target o f the 
Bush administration before it leaves office.
DoD’s middle status was not just a function o f the size o f its inventory, 
though. DoD’s new-found organizational strength in the Bush administration, and 
its explicit endorsement o f A-76 in a public way, earned DoD the right to pursue A- 
76 with relative autonomy.
The case o f the DoD was more complex than the rest o f the cases because of 
its long history with A-76, its giant personnel size and budget, the military’s role in 
the war on terror since 2001, and the closeness o f Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to 
Bush and his prominence in the Bush Cabinet. The department had experienced 
budget and personnel reductions in the past but became so strong after 2001 that it 
could have ignored the initiative if it wished to. Instead, contrary to the assumption 
o f bureaucratic politics that agencies will always try to protect themselves if  they 
are able, DoD generally complied with A-76. DoD pursued the president’s agenda, 
and even sided with OMB in opposing congressional attempts to modify A-76 rules 
to favor government employees.
DoD’s power was used to endorse competitive sourcing. The desire o f top 
political leaders -  contrary to the desire o f employees -  emerged as the important
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determinant o f response. That desire almost certainly arose out o f closeness to the 
White House. Undersecretary David Chu (2002,1), promoting A-76 on OMB’s 
website, described DoD’s pledge to achieve the goals and objectives o f the 
President’s Management Agenda, arguing that the pledge was based in part on 
commitment and loyalty to the president.
Pro-A-76 groups approved o f DoD’s A-76 implementation, applauding 
Bush’s decision to keep Rumsfeld, who did “a good job streamlining procurement 
and implementing competitive sourcing in the face o f (c)ongressional and 
bureaucratic hostility” (ATR 2005,10). By June 2004, DoD had achieved its green 
score on OMB’s Scorecard after competing more than 10,000 FTEs in FY 2003 
(OMB 2004a), mostly through direct conversions. GAO’s A-76 task force panelist 
Robert Tobias noted in an interview for this dissertation that if  a powerful agency 
would like more flexibility in carrying out the president’s agenda, “it would be hard 
to turn them down. But DoD says, ‘I want to do more.’”
OMB and the Pentagon seemed to agree on many areas regarding 
contracting. Both camps opposed the TRAC Bill in 2001 that the unions backed and 
an in-sourcing amendment that lawmakers tried to attach to the 2002 Defense 
Authorization bill. It also requested to study some 13,000 FTEs upon direction by 
OMB, against congressional sentiments. During congressional debates on OMB’s 
A-76 quotas, DoD even argued that a ban would be a poorly conceived action that 
could prevent agencies from making basic management decisions. The House 
Armed Services Committee reported its concern that the DoD was under too much
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budgetary pressure to initiate and complete the studies. In 2003, DoD officials 
opposed language passed by the Senate in the Defense Appropriations bill that 
would have favored in-house teams in competitions with contractors (Peckenpaugh 
20031). Senator Edward Kennedy had inserted a provision granting cost advantage 
to federal workers in competitions involving more than 10 FTEs but the language 
was eventually dropped. In 2004, the Hill battle was replayed when a provision to 
the FY 2005 Defense Appropriations bill tried to deny advantage to offerors who 
might reduce their bid cost by not providing employer-sponsored health insurance. 
DoD opposed the provision (Gruber 2004a). Still, lawmakers were able to put in 
place laws favoring DoD employees in terms o f costing and getting credits for A-76 
for direct conversions, as a moratorium in 2003 prevented DoD from using the new 
Circular until it reported its A-76 plans to Congress. The moratorium was lifted only 
by the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act.
DoD was getting pressure not only from Congress but also from its own 
component units. The Navy, which had been the most aggressive at competitive 
sourcing, publicly worried that outsourcing during the Clinton period had taken 
much o f the low-hanging fruit. The Army, since the release o f DoD’s “Third Wave” 
competitive sourcing plan in 2003, was said to have “flooded the Pentagon with 
exemption requests that would leave the Service short o f its target o f 154,910 FTEs” 
(Cahlink 2003, 3). A former DoD Undersecretary, Jacques Gansler, explained, “I
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was trying to get it pushed within the Defense Department and I got all kinds of 
resistance because the government managers thought they were losing control.”224
DoD officials not only sought to defuse opposition within DoD, but also in 
other agencies. To try to break down resistance, DoD in 2004 sought consultants to 
create positive publicity about A-76. Joseph Sikes, the DoD A-76 Director, said it 
should trumpet “success stories” and convince the public that the new A-76 was 
“faster and fairer” (Gruber 2004c, 2). These public efforts are evidence o f DoD’s 
support o f A-76 and the president’s agenda.
To many it seemed inevitable that DoD would follow the agenda because of 
DoD’s decades o f A-76 experience and the number o f its commercial FTEs. Former 
OFPP Administrator Steven Kelman remarked in an interview for this study that 
DoD’s compliance with A-76 was inevitable because its central mission was to fight 
wars, and that so many o f DoD’s functions - cutting the lawn on bases, running 
health care systems and so forth - were separate from its core mission and could be 
carried out by those outside the DoD.225
DoD’s vocal support was crucial because the White House campaigned for 
A-76 based largely on results coming out o f DoD’s A-76 studies through the years. 
Civilian agencies were being asked to use A-76 because the process had saved DoD
224 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8, 2004.
225 Interview with Steven Kelman, October 15,2004.
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a lot o f money in tight budget years.226 In 2001 OFPP Director Styles (2001) 
explained to a subcommittee that OMB was working to ensure that DoD's 
experiences, both positive and negative, could be utilized by the civilian agencies.
At a 2002 hearing on DoD’s budget, Styles also said that what OMB wanted to do 
with DoD was
to take what they have learned and use that at the civilian agencies which 
frankly haven't been conducting any A-76 studies with the exception o f the 
Department o f Veterans Affairs and GSA about 15 years ago. (Styles 2002, 
36)
DoD was set up by OMB as an example but some lawmakers were 
concerned that the imitation would be too literal and that the main method of 
compliance -  direct conversion -  would also be copied, with serious consequences 
for civilian agencies. According to my interviews with managers in other agencies, 
DoD did serve as a model, not so much in terms of how to run A-76 competitions as 
how to adapt to the uncertainties o f public-private competitions.227 Except for the 
Energy Department, all the compliers and over-compliers in these cases studies used 
direct conversions to meet their A-76 targets (see OMB 2004a; OMB 2005b).
Even though DoD was willing to tout the A-76 process, DoD tried to flex its 
muscle about the way it was going to implement the rules. The muscle flexing
226 OMB (2003c:9) estimated the DoD savings from the 3000 competitions it held since 1979 at 33 percent. The 
figures vary in numerous studies.
22 For example, in my interviews with Denis O ’Brien on October 13,2004, Raymona Stickell on September 10, 
2004, Scott Cameron on September 13,2004, and Robert Knauer on September 24, 2004.
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occurred during the A-76 launching in 2001. In a memorandum in 2001, the 
department declared it would follow a system based on its own Quadrennial 
Defense Review: “Rather than pursuing narrowly defined A-76 targets, we propose 
to step back and not confine our approach to only A-76” (Aldridge 2001,1). The 
unions saw it as a sign for civilian agencies to be bolder in pursuing A-76 as they 
saw fit: “We think this will embolden agencies to reject the quotas,” said AFGE’s 
John Threlkeld. The Brookings Institution’s Paul Light added, "Defense is basically 
saying we're not going to follow your order.. .That's an implicit gesture that shows 
OMB it doesn't have much leverage in Washington on management right now" 
(Peckenpaugh 2002c, 1).
OMB needed the Defense Department to serve as an example, so while this 
flexibility might have been acceptable to OMB for decision making internal to the 
Defense Department, it could not stand as a public example to other agencies. The 
DoD memo signaled, if  not outright disobedience, then agency independence to 
interpret the president’s agenda. Days after the memo became public OMB 
convinced the DoD to back away from the memo. OMB’s Angela Styles announced 
that:
Defense is going to meet the 15 percent goal, and they are doing exactly 
what we want now, which is just using (OMB Circular) A-76 and public- 
private competition as one tool in their tool bag for looking at how to 
manage their agency. (Peckenpaugh 2003m, 1)
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This announcement, while appearing to have brought the DoD back in line, was 
complicated by the qualifier that DoD was still going to exercise discretion in A-76. 
It was clear from Styles’s statement that it was important to OMB for DoD to have 
an appearance o f compliance.
Defense officials also made sure that their ideas were heard during the 
drafting o f the 2003 Circular. DoD Undersecretary Peter Aldridge joined GAO’s A- 
76 task force and Annie Andrews from DoD was in the elite circle that helped 
OMB’s Office o f Federal Procurement Policy draft the A-76 Circular. The Defense 
Department was particularly supportive o f the “best value” provision, which trades 
off lowest cost for highest quality services. DoD argued that they needed a best 
value approach for flexibility. Several lawmakers viewed best value negatively 
because they said it raised issues o f subjectivity in awarding contracts. For decades, 
the U.S. Code required the DoD to use cost as the basis for comparing government 
work with the private sector. The new OMB Circular created a framework for 
trading off cost, reliability, and quality, but only civilian agencies were permitted to 
use the best value criterion, something OMB was campaigning to change (OMB 
2006a). Pentagon officials tried to use their internal administrative rule-making 
process to adopt best value. During the FY 2004 Authorization debate DoD 
officials urged Congress to repeal the ban on best value, but lawmakers merely
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allowed for a pilot study.228 Later, in the FY 2006 Authorization Act, even the pilot 
program was banned for DoD.
OMB and DoD had sparred about other things, such as OMB’s rejection of 
the Air Force’s attempt to get credit for its “Shared-MEO” approach229 across the 
Service without competition from private firms. Styles tried hard to make Defense 
follow the same rules as the other agencies (Peckenpaugh 2003h). After a period of 
good effort to comply with OMB rules, the powerful agency must have decided it 
had done enough. DoD proved it could resist a little bit when in 2004, after reaching 
green fairly early and ahead of many agencies, the department slipped back to 
yellow. The budget request for FY 2006 explained OMB’s decision to downgrade 
DoD: “While DoD has effectively used competitions.. .in the past, the pace of 
announcements has slowed significantly causing DoD to fail to meet its goals” 
(OMB 2005c, 94).
I speculate that the lag was partly a cumulative result o f DoD managers’ 
sentiments, expressed as soon as the initiative was launched, that the Pentagon 
needed a reassessment o f its contracting capacity. “Such a reassessment may very 
well show we have already contracted out capabilities to the private sector, that are 
essential to our mission,” according to DOD’s Undersecretary for Acquisition,
228 Section 336 o f  Public Law No. 108-136, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. 
Section 335 o f  the same Act delays the implementation o f the new A-76 Circular until 45 days after DoD had 
reported the impact o f  the new rules.
22 This refers to a Most Effective Organization or in-house staffing plan with high performance goals and 
accountability metrics.
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Technology and Logistics (Aldridge 2001, 1). The department developed its 
“strategic sourcing” approach that considered options other than A-76 like 
restructuring, re-engineering, consolidation, termination of inefficient practices, and 
adoption o f more streamlined practices (Grasso 2001, 20). But the saturation point 
in contracting out might have played a lesser role than the demand for flexibility in 
DoD’s middle compliance with A-76. The agency has significantly increased its 
spending on contracts since 2001 but it wanted to maintain discretion. DoD’s memo 
to OMB stated that “gaining overall efficiencies is even more crucial since 
September 11” and that DoD was committed but they “must have the freedom to 
manage.. .in ways that best support our strategic objectives” (Aldridge 2001,1).
In sum, in DoD’s case, agency strength did not translate into policy 
resistance. Nevertheless DoD did use its power. OMB was most interested in using 
DoD as an example for civilian agencies, and DoD allowed itself to be so used, but 
it was determined not to follow quantitative targets that the agency lacked the 
capacity to manage, and wanted more flexibility to implement the rules as it saw fit. 
To the extent that it was among the first to achieve OMB’s green score, it showed 
adherence to President Bush’s agenda. It led the federal bureaucracy into the 
complex arena o f competitive sourcing but it also used its power to assert autonomy 
over its own processes. The result was a case in the middle o f the compliance range.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
280
Summary
My assumption going into the research was that the agencies that had been 
cut severely before 2001 would be less effective at responding to the pressure to 
implement competitive contracting, and therefore would put more FTEs into job 
contests. The agencies in the study suggested that weakness from prior budget and 
staffing cuts - resulting in hollowness in some and extensive experience with 
contracting out - did in fact result in less ability to resist the firm White House push 
for competitive sourcing. The mini-case analyses found a stronger case for the role 
o f prior budget and personnel cuts, but other factors also contributed to the 
outcomes such as: vulnerability, as measured by the number o f commercial 
positions; congressional interest and resistance to A-76; and the positions taken by 
the political appointees. Weakness or strength was less o f a predictor in cases where 
the agency leaders determined to resist or avoid competitive sourcing (Army Corps 
and HUD) or a statutory block was in place (Veterans Affairs), respectively. Agency 
strength did not result in resistance (DoD and USDA) when the leaders supported 
the agenda. (Chapter 7 elaborates on how leadership worked to counter the effect of 
some o f the variables in creating the observed outcomes.)
Agencies in the three groups shared some attributes with one another, but 
there was considerable variation between agencies even within the same level of 
conformity to A-76 (Figure 8). The under-compliers fell into two groups, those 
whose missions did not seem to lend themselves to competitive sourcing (NSF,
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Smithsonian) and those that were protected by congressional blocks against A-76 
(Corps, VA).
■ Weak A-76-missian fit
■ Mixed strength agencies
■ Leadership resistance in 
strong agencies
■ Hill intervention
- Vocal A-76 support
■ Strategic compliance
■ Contracting experience










Figure 8. Common Attributes Within the Agency Groups
The over-compliers were a mix o f small and giant agencies with different 
missions, but they shared an extensive experience with contracting out due to the 
previous decades’ workforce downsizing. Their prior experience with contracting 
seemed to lessen their inhibitions against A-76, so that more contracting in the past
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appeared to breed more in the future. These agencies may be mirroring studies that 
show that an entity that is influenced once, tends to become more vulnerable to 
additional influence in the future. As a result, “organizational autonomy may be lost 
progressively as behaviors and decisions are increasingly constrained by the context 
in which the organization operates” (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003,95). More 
importantly, these agencies were led by loyal political appointees and adherents of 
A-76 and Congress had minimal intervention in their implementation.
The middle compliers shared a strategy o f adaptive compliance in 
competitive sourcing. The agencies in this group were mostly large, attracting the 
interest o f OMB and Congress, encouraging agency heads to tiptoe through the 
competing demands. Their agency leaders signed on early to the agenda, earning 
some flexibility in the shaping and implementation o f the new A-76 rules. Like the 
over-compliers, they were downsized and had experiences with contracting, some of 
them so extensively that they had little more to contract out without damaging the 
agency’s capacity to achieve its mission. As a result, they could only reach a 
middle level o f compliance. In sum, the middle compliers appeared to have more 
things in common among themselves compared to the resisters and over-compliers. 
But when all the compliers are taken as a whole, leadership emerges to be the strong 
intervening element between agency strength and its adaptation choices.
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AGENCY LEADERSHIP IN COMPETITIVE SOURCING
When this study was first conceived, the influence o f leadership on agency 
implementation o f competitive sourcing did not appear to be as strong as the nature 
o f the agency and its mission in terms o f whether the agency’s functions had a more 
or less commercial orientation, size, and power in terms of budget and staffing 
history and political alliances. During the course o f the study, however, it became 
apparent that leadership in the agencies was critical to the nature o f the response. 
This chapter is devoted to discussing the role o f leadership in competitive sourcing 
decisions. It explores the relationship between leadership and organizational 
adaptation and offers a glimpse of how leaders responded to the pressures involved 
in A-76.
Leadership is defined here in terms o f the choices of political appointees at 
the agencies to obey, defy, or strategically adapt to an unsettling mandate like 
competitive sourcing. Leadership was demonstrated in the top management’s 
decisions to support or be passive to President Bush’s agenda and the new OMB 
rules, to expose or protect their activities -  their inventories or “control valves” 
according to OMB -  to potential outsourcing and to put more or less effort and
230 Interview with Joseph Montoni, September 10,2004.
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resources into conducting the actual job contests. Political appointees also 
demonstrated leadership by balancing in some way the pressures coming from 
different sides, and changing their courses o f action when necessary to align with 
internal and environmental changes, as contingency theories demand (see Scott 
1970; Snow and Hambrick 1980).
Leadership made a difference in several kinds o f settings. In this chapter, I 
show how leadership interacted with other variables in a manner that influenced 
implementation in some agencies. This model puts leadership at the middle, the 
variable that moderates or exaggerates the impact o f organizational and political 
factors on the outcomes. This study provides support for the theory that the 
influence o f agency power on organizational adaptation runs through leadership.
The study also reinforces the theory that bureaucratic controllability lies in large 
measure in appointing agency heads loyal to the White House (Nathan 1983; Rubin 
1985; Wood and Waterman 1991; Wood and Waterman 1994; Koenig 1994).
Leadership Choices and the Continuum of Response
In Chapter 4 I catalogued a continuum o f agency responses. To recap what I 
said, I found three categories o f responses: compliance and over-compliance, 
strategic adaptation, and resistance. Compliance is defined as policy adherence or 
implementing the policy as required by the dominant actor, OMB/White House. A 
sub-theme that emerged during the study was over-compliance or serious 
compliance. Over-compliance is adherence to the point of the agency cutting itself
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to comply. Strategic adaptation moves away from a subservient posture to one that 
balances obligations to the policy with the mission and needs o f the agency. In A- 
76, agencies tried adding to existing discretion to achieve more certainty, bargaining 
to protect the organization while keeping an appearance o f adherence, or “going
O'X 1slow without incurring wrath” from the White House. Resistance involves what 
Miles (1965) and Rubin (1985) called fighting a rearguard action. At this level of 
response, organizations employed counter-measures against the threat, including 
gaming the rules. Here agencies protected as much of their organization from 
potential outsourcing as they could. Resistance involved evasion, non­
implementation, debate reframing, guerilla tactics, and actions that thwart the policy 
intent.
It appears that many o f these responses occurred because o f leadership. In 
this chapter, these responses are further delineated by describing the agency leaders’ 
choices and how their choices relate to the A-76 efforts and outcomes o f their 
agencies. While categories are not totally neat, those choices generally fell under 
(1) adherence to either A-76 in itself or the president’s agenda, or both, for various 
reasons, (2) resistance to A-76 for various reasons, and (3) leadership in the middle. 
Those who felt more strongly about either adherence or resistance pushed for what 
they believed was appropriate in the context of their agencies and the sentiments of 
lawmakers and unions. Agency leaders decided what direction to take, knowing
231 Interview with John Threlkeld, September 23, 2004.
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their agencies were in a position of weakness, strength, largeness, smallness, or 
hollowness. They were cognizant o f OMB’s power to control the process if  they did 
not. In some cases the adherents succeeded in pushing the policy; in some they 
overcame forces against implementation that came from inside and outside. On the 
other side o f the fence, some resisting leaders ably neutralized organizational factors 
that could have pushed the agencies toward A-76. The third group consisted of 
leaders who took a middle road, yielding somewhat to political direction from the 
White House but balancing several competing interests at the same time.
Adherents appeared to be sub-divided into two major types. Appointees at 
the agencies could go along with A-76 for distinct although sometimes overlapping 
reasons. A number o f agency heads believed the process worked, and that it would 
save money. If  done correctly, competition with the private sector would wring out 
the waste in government regardless o f who won the competition. For others, the 
choice to adopt A-76 was less based on whether the process saved money than on a 
desire to show loyalty to President George W. Bush and his agenda, which 
emphasized competition. In most cases both reasons probably operated 
simultaneously. (The choice to adopt A-76 out o f bureaucratic duty is discussed 
later under “Dutiful Bureaucrats.”)
The A-76 managers and officials in agencies that scored well on OMB’s 
Scorecard (for example Energy, Treasury, USDA, Labor, Homeland Security) as 
well as some academics and former agency and OMB officials (who had been 
consulting for these agencies) whom I interviewed revealed their belief in the
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savings that could come out o f public-private competition. When A-76 is carried out 
with enough top-level commitment, planning, time, skills, and funds, and without 
the pressure to meet numerical targets for a specified period, these officials felt the 
A-76 process could save the agency some money and support their mission. As 
David Childs, the DHS competitive sourcing chief, explained,
The strategy is, you do a study, and put the resources into it to do it right. I’ll 
tell you, if  you do an A-76 right, there (are) enough advantages in the 
process that the 60 percent (in-house win rate) is the minimum that you 
should be doing.232
OMB officials and budget examiners, managers from the IRS, Interior, 
Energy, USDA, Labor, and Homeland Security, even union leaders echoed OMB’s 
line that A-76 had been institutionalized; it was here long before the Bush 
administration and it would remain long after because o f its value or usefulness in 
finding efficiencies.233
On the other hand, a number o f officials were loyal to the current president 
and his father, a loyalty that may have translated to the appointees’ support for the 
Bush policy agenda, including competitive sourcing. Some o f the president’s 
appointees had been his friends from college days; others were allies while he was 
governor o f Texas. Several actively campaigned for Bush in his bid for the
232 Interview with David Childs, September 13,2004.
233 Interviews with Robert Knauer on September 24,2004, David Childs on September 13, 2004, Denis O ’Brien 
on October 13, 2004, Raymona Stickell on September 10, 2004, a NASA manager on September 16, 2004, Scott 
Cameron on September 13, 2004, a long-time, career federal official on September 8, 2004, Omar Nashashibi
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presidency. Many of Bush’s appointees had served in his father’s presidential 
administration. A 2001 survey found that 43 percent o f Bush's top appointees had 
worked for former President George H. W. Bush (Barnes 2005, 2).
In some agencies both motives, belief that the process properly done works 
and desire to please the president, occurred side by side, if  in some tension with 
each other. For example, at NASA, whose head Sean O ’Keefe came from Bush’s 
OMB and also served as Navy Secretary for former President Bush, an informant 
explained their A-76 approach:
We are trying to do things smart and not just run off willy-nilly to do 
competitive sourcing. We could probably pick 2 or 3 FTE and do a 
competition, get credit for it, and just go our merry way. But we just don’t 
think that that is right for the agency. And if  it's not, then we would like to 
do what is smart, and yet we still would want to support the president.234
To flesh out the influence o f leadership, I constructed Table 19 to anticipate 
what manner o f implementation and competitive sourcing outcomes could ideally be 
observed in agencies led by the different types o f leaders and to see which agencies 
fit these types.
and David Muzio on September 13, 2004, an Administration official on September 9, 2004, and anonymous 
NRCS sources on October 19, 2004.
234 Interview, name withheld by request, October 6, 2004.
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Table 19
The Difference that Leadership Makes: Ideal-type Implementation Approaches and
















•  Amount o f  planning, 
funds, and staff for 
A-76
High Low to Moderate Low Low




Small Small to 
Medium








Direct conversion & 
streamlined
•  Innovations in the 
A-76 process
High Low to 
Moderate
Low Low
•  Efforts to win 
employee support
High Moderate High Moderate
Implementation Outcomes





High Zero to Low Low to 
Moderate




Moderate High Moderate to 
High
•  Net dollar savings 
per FTE
Large Low to 
Moderate
Low Low to 
moderate
This is how Table 19 would explain A-76 processes and outcomes based on 
the type o f agency leadership: first, for those whose leaders truly believed in the A- 
76 process, their agencies would be expected to have adequate plans, funds, and 
skills for their A-76 program. They would take the time to plan their studies. 
Because o f this, their agencies would be able to mount good bids to defend their 
jobs, conduct big contests, obtain employee cooperation, and convince them that the 
goal is not to contract out. The goal was to encourage in-house innovation. These
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agency heads put a premium on assuring that the A-76 rules were workable for their 
agencies, and suited the agency’s needs and mission. Their approach would result in 
fewer completed competitions but large savings and high in-house win rates.
Second, for those whose leaders were loyal to the president and his 
competition agenda, their agencies would be expected to mount a high number of 
competitions, with a mix o f small and large ones, with preference for direct 
conversions (when allowed) and streamlined contests in order to meet the numerical 
goals. They would have staff and a moderate amount o f funding for their A-76 
program, enough to be able to complete their targets, which they would try to meet 
quickly to please the White House. They would obtain employee cooperation by 
using small-FTE contests and other mitigation efforts to minimize disruption. Their 
approach would result in a high number o f completed contests, moderate savings 
and high retention rates for streamlined contests, and moderate wins for standard 
ones.
Third, for those whose leaders believed in government hierarchy and felt 
duty-bound to carry out competitive sourcing, their agencies would be expected to 
engage in a moderate number o f small competitions, with preference for direct 
conversions (when allowed) and streamlined contests especially if  their agencies are 
small, in order to obey the White House and ease the pressure. They would take the 
minimum effort to staff their A-76 program, create a plan, and fund it. They would 
try to minimize organizational disruption. They would strive to meet targets but
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their overall approach would result in a low to moderate number of completed 
contests, minimal savings, and a fair amount o f agency wins.
Finally, for those whose leaders did not believe that the A-76 process suited 
their agencies’ mission and goals, they would not be expected to prepare an A-76 
plan and would try to appeal to OMB to be excused from the process, especially if 
their agencies are small. Management and employees would defend each other’s 
viewpoints. They would not be expected to establish a program office for 
competitive sourcing or have adequate funds and staff, and would therefore be 
unable to conduct more than a few contests. They would not innovate within the A- 
76 process but they would use other tools to prove to OMB the efficiency o f their 
existing operations. They would be expected to directly convert some positions. 
Their approach would result in the very few completed studies, minimal savings, 
and high in-house wins if  they launched competitions at all.
Agencies Led by the Adherents
Top-level officials who believed in A-76 were more likely to devote the 
resources to seeing that real and meaningful contests occurred. Interviewees 
frequently spoke about “management buy-in,” or “leadership buy-in” as key to 
compliance. All the OMB officials and staff, incumbent officials at Interior, IRS, 
Homeland Security, Energy, Labor, Health and Human Services, former DoD 
officials and managers, a GAO A-76 Panelist, a former OFPP Administrator, 
academics, and industry leaders whom I interviewed said or alluded to it. From the
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perspective o f interviewees, the role of agency leaders in facilitating or encouraging 
implementation o f A-76 was critical. As Robert Knauer, a noted A-76 expert 
explained, leadership was necessary in order to execute A-76 right:
They must decide if  they want to expend resources. So if  federal workers 
claim they don’t have the resources.. .it has to do DIRECTLY (emphasis the 
speaker ’s) with upper management at the department level or with the 
SES’s, they're simply not willing to fund competitive sourcing efforts, 
they're not willing to put their money where their mouth is.235
The Federal Acquisition Council (2004) also found that the more vocal top 
management was in supporting A-76, the more commitment managers and 
employees demonstrated toward achieving results.
Top officials, on the other hand, who were loyal to the president and his 
competition agenda, would behave in slightly different ways. In Chapter 4 ,1 cited a 
key informant who noted that streamlined competitions, despite the limited benefits 
and huge costs they entailed, were favored by all, because “all OMB cared about 
was basically their statistics.”236 Leaders who were loyalists who interpreted the 
mandate in this way would emphasize getting the number o f FTEs competed up to 
target numbers through streamlined competitions and direct conversion, to show 
that they had become “competitive” or “disciplined” in the area o f competition, as 
the President’s Management Agenda had envisioned. In one department that 
reached green in 2005 an official explained to me that, “Basically, what upper
235 Interview with Robert Knauer, September 24, 2004.
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management only wanted was to win and there are all kinds o f ways you can 
manipulate the system under the streamlined process to win.”
Department of Energy: Belief in A-76
The case o f Energy is one where leaders seemed to have adopted 
competitive sourcing for its merits. They devoted adequate resources to carry it out 
well. Energy was perhaps the boldest in testing OMB’s patience with its team’s 
creative use o f A-76 rules, instead of simply running a series of streamlined contests 
as Agriculture and Interior did. Table 20 shows that DoE did not carry out a single 
direct conversion in FY 03-04 to meet their quota and please OMB in the process.
Its competitions were few but big, standard types that required adequate time, 
preparation, and effort from the top, probably the reason they posted high net 
savings from their competitions in 2003 and 2004. “This is leadership,” observed a 
former DoD Official, when officials “do not just put out a directive, and say, go do 
it. They have to convince (employees) that they care about competitive sourcing, 
that they really want to do it.”238
236 Interview, name withheld by request, September 24, 2004.
237 Interview, name withheld by request, September 24, 2004.
238 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8,2004.
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Table 20
Completed Competitions. Agency Victories, and Net Savings bv Compiler Agencies
(FY 2003 and FY 20041
Agency FTEs Competed 
(as % o f 
baseline A-76 
FTEs)
Total No. o f 
Completed 
Competitions














5 0 40 98 $74,088
DoD 18,366
(6.78%)
204 33.33 5.35 85.5 $31,801
Dol 1,641
(7.13%)




47 55.32 2.13 100 0
Treas. 1,351
(7.34%)
41 43.9 41.46 92 $53,732
USDA 5,416
(15.21%)
433 3.93 94.69 97 $23,220
OPM 366
(61%)
11 9.09 81.82 100 $12,716
Sources'. Data f r o m  OM 3 2003a, 5; OMB 2004a, Appendix A- and Appendix E;
OMB 2005b, Appendix A -l and Appendix G.
As noted in Chapter 6, Energy leaders’ commitment to A-76 was 
communicated to the organization from the beginning. A good A-76 team was put in 
place with “extremely strong” support from Secretary Abramson, according to its A- 
76 Director Denis O’Brien. Unlike in many agencies, DoE’s senior managers 
recommended that the Competitive Sourcing Official role be filled with an 
individual o f at least the Assistant Secretary level. Management quickly sent out 
communications and guidelines, talked with employees face to face, and inserted 
enough innovation into the process to tailor the initiative to the agency’s needs.
Energy’ prior budgetary weakness and the subsequent budget threats by 
OMB gave DoE leaders more reason to be proactive in A-76. The chance to
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innovate in some o f its contests was something that Energy’s leaders gained in 
return for expressing enthusiasm for A-76 and putting enough resources into its 
management. Energy officials contributed to the development o f the revised 
Circular, perhaps explaining why they and the other contributors advocated 
competitive sourcing.239 With the flexibility granted by OMB, DoE leaders were 
able to push the initiative despite the agency’s being on a high-risk management list 
for its already extensive contracting. Agency leaders emphasized that they were 
careful not to compromise their contract management capacity. In fact, contractors 
criticized that one o f the DoE’s big contests was structured so that a lot o f outside 
bidders lost interest to compete. The DoE’s A-76 manager said that they were 
simply thinking outside the box in the way they designed their contests. DoE’s 
leaders seemed comfortable with their own employees winning the contests, as long 
as the competitions saved money.
It may be that DoE’s adherence to competitive sourcing was consonant with 
its heavy reliance on contracting out, being second only to NASA with the biggest 
share o f its budget going out the door to contractors. However, Energy clearly 
helped make competitive sourcing a distinctive mark o f the Bush administration by 
showing that the agency could capably manage large public-private contests while 
many agencies were scrambling to finish a series o f small-FTEs contests. DoE with 
its hollow structure would have been expected to merely convert some positions
239 Interviews with Denis O ’Brien, October 13, 2004, and Raymona Stickell, September 10,2004.
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directly, as NASA had done, but it did not. It avoided streamlined competitions and 
chose to plunge into standard competitions, albeit with a lot o f bargaining with 
OMB, to prove their in-house capability and current contractors were better than 
outsiders.
To make this model work for DoE, the department had to have the 
cooperation o f the employees. The top management’s decision to let the unions 
AFGE and NTEU participate in its A-76 Steering Group ensured lesser anxiety 
about the contests, even though jobs were cut in some of their MEO staffing plans.
Department o f Interior: Political loyalty
Secretary Gale Norton was widely known to have close ties with the 
president. Norton pushed Bush’s agenda of opening up more government land to oil 
and drilling, leading environmental groups to accuse Norton “o f putting politics 
before science” in making her decisions as secretary (ABC News 2006).
Interior’s implementation approach to A-76 was to meet the department’s 
targets cheaply and quickly240 and with minimal disruption, which explains the high 
number o f positions that were directly converted to contract, and the preference for 
a type o f streamlined competition called express review. The agency’s leaders got 
permission from OMB for this version o f the streamlined process in return for their 
enthusiastic attitude toward competitive sourcing. Leaders communicated with the
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unions and employees and they tried to make the independent-minded bureaus “see 
competitive sourcing as a useful tool instead of a threat.” To minimize the threat, 
agency officials deemphasized the importance of numerical targets in dialogues with 
employees.241 Interior leaders tried in public not to antagonize employees, at times 
meeting targets by converting vacant FTEs rather than threatening job loss to 
existing employees.
Agency cooperation was also encouraged by allowing senior managers 
discretion in the choice o f functions to study. A top official explained their 
approach:
rather than the Office o f the Secretary dictating what was going to be studied 
and where, we trusted the good judgment and the experience o f our senior 
career managers to tell us what they thought.. .1 knew enough about the 
culture o f the Interior Department to avoid...a centralized approach. (Hill 
2005c, 2)
While Interior’s leaders worked to assure internal cooperation and get the 
numbers up, they publicly advocated for the process, leading government-wide 
chats on A-76 and campaigning for flexibility in employee buyouts. Such buyouts 
helped to reduce the threat value to current employees. The enthusiastic support of 
the top leaders may have compensated for the resistance at the Park Service. When
240 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13, 2004.
241 Interview with Scott Cameron, September 13,2004.
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Park Service leaders made a noise about the high cost o f A-76, Interior leaders 
quickly acted to assure lawmakers they would not overspend on A-76.
Interior’s brand o f compliance is in marked contrast with Energy’s 
performance. Interior completed the highest number o f competitions in the 
government in the period under review, more than DoD’s, it converted the highest 
number o f FTEs, and had the highest in-house rate o f victory. Its savings (data for 
FY 2003 not reported) appeared to be minimal, but at least they won most contests 
and met their targets as the White House would prefer.
Overall, Interior’s strategy also helped the leaders’ career. Lynn Scarlett, 
whose office was in charge o f the Interior Department’s competitive sourcing 
program, was promoted from Assistant Secretary to Deputy Secretary by the re­
elected president. Secretary Norton was one o f only four cabinet heads asked to stay 
when Bush was re-elected in 2004.
Agencies Led bv Non-believers of A-76
I am not sure I have ever heard anyone express gratitude for A-76, that due 
to A-76 some wonderful things happened, or such and such terrible things 
were prevented. More often, the A-76 process is viewed as an agenda 
pushed by anti-government ideologues, greedy business people, and/or OMB 
bureaucrats that are not in touch with the true needs o f government 
programs. -  Long-time career, federal official242
242 Interview, name withheld by request, September 8. 2004.
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At the opposite end is leadership resistance. Leadership was a little harder to 
see among the compliant agencies, especially because compliance was the norm, but 
it could be seen more clearly in the resisting agencies because that resistance had to 
be at least sanctioned by the leadership, if  not promoted by it.
In this section I cite comments from officials who asked not to be identified 
that indicated the presence of some resistance in their agencies. The nature o f this 
topic was very sensitive and interviews were obtained in exchange for 
confidentiality. Careerists were careful to say that their views did not represent 
those o f their agencies or political bosses, but they were in good positions to 
observe the degree o f resistance in the agency and employees’ perception o f leaders’ 
at least tacit support o f resistance tactics. When the views o f leaders were public 
and where I interviewed those officials, I report on leaders’ views directly.
Resistance stemmed in part from a desire to hold the organization and 
personnel together in the face o f overwhelming insecurity. Some leaders managed to 
bear the pressure and avoid competitive sourcing when others jumped ahead. Some 
leaders could not seem to bear the pressure at all, with A-76 threatening to disrupt 
everything. For example, at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, management was
afraid to notify employees... .(or) unduly alarm an employee that their job
may be up for consideration because that gives an employee less security
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and it gives the agency less security if  all o f a sudden the employees think 
that their job is at risk.243
Covertly resisting agencies, according to an OMB official, usually threw up “a lot o f 
complexities” around the function.244 They often proposed doing business case 
analysis (BCA) first, before going to A-76. In one agency, according to an official, 
they just kept
showing the bone to OMB saying we are doing our effort.. .and hopefully 
the BCA will show that our cost to do the effort is not outlandish and 
nowhere near the point where any contractor would even come close.245
For those openly resisting, leaders’ and managers’ resistance, as Chapter 4 
discussed, stemmed from: (1) OMB’s across-the-board, hard-line approach to 
implementation, constraining internal strategies; (2) a simplistic, widely publicized, 
A-76 evaluation mechanism (the Scorecard) that OMB said was meant to humiliate 
those unable to meet OMB’s goals fast enough; and (3) a lack o f congruence 
between their mission or functional orientation and a target-driven, annual initiative. 
Civilian agencies were unfamiliar with full-fledged competition, the experience o f a 
few of their aging staff harking back to the Reagan years when agencies simply 
outsourced jobs or conducted market research for cost comparison. This 
unfamiliarity was compounded by OMB’s early signal that agencies should not 
expect extra funding for the process, either from OMB or Congress. Training and A-
243 Interview with Dale Yielding, November 8, 2004.
244 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9,2004.
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76 guidelines from OMB were so scarce in the early months o f the initiative that 
some were forced to seek individual help from their friends in other agencies 
through emails and phone calls, according to a USDA manager.246
In Chapter 4 1 discussed OMB’s view of how agencies tried to resist, 
primarily, by claiming that their jobs or missions were unique and getting 
congressional delegations to dissuade OMB on their behalf. Explaining resistance 
from the agency point o f view, the A-76 managers that I talked to agreed that one 
strategy was making a strong defense o f agency mission, claiming that A-76 did not 
suit it. They added other reasons, including that low-hanging fruits had already 
been outsourced before 2001, A-76 was too confusing, or the agency was already 
well managed. Presidential initiatives come and go, according to an informant* but 
managers try daily to be efficient: “efficiency was not invented” when Bush was 
elected in 2000, said one.247 Another strategy was relying on the assurance that 
allies, especially in Congress, would step up to ease the pressure or threat. “If you 
get bipartisan support on the Hill, among your appropriations committees, and we 
do, all this other stuff really becomes an exercise.”248
245 Interview, name withheld by request, November 8,2004.
246 Interview, name withheld by request, October 19, 2004.
247 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15,2004.
248 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15,2004.
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Smithsonian and National Science Foundation: Non-believers of A-76
Among the leaders who resisted the initiative were those o f the Smithsonian 
Institution and NSF. To begin with, both agencies could not be expected to reach 
“green” on the OMB Scorecard, because the green criteria involved conducting one 
standard competition (65-plus FTEs) and both did not have commercial programs 
that big that they could compete. Smithsonian leaders delayed in submitting their 
inventory for a while, and told OMB, regarding a function OMB would like see 
studied, “We’re not even going to categorize these functions as competable,” 
according to an OMB official.249 They questioned the Smithsonian’s presence in 
the Scorecard and the lack o f fit between A-76 and the nature o f their work and 
sources o f funding. Secretary Lawrence Small maintained that the Smithsonian is a 
trust establishment that should not by covered by the FAIR Act law, hence it should 
not be required to engage in competitive sourcing. The small number o f its 
commercial FTEs that were funded by government appropriation complemented this 
agency’s argument that it should not be expected to behave like other agencies that 
were embracing competitive sourcing. Contracting for them was not just a matter of 
cost and speed, but who in the commercial world could meet their requirements, 
usually o f an artistic nature.
249 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9,2004.
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I gathered some sentiments from Smithsonian employees that they were 
worried that the Secretary would eventually capitulate; but by the end o f 2004 the 
Smithsonian remained free o f A-76. According to the local union, they were
concerned about contracting out that takes work away from Smithsonian 
employees... Management feels exactly the same way, that we are not a
^ crt
regular federal agency, speaking from a historical standpoint.
The informant added that Smithsonian leaders “from time to time” had looked at 
functions that could be outsourced
to see if  it would be advantageous to them but so far, both the unions and 
management have come to the conclusion that it is in the best interest o f the 
Institution not to contract out.. .the positions that we have traditionally 
represented.251
The employees knew that what was keeping the agency from A-76 was not 
that the size o f the organization made it impossible for them to conduct some kind 
of cost comparison, but the opposition o f their leader to competitive sourcing. 
Informants argued that if  leadership resistance collapsed, the Smithsonian would 
have to comply with the policy. From their point o f view, leadership was critical in 
mediating and shaping the agency response.
Delay was an important strategy observed at the National Science 
Foundation. The tenacity o f the National Science Foundation annoyed OMB for 
some time. OMB staffers revealed in interviews that NSF would not commit to a
250 Interview, name withheld by request, February 14, 2005.
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competition o f any o f  its commercial positions. NSF, however, was getting to 
green in the other components o f the President’s Management Agenda during this 
time, allowing the agency to argue for good management outside o f A-76. “The 
President's Management Agenda has been very valuable for NSF, not necessarily in 
the competitive sourcing arena but certainly in the other four elements,” one 
manager told me. Since NSF had few FTEs available for competition, the best 
they could get to was “yellow,” and its management believed that direct conversions 
should have remained an option for agencies that could not go through competitions 
for reasons of size, morale, and funding. It helped NSF leaders that its allies in 
Congress kept fighting OMB for an increase in the agency’s budget. NSF leaders 
succeeded for a while. By the time Bush was re-elected, “red” agencies like the 
NSF, the Army Corps o f Engineers, and HUD could no longer avoid competitive 
sourcing and began their job contests. As Amelia Gruber, Government Executive's 
Editor and avid follower o f the A-76 debate, said in an interview for this study, 
when Bush was re-elected OMB re-educated the political appointees in the agencies 
“if they forgot what the goals were initially.”254
251 Interview, name withheld by request, February 14, 2005
252 Interviews, names withheld by request, September 8 and 10, 2004.
253 Interview, name withheld by request, October 15, 2004.
254 Interview with Amelia Gruber, February 16, 2006.
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Agencies Led by Dutiful Bureaucrats / Middle-of-the-Roaders
Before looking at cases under this label, a discussion o f the nuances o f the 
middle position is required. A sense of responsibility to comply despite some 
hesitation would probably lead some agencies in the middle in terms o f the 
leadership o f their agency. This third set o f leaders would demonstrate loyalty to 
hierarchical superiors, not specifically to the Bush family, and they would not 
possess a strong, ideological belief in competitive sourcing. Middle-of-the-road or 
dutiful bureaucrats, as I call this category of leaders, would be characterized by a 
sense o f duty, by a belief that democratic governance requires agents to be 
accountable to principals, akin to the old concept o f bureaucratic neutral 
competence (Heclo 1975). OMB staff members said they saw managers with “a 
desire to make it look good. And to achieve the results they have said they were 
going to do.” According to another source, “basically, they want to respond to 
what their boss tells them.”256 One OMB staff member interpreted the appointees’ 
goal as looking good in front o f the president:
There is a definite desire within each agency -  at least at the management 
level -  for them to achieve green. One individual I met the other day, she 
said her agency, the head o f it, came in wearing a bright yellow suit because 
they had just achieved yellow status. And they held a party for it. And you
255 Interviews with Omar Nashashibi and David Muzio, September 13,2004.
256 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8, 2004.
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can see that there is a rallying cry within the troops there, so to speak.
Obviously, they want to look good in front o f the president.257
During a Cabinet meeting, Attorney General John Ashcroft showed off a blown-up 
version of his Scorecard because the Justice Department had achieved good grades. 
On the other hand, Treasury Secretary John Snow was quite nervous because his 
agency had more reds than the Justice Department (Gruber 2004e). An OMB staff 
member explained to me that “It’s accountability. None of them wants to be seated 
at the back o f the room because they have been red for the last two-and-a-half 
years.” OMB’s Deputy Director Clay Johnson (2003, 1) had said poor performers 
would face public humiliation and questioning by the president. A former 
Undersecretary who managed A-76 said “it can make them look bad if  somebody 
can do it a lot better than they were doing it,” to explain the leaders’ attentiveness to 
the White House initiative.258
The pressure from elected principals on unelected agents was a given for 
these agencies, but there were other competing pressures. If middle-road leaders 
showed OMB enthusiasm in A-76, it was probably part of a strategy to ease off the 
pressure from above due to the intense politics around the initiative. If the leaders 
avoided showing OMB enthusiasm, it was likely to ease off the pressure from their 
organization. The pressures may have been greater in large agencies, but OMB set a 
bar for all the agencies, big and small, from the outset. The decision to put the
257 Interview with Omar Nashashibi, September 13,2004.
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Smithsonian and USAID, for example, on the list o f agencies to be graded every 
quarter was a signal by the White House to the entire bureaucracy to pay attention to 
the agenda. Thus leaders entered a contentious arena with intent and foreknowledge. 
The deep divide between the camps on A-76 made it very hard for the appointees to 
come out clean: too much A-76 invited the ire o f Congress and the employees; too 
little, OMB’s wrath. Chief Financial Officer William Campbell o f the Veterans 
Affairs acknowledged this pressure on senior leaders: “I knew that this was not 
something that was going to bathe my career in its final days in glory. So I tried to 
avoid it at all costs” (Gruber 2004a, 2).
Deliberation characterized middle-roaders. Former OMB staff member
• J C Q
David Childs told me that there were many agencies that were holding out on A- 
76 because the leaders knew that “they could lose an awful lot of 
reputation.. .Nobody wants to be the head of an agency that goes down by 50 
percent. They take ownership. They own their organization” even if the leaders 
wished to follow the president. Childs believed that political appointees could be 
won over to a more staff-oriented approach to competitive sourcing. Contractors 
worried that managers could be “reluctant to put themselves in a position that could 
mean cutting staff’ (PSC 2004,13). Unions, particularly AFGE, branded A-76 as a 
“career killer” for leaders not just because o f the antagonism A-76 could generate
258 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8, 2004.
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among staff but also because it was easy to make serious mistakes in the process. 
The leaders’ challenge was how not to antagonize the organization they needed to 
lead -  and, in competitive sourcing, potentially shrink -  while complying with or 
seeming to comply with the White House guidance (see Cohen 1996 and Maranto 
2002).
James Wilson (1989, 28) in Bureaucracy wrote that executives want to 
maintain their own agencies and their political position in the larger governmental 
world. This is echoed by a former DoD A-76 expert, who said that most appointees 
did not really wish to conduct A-76 “because most o f them are place holders and 
want to stick around later and get a job as a regular civil servant.”260 The 
organizational and personal interests come together to make the job a test. For 
example, a bureau official shared with me this perception of leadership in policy 
implementation:
The one who runs (the A-76 program in the agency).. .thinks that his career 
hangs on how well he does competitive sourcing here. So if that's what's 
you've committed to, that's what you shove down our throats.261
Apart from filtering through variables such as size, mission, and strength, leaders in 
this category therefore would add their career prospects in the mix. A middle
259 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
260 Interview, name withheld by request, September 30,2004.
261 Interview, name withheld by request, February 8, 2005.
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outcome was necessarily the result for leaders who attempted to balance internal and 
external pressures and align their agencies to the changes around them.
None o f the cases I looked at in detail for this study was a pure case o f a 
leader taking a middle road. However, two agencies (DoD and USDA) exhibited 
what I call evolutionary adaptation, which moved their agencies toward the middle 
after an initially high level o f compliance in the context o f their changing internal 
and external conditions. The concept o f evolutionary implementation first showed 
up in the work o f Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, 175). The authors wrote that 
controlling implementation and anticipating changes in the policy implementation 
environment is impossible and that “we must rely on learning and invention rather 
than instruction and command” in order to achieve policy goals. Two cases in this 
study show an agency’s ability to adjust their behavior, discover the constraints, and 
cope with new circumstances. The USDA and DoD cases show that 
“implementation is evolution” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984,176).
Both agencies were led by Bush political allies but they were also careerists 
(Donald Rumsfeld and Ann Veneman) in organizations that were large, 
congressionally important, and decentralized. Under these leaders, the two 
organizations engaged in a lot o f A-76 activities initially, but unfavorable outcomes 
and/or changed conditions by 2004 led them toward a position more balanced than 
the ones with which they started out. Instead o f committing to the choice they made 
from the beginning, both agencies moved toward a pragmatic position that 
demonstrates how bureaucratic strategies could change over time, staying dutiful
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while minimizing harm to the agency, and using new resources in adapting to 
implementation pressures.
Department o f Agriculture: Evolutionary adaptation
The USD A was an over-complier from the perspective o f size: the 
percentage o f FTEs in completed competitions during FY 2003 and FY 2004 was a 
lot more than would have been expected, mainly due to the frenzied A-76 activities 
that occurred at the Forest Service in FY 2003. The USDA had political power, but 
did not exercise its power to resist, at least in the initial years. However, when the 
Forest Service case study in Chapter 5 is combined with that snapshot o f USDA 
compliance in Chapter 6, what emerges from the analysis is a demonstration of 
evolutionary response by the leaders at the USDA, getting to the middle from an 
extreme position, which was as much a product o f changes occurring internally as 
re-alignment o f the pressures externally.
The Forest Service implementation was a case o f over-enthusiasm by its 
leaders, a sense o f bureaucratic accountability, not ideology, that slammed against a 
strong barrier when the Republican-led Appropriation committees sided with the 
employees and environmental/forester unions and reprimanded the agency’s over­
spending on A-76. The USDA Secretary was strongly committed to competitive 
sourcing, according to OMB, but the eagerness to comply may have reached its
262 Interviews with Adrienne Erbach, Joseph Montoni, Jason Weller, and John Pasquantino, September 10,2004.
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limits. Forest Service competitions in 2003 and 2003 reached an embarrassing limit 
because o f the high costs o f its competitions, making the USDA, their parent 
agency, the only one on the Scorecard that had a deficit with net projected savings 
from A-76 lower than its net spending on the competitions in FY 2003 (OMB 
2004a). This outcome embarrassed the administration and OMB, and gave 
congressional opponents evidence o f the initiative’s dark side. As the career 
officials at Forest Service recalled what happened:
We were trying to hit a fairly ambitious target o f number o f jobs to be 
studied. And to show that we could get the work done, we had to do it 
without the kind o f internal oversight that obviously tripped us up.263
The officials said they were simply trying to comply but they did not know the A-76 
process well and they were conflicted between their employees' and organizational 
welfare, and meeting the agenda. This conflict resulted in the faulty manner o f 
implementation.264 This description was corroborated by knowledgeable sources 
outside the Forest Service who explained that its people were like soldiers who 
would try their best to meet OMB orders in order to address their “bad boy” image 
o f management.265 Added an informant, the agency officials probably designed the 
contests in such a way that “they could go back and tell OMB, ‘We hit your target, 
and by the way, we won virtually all o f the competitions.’”266
263 Interview with David Heerwagen, November 1,2005.
264 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1, 2005.
265 Interviews, names withheld by request, January 27, 2005, December 9, 2004, and January 25, 2005.
266 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27,2005.
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What stands out from the Forest Service and USDA’s sequence o f events 
from 2002 to 2004 is a movement from high compliance to pragmatism. There was 
a big push initially and by the next year the momentum vanished. Why? First, 
the parent and daughter agencies tried to meet the mandate to prove their 
commitment and that they were good subordinates. In the process they did not 
manage the OMB pressure and the competition process well. They paid millions of 
dollars to private consultants to conduct the studies without upfront planning and 
sufficient guidance, instead of using a more deliberate approach characterizing some 
o f the DoE and IRS studies. Forest Service also neglected the other source of 
organizational strength, the Congress, which informants said the agency could have
*)fLQ
turned to for help if  the pressure was too much.
Allies o f the agency across the country began telling the press and Congress 
about the A-76 expenses, work disruption, and low morale. Appropriators started 
their investigation. Before the House of Representatives released its report in 2004, 
the OMB official in charge o f A-76, Angela Styles, resigned and left OMB. 
Congressional funding caps were put in place for the 2004 Interior Bill and OMB 
reported that USDA indeed was in the red as far as A-76 costs were concerned. The 
House report came out in 2004, a report so critical o f the A-76 pressures and faulty 
implementation that an informant wondered how anyone could have managed a
267 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27, 2005.
268 Interview, name withheld by request, January 27, 2005.
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straight face.269 The Forest Service manager in charge o f the flawed contests 
retired.
The funding cap, the replacement o f key actors at OMB and Forest Service, 
and the lawmakers’ scrutiny led OMB to relax some o f its A-76 requirements in the 
Forest Service to give it a “fresh start” (Gruber 2004d, 1). As the new A-76 leaders 
at Forest Service explained, OMB itself realized there were limits:
That is one example o f how they (OMB) have been willing to work with 
u s.. .They have been a fairly strong advocate o f the competitive sourcing 
program.. .they just want to make sure the program is working out as 
intended.. .at this point in time OMB is understanding o f our managerial 
limits.270
Breathing room obtained, the USDA and Forest Service bureaucracy paused and 
planned for bigger studies in 2004, despite an OMB warning by 2005 that the lack 
o f competitions would put USDA back into the red column (Forest Service 2005).
The USDA’s strength was not based on the number o f its employees or the 
size o f its budget, so much as employee complaints, public outcry by allied 
organizations, and congressional pushback. This series o f reactions allowed Forest 
Service some space, and enabled careerists to inject some pragmatism into the 
program. In this model, the internal conditions had changed (funding was capped; 
officials replaced), the political environment changed (Congress supporting the
269 Interview, name withheld by request, December 9, 2004.
270 Interviews with Chris Pyron and David Heerwagen, November 1,2005.
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employees; OMB weakened), and the USDA and Forest Service leaders ably 
adjusted their response.
Department o f Defense: Strategic choice over environmental determinism
The Department o f Defense was among the first to reach “green” in 
competitive sourcing on OMB’s Scorecard. However, it had joined the ranks of red 
agencies by 2005. What led to this move from one end o f the strategy continuum to 
another? It appears to be a combination of congressional protection o f the agency 
and its employees and the military mobilization in Iraq that technically exempted 
DoD from public-private competition (but not contracting out), except that its 
leaders still wanted to pursue competitive sourcing around 2001. But the ongoing 
war since 2003 extended the agency’s capacity and A-76 competitions would have 
added to the strain.
As discussed in Chapter 6, DoD was an agency that could be considered 
powerful enough and would be expected to resist by virtue o f its large personnel 
(who remained resistant to A-76, according to a former official, Jacques Gansler271), 
the level o f its resources in a time of war, and A-76 opposition from some of the 
Services even during the Clinton years, but it did not resist. Secretary Rumsfeld and 
his staff steered the DoD early on toward A-76. Gansler argued that if  senior 
political appointees had not made it an issue, A-76 compliance would not have
271 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8, 2004.
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occurred. He said leadership is indicated by the amount of will that leaders possess 
“to fight the internal resistance.”272
Evidence o f DoD leaders’ steering toward compliance and fighting initial 
resistance included the agency’s proclamation of its support for President Bush and 
A-76 on OMB’s competitive sourcing website, its support o f OMB against some 
lawmakers in changing the A-76 rules, and its donning a leadership role for civilian 
agencies. Rumsfeld also tried to centralize DoD, which would have helped 
implementation. DoD’s A-76 manager Joe Sikes also worked hard to create positive 
publicity (Gruber 2004c).
Hrebiniak and Joyce’s adaptation study (1985) says that environmental 
determinism can be offset by strategic choice. The DoD is a case where its huge 
cache o f commercial FTEs would have taken years to bid out if  the department 
religiously followed OMB’s numerical targets throughout the years, which it did not 
by leaders’ choice. The leaders were loyal and close to the Bush family but they 
were also familiar with the savings coming out o f A-76, how to do it right, and 
when to do it. As explained to me by A-76 expert Robert Knauer, who also taught 
at the Defense Acquisition University,
DoD is the most progressive federal agency around, all things considered, 
and has taken A-76 upon itself as a managerial program to get lean and do 
the right thing. And they were doing this on their own without any push or
272 Interview with Jacques Gansler, September 8, 2004.
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shove. But federal agencies outside o f DOD, well, they've literally sat on
Ol'Xtheir ass for years never doing a thing.
As occurred in the USDA, DoD’s response in A-76 evolved over time in 
response to internal and external demands. Congressional protection o f DoD 
workers and the war on terror combined to prevent DoD from continuing much of 
its competitions. The initial surge brought about by direct conversions and 
streamlined competitions early in the Bush administration stopped with a 
congressionally imposed moratorium in 2003. Employees o f the Navy - which 
NAPA (2001) called the leading practitioner o f strategic sourcing - and of the Army 
also called for exemptions from A-76, inundating the Pentagon with their requests 
(Cahlink 2003). The congressional moratorium must have allowed the autonomous 
Services to exert influence on headquarters. When the ban was lifted in 2004, job 
competitions proceeded slowly, leading OMB to downgrade DoD to “yellow” and 
then “red” by 2005.274
In the past, DoD tried to strike a balance “between centralized management 
and field responsibility...to incorporate lessons learned from successful 
competitions while still encouraging innovative ideas from the field (Gansler 2000). 
GAO had repeatedly indicated that A-76 at DoD was time consuming. Clearly, 
public-private competitions would have been difficult for the Services in the middle 
of mobilization. With the war going on, A-76 could potentially be disruptive, the
273 Interview with Robert Knauer, September 24, 2004.
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military services needing all the in-house expertise and experience it could get. 
Pentagon officials acknowledged in 2002 that the war could create “surge 
requirements” that could make it difficult to conduct A-76 because o f the attention it 
would require from base commanders and its demoralizing effect on employees 
under study (Peckenpaugh 2002h, 2). For example, the Army Vice Chief o f Staff 
John Keane acknowledged that outsourcing initiatives destroy organizational 
loyalty:
When you have a civilian employee, that employee's loyalty is to you, the 
institution itself, the United States Army. And there is a bond created 
between that civilian workforce and this institution called the Army, much as 
there is among our soldiers. (Peckenpaugh 2003h, 9)
It is also possible that the slow pace beginning in 2004 was a top-level 
decision, recalling the Pentagon’s early insistence to OMB that it would like to have 
as much autonomy on sourcing strategies as possible (see Aldridge 2001). In this 
light DoD’s participation in shaping the 2003 Circular was a strategic attempt to 
ensure that DoD’s expertise was not only tapped, but the agency would also not be 
unduly threatened by A-76, particularly if, like HUD (see Chapter 6), DoD simply 
wanted to outsource without conducting competitions during a time of mobilization. 
Based on OMB’s latest Scorecard, if  DoD was a model for competitive sourcing in
274 See the Scorecard updated at httD://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/200412scorecard.pdf
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the beginning, then it definitely was a resister by 2005. Overall, it was a 
bureaucracy in the middle, where adaptive navigation was key.
In both cases o f the USDA and DoD, the evolution o f pragmatic strategy 
was visible only when the bureaucratic sub-units are examined. Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1984, 92) once observed that an agency “that appears to be a single 
organization with a single will” could turn out to be “several suborganizations with 
different wills,” and perhaps sub-cultures, and these could lead to a balance. The 
ability to adapt to external political pressure is affected by organizational factors 
like structure and culture (see Koenig 1994; Kaufman 1976). At USDA, the 
decentralized structure let OMB influence Forest Service directly. At DoD, the field 
units regained more influence over their A-76 process once a moratorium took 
place.
Leadership and a Model o f Adaptive Response
The likelihood o f high compliance in competitive sourcing was substantially 
increased by the appointment o f loyal agency leaders regardless o f initial agency 
strength and conditions. If  the leaders were loyal to the White House, there was a 
better chance o f implementation. In Figure 9 ,1 sketch how leadership could work 
with other variables to determine response. Each variable is given a plus or minus 
sign; compliance results from a combination o f pluses, under-compliance or 
strategizing from a predominance o f minus signs. This model responds to the 
study’s theme exploring the relationship between bureau power and adaptation. The
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model puts leaders in the middle, moderating or exaggerating the influence of power 
and other external and internal conditions.
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Figure 9. A Threat-Strength-Leadership Model of Agency Response
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This is how the model would explain the dynamics observed in Chapters 6
and 7:
■ If agency leaders are not under tight White House control and wish to protect 
their mission and staff, and the agency is budgetarily backed by Congress, the 
likely outcome is resistance. This model shows that strength is essential in foot 
dragging, evasion, or resistance when the leaders so desire. The nearest cases 
were the NSF, the Army Corps, and Smithsonian.
■ If agencies have a lot o f A-76 FTEs and their leaders support the White House 
agenda, but the agency is weak, Congress can neutralize the adherents and lead 
to a lower level o f compliance. Leaders can take a stance o f obedience, as in the 
VA case, but Congress can still rescue the staff.
■ If an agency is weak, it may be able to resist for a while and protect its existing 
staff but perhaps not the overall organizational capacity to perform its mission, 
if  leaders do not exercise caution. HUD’s weakness gave its leaders a reason to 
avoid A-76 for years, but not contracting outside o f A-76.
■ If an agency is weak and capacity to contract out more is an issue, if  leaders 
support A-76 out o f loyalty or pragmatism, and Congress does not intervene, 
leaders will steer their agency toward high compliance. NASA, OPM, and DoE 
leaders allowed their organizations to be exposed more to A-76.
■ If leaders aim to adapt A-76 to their agency’s needs and mission, their attitude to 
OMB can gain them leeway to tailor the process, evidence that adherence to a 
contentious policy could itself be a strategy, as in DoE and NASA’s cases.
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■ If an agency is strong, large, and congressionally-backed, leadership will be the 
most challenging, but leaders may choose not to exercise power. USDA, Interior 
and DoD are showcases o f how power could remain unused, if  the leaders 
chose. They steered their agencies to compliance despite the odds: their agencies 
had missions that touched the grassroots, decentralized structures, field 
employees with protective delegations in Congress, unions, group alliances, and 
A-76 was inevitably “a cultural issue” they had to confront.
■ It is harder for political loyalists at the top to control compliance in 
decentralized agencies. Leadership o f a federal agency may be less effective in 
a highly decentralized environment, as there is no mechanism for the Secretary 
and his/her key officials to implement policy in the highly independent subunits, 
or at the most a limited capacity. Leadership o f the large agencies means 
balancing the demands o f multiple principals and the delicate task o f leading 
component units with traditions o f change resistance and support from 
Congress. The bigger the agencies, the stronger Congress’s intervention.
■ An evolutionary strategy may arise as the consequences o f policy choices are 
felt and reactions begin to set in. Leaders who begin responding with 
enthusiasm may find they become more pragmatic over time.
The concluding chapter discusses the contributions o f the study to the
literature and future research agenda.
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CONCLUSION AND AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Before I conclude, I quote below three key voices to recall the tenor o f the 
issue during my research and also show the topic’s significance in public 
administration and political science. In these voices one can sense why the A-76 
agenda engendered civil service anxiety, turmoil over process and policy, and an 
urgency to adapt. In the first quote, a government employee suggests that there is 
nothing special about public employees, and that the private sector can do the work 
as well. In the second quote, some of the difficulties o f comparing costs across 
sectors are discussed, along with the serious implications o f whatever method of 
comparison is adopted. The third quote describes the necessity o f gearing up for A- 
76 and doing the process correctly, to enable the government team to win 
competitions.
Federal employees would like to be recognized for reasons other than 
performance but the qualities they have as loyal employees and that they 
bring with them a long tradition. You’ll hear them argue that they are more 
loyal, they are more trustworthy, they won’t commit fraud, but the fact is, 
for every case against a contractor there is a case against federal employees.
.. .Do not put federal employees in this cocoon, with the Boy Scout code: 
loyal, clean, reverent.275
275 Interview with a  career agency official, name withheld, September 13, 2004.
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There are very real, very tricky problems about how people do the 
charges.. .If the government competes with some proper costing for 
retirement, and the contractor provides little or none, that would be a big 
cost advantage to the private sector -  not to mention a backdoor way of 
revising public policy about retirement plans.276
If you want to succeed... budget for.. .internal teams and do the job 
yourself... We cannot and should not totally rely on Beltway bandits. We in 
government have a basic duty to oversee products.. .by consultants to ensure 
they are absolutely correct and meet our needs, and work to make us 
competitive against industry. We cannot.. .drag our feet anymore. Get all the 
training you can, and take the lessons learned over the last 20 years to heart. 
You may win. -A -7 6  expert Robert Knauer (2003, 1)
The implementation o f the federal government competitive sourcing 
initiative, the centerpiece of President George W. Bush’s Management Agenda, 
offered a rich ground for exploring bureaucratic adaptation in the age o f contracting 
out. This chapter summarizes the study’s findings and contributions to the literature 
and suggests potential research avenues to carry the conclusions forward.
How the Study Extends the Literature
This work differs from studies o f A-76/competitive sourcing and the general 
literature o f privatization since the 1980s. Earlier studies focused on econometric 
cost-savings analysis, while the present study examines how agencies adapted to 
and implemented the policy. I extend the implementation literature by treating 
agencies as organizations with varying starting conditions, goals, and strengths, as 
they tried to align themselves with the conditions and demands of their
276 Interview with a long-time career, federal official, September 8, 2004.
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environments. One segment o f the study looks at policy implementation from the 
perspective o f bureaucratic control, examining the threats and dynamics between 
elected principals and agents. Rather than assuming, as much o f the principal-agent 
literature does, information asymmetry as a source o f power that is used by agencies 
to protect themselves, this study examines the degree o f threat and the degree of 
compliance in different agencies, and examines the reasons for the strategies 
agencies adopted. The entire adaptation process is viewed in the context o f the 
diminishing size, resources, and autonomy of federal agencies, continuing 
centralization o f management, and unending controversies in govemment-by- 
contract.
This study seeks to create a comprehensive picture o f A-76 as a threatening 
reform and the bureaucracy’s macro- and micro-level responses to that threat. It is 
thus a study about bureaucracy and adaptation to threat. It looks not only at 
provocation and response, but action and reaction over time by multiple actors with 
overlapping interests. It portrays an image o f bureaucracy in transition, an image 
that is changing rapidly.
The Themes Revisited
The study began with rudimentary themes on A-76 strategies, agency 
strength, and adaptation. Quantitative data and OMB’s own traffic-light Scorecard 
provided the first glimpse o f the dynamics of compliance. Qualitative research 
methods, mainly interviews with 42 key informants, and document analysis fleshed
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out perceptions, calculations behind strategies, insider sentiments, failures and 
successes, negotiations and push-backs.
The study finds a range o f adaptive responses by a diverse set o f agencies to 
an efficiency device rooted in the market philosophy. The study illustrates the 
workings o f democratic structures and institutions by capturing the politics of 
reform between the Executive and Congress, with the federal bureaucracy 
struggling between them. It confirms the effectiveness o f the presidential policy 
implementation strategy of making “appointment decisions based on loyalty first 
and expertise second” (Nesterczuk 2001,9). But the study also points to new ways 
o f viewing bureaucratic power and adaptation. The findings provide grounds for 
further studies on agency control, continued adaptation to anti-bureaucratic 
movements, and the institutional dynamics that could shape the future character of 
the bureaucracy.
Theme # 1:
Federal agencies perceived varying types and levels o f threats in 
implementing the competitive sourcing policy.
When this study started, a concern loomed large that the five-year re­
competition requirement for any in-house commercial work would forever alter the 
nature o f civil service. If  agencies defied the initiative, they feared their budget 
could get cut. The agencies felt threatened by the new rules and arbitrary targets for 
A-76. Workers’ anxiety showed up regardless o f agency conditions. They felt it in
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large and small agencies, civilian and defense agencies, strong and weak agencies, 
and among rank-and-file and middle managers. These threats were conceived in 
terms o f unemployment and organizational dilemmas resulting from A-76 as well as 
penalties potentially resulting from non-compliance. Organizational dilemmas 
included low productivity and morale, threats to the concept o f career, endangered 
program or mission control, lack o f resources to conduct A-76, and disruption of 
organizational processes. Some agencies emphasized certain facets o f the threat 
over others. There were concerns about protecting hiring incentives and FTE levels 
at the hollo wed-out NASA and the smaller ones like the NSF and Smithsonian; 
about carrying out their mission adequately at the Agriculture and Interior agencies; 
about the ability to manage contractors at the Energy and Defense Departments. 
Future research can examine whether hollowing out is a stage toward a market- 
oriented type o f government and how prior extensive contracting works when new 
pressures or threats emerge.
Theme # 2:
As adaptive organizations, federal agencies responded to the threat and pressures 
posed by competitive sourcing with a range o f strategic responses.
Perceptions o f threats brought on various strategies to cope with the pressure 
to obey the White House. These included: mitigating adverse consequences for the 
affected employees, finding enough funds to conduct A-76 studies, and protecting 
the agency from crippling its ability to perform its mission. As the agencies
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conceptualized the threat in different ways, a number o f adaptive strategies were 
taken. These adaptive strategies were shaped by the finding that a strong 
relationship existed between response (compliance) with the initiative and the threat 
indicated by the number o f commercial positions. Most o f the contests in the period 
under study were conducted by agencies with large commercial FTEs.
Most o f the adaptive strategies or responses leaned toward policy compliance, 
which was expected, but some of the actions were outright resistance or efforts to 
modify the threat, change the rules, and redefine compliance itself. Agencies did not 
confine themselves to reactive responses but rather used strategies to find and create 
some wiggle room for themselves in order to show that they could “salute the 
President and at the same time protect” their organization.
While the continuum of agency responses appeared on the surface to contain 
divisible categories (over-compliance and compliance, creating wiggle room, 
resistance, and environmental modification), the adaptive strategies in the middle 
demonstrated that not all cooperation is alike and not all resistance is alike, to echo 
Golden’s study (1992). Some agencies appeared to be using mixed strategies (see 
Lambright 1998), or using one or more at the same time, or moving along the 
continuum. This explains how an agency that appeared to over-comply by virtue of 
a large number o f commercial FTEs, like the USDA, also appeared to be a middle 
complier when the behavior o f its component units was examined. These conflicting 
faces o f the bureaucracy depending on the viewer’s vantage point illustrate how 
implementation studies should examine a range o f agency behavior over time
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instead o f focusing on just one aspect o f performance. Bureaucracy can respond to 
political mandates “in terms o f one goal while simultaneously moving away from 
political intent on another” (Meier and O’Toole 2006, 33). For example, to the 
extent that at least 89 percent of public-private competitions in FY 2003 and 91 
percent in FY 2004 were won by federal workers’ teams, agencies successfully 
coped with competitive sourcing, but future research may look into different forms 
and consequences o f “adaptive success.”
The variability among the federal agencies and their actions demonstrated 
that the federal bureaucracy was not a uniform unit upon which across-the-board, 
business-like concepts could be imposed without impairment to agency mission and 
capacity. The “management buy-in” strategy suggests to practitioners an effective 
way to manage threatening situations: exhibiting enthusiasm rather than reluctance, 
despite internal anxiety, in order to gain leeway in policy implementation.
Immediate display o f reluctance may invite stricter supervision. This is also an area 
for research in principal-agent relations.
Theme # 3:
In competitive sourcing, the strong agencies were less likely to yield to the threat, 
or more likely to respond effectively to such threats, or both.
Bureau power and politics fills a gap in the implementation literature. 
Stronger agencies are able to visualize and minimize threats earlier and devise 
mechanisms of response and get them implemented. In competitive sourcing,
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agency strength depended on a mix o f organizational and political factors.
However, sometimes that power went unused. There were agencies that responded 
counter-intuitively, or complied less when more was expected, or more when less 
was expected.
Weakness from previous histories o f staffing cuts -  resulting in hollowness 
in some and extensive experience with contracting out -  was associated with higher 
levels o f compliance. However, the budget weakness-compliance relationship was 
not as strong but was still substantial. Neither a history of personnel nor o f budget 
cuts was determinative, however, as many other factors also contributed to the 
strategies employed and the outcomes. For example, agency leaders’ choices 
seemed to have an independent effect, over and above other factors contributing to 
outcomes. Leadership choice was associated with the extra mile o f compliance, 
resistance, or strategic adaptation, in both strong and weak agencies.
Some powerful agencies exhibited a type o f evolutionary response wherein 
the organization hit certain limits and moved back into the middle from an extreme 
position, allowing for organizational learning and pragmatism in obeying 
hierarchical superiors. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) thought that evolutionary 
behavior occurs because o f the system o f divided authority obtaining in the political 
system and the inability o f political actors to coerce all others. Further research is 
necessary to test under what political and organizational conditions this behavior 
may be expected.
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Not all agencies in the study appeared to have used the same sources of 
strength in their responses. Some relied on Congress more than others, some built 
power by offering their services to encourage and teach other agencies how to 
comply with A-76, and some relied on a more centralized structure o f their own 
organizations.
The exchange o f cues between agencies and Congress in implementing a 
threatening Executive initiative played a role in the strength-adaptation logic. 
Agencies took cues from Congress; but Congress also relied on agency signals to 
act on competitive sourcing. Where lawmakers decided to intervene, it proved to be 
a powerful source o f strength in bureaucracy’s attempts to create or re-create 
discretion and autonomy, within and outside the budgeting process. The 
lawmakers’ hard look at controversial A-76 studies perhaps alerted the rest o f the 
bureaucracy to treat the A-76 agenda with more caution. The institutional animosity 
between OMB and Congress also put agencies in the difficult position o f trying to 
please both elected principals. The actions o f the White House that appeared to 
target slack in the agencies through A-76 could be seen as a technique to reduce 
congressional influence on the bureaucracy because Congress would have less and 
less federal workers to control and monitor. Future studies may examine how 
outsourcing affects congressional control of the bureaucracy.
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Theme # 4:
Agency strength was a determinant o f agency compliance in competitive sourcing
but power could also remain unused.
The lack o f a strong relationship between compliance in A-76 and prior 
budget cuts was demonstrated in some of the mini-cases where budgetarily weak 
agencies resisted while budgetarily strong ones complied. This reaction was 
counter-intuitive, but explained by agency leaders’ influence.
The intervening factor in the strength-response relationship was the choice 
made by agency leaders and/or senior management. Leaders’ loyalty to President 
Bush and his agenda neutralized the internal strength to resist. Some leaders did not 
believe in A-76 and thought it inappropriate for their agencies, choosing to resist 
even without a strong power base.
The hierarchical model o f implementation worked to the extent that putting 
loyal people in key places ensured greater chances in carrying out presidential 
initiatives. The study supports previous studies that highlighted the importance of 
political appointments in policy implementation. While agency leaders generally 
desired to conform to the president’s policy, such desires were not always sufficient 
to produce a high level o f compliance. Low to mid-level compliance resulted when 
leaders desired to obey but other organizational factors intervened, such as 
decentralization, strong and family-like culture, staff or union opposition, and 
legislative protection. In agencies where component bureaus exhibited autonomy
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because o f their independent political alliances the influence from the top was not as 
strong.
The study found that bureaucracy yielded to political direction and that 
resistance for many agencies weakened over time. A number o f agencies that 
escaped the contests during President Bush’s first term were forced to turn around 
and open their agencies to competition. While much research discusses the effect of 
a new president, more research is needed to study the evolution o f strategies when 
presidents remain in power for a second term.
Theoretical Implications and Additional Issues for Further Research
Lawrence Martin (1999, 9) wrote that “Public-private competition represents 
one of those interesting government phenomena that arise from time to time where 
administrative practice has outpaced theory.” The findings presented here do not 
create a new theory, but they raise questions about bureaucratic adaptation and 
controllability o f the new “multi-sectored public service” (Lane et al. 2003) that 
might help frame a new theory at some point in the future.
Policy Implementation: Theoretical Implications and Further Studies
In terms o f policy implementation theory, the study demonstrated that 
implementation involves more than a single or dichotomous response, i.e., obey or 
resist. The dependent variable is rich and complex, with multiple strategies
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occurring either at the same time or in succession. Responses formed a rough 
continuum, with positions on this continuum changing over time. The result is a 
new set o f research possibilities, because some agencies began with some foot 
dragging or resistance and later more compliance in A-76, while others started with 
a high level o f conformity to policy and later tempered that response. Not only were 
there under-compliers and over-compliers whose positions needed to be explained, 
but the dynamics o f the sequence o f positions needed to be worked out. How are 
agencies brought to heel, what tools are used and effective, from threats o f budget 
cuts to humiliation, and from the opposite end o f the spectrum, what inherent 
constraints or sets o f reactions occur as a result o f overly enthusiastic conformity? 
When do unintended side effects swamp the main effects and with what result?
Second, the study demonstrated that bureaucracy is controllable through the 
simple mechanism of appointing agency heads who are loyal, although 
organizational structure and culture weakened in some way the influence o f leaders 
in the regional units. This finding suggests first that more attention needs to be paid 
to the political appointees, how they are chosen and what they believe and think. It 
also suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the degree o f decentralization 
for implementation studies, and that cultural variables related to the policy being 
implemented be explored.
Third, in this study, implementation was a negotiated process rather than 
obediently carrying out an order from a superior. Leadership was demonstrated by 
putting sufficient resources into training employees, doing studies, and choosing
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areas in which to compete. Agency heads won over employees, in part by giving 
them a role in the decisions and assuring them that the goal was not to eliminate 
their jobs and that winning the competitions would be fine. A more oppositional 
mode and a failure to deal with the threat value led to guerilla tactics to change the 
policy in Congress. This finding suggests that implementation depends not only on 
the loyalty o f the agency appointees, but also on their skill and their understanding 
o f their agencies and personnel.
A fourth and especially intriguing finding of the study was that there were 
limits to compliance or the extent to which agencies could be pushed to carry out 
directives. The study found that agencies that did not have enough slack (discussed 
further below) reached their limits and could not comply with the competitive 
sourcing agenda as much as OMB would like. It also found that momentum in 
policy implementation can slow down once effects accumulate. Future research 
may look at limits to policy implementation and how they are invoked. Is there a 
rational process with a measurable bottom line? If a policy does not achieve its 
goals, say saving money, do those results become known and is the policy reversed? 
Under what circumstances would such a result occur or fail to occur? Under what 
circumstances would the bottom line be obscured, by whom, and with what success?
Some avenues for research into policy implementation already cited in the 
discussion o f themes above include: investigating the notion o f “adaptive success” 
in policy implementation, and the circumstances under which evolutionary response
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may be expected in implementing certain types o f policies. The study also raises 
other questions in policy implementation.
Games in policy implementation
Eugene Bardach’s concept o f games (1977) in policy implementation 
appeared in the agencies’ A-76 stories. At least three informants from inside and 
outside the government raised the issue of competitive sourcing as a “bureaucratic 
exercise” that carried no great penalties or rewards. This needs more exploration. 
Some questions might be: What constitutes games where opening up bureaucracy to 
privatization is concerned? What enables games to be played? Were agencies 
gaming A-76 as a form o f resistance, or were agencies resisting A-76 because they 
thought it was merely an exercise? Under what political conditions is bureaucracy 
more apt to play games? Are games to be found more at the implementation stage o f 
the policy process than at the beginning? Are games largely about control o f 
discretion?
Resources for implementation
The findings suggest that there may be necessary conditions for 
implementation to occur. Agencies needed time to learn a highly complicated 
process like A-76, as well as the resources with which to learn. Future research 
might focus on identifying what the necessary resources are. We may wrongly 
attribute willfulness to the bureaucracy when in fact the way policy is being
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implemented prevents the bureaucracy from following through. What level of 
agency performance might have occurred if OMB gave agencies more resources to 
finance and time to learn the A-76 process? Congress might have still capped 
funding or barred it totally in particular agencies, but if  most agencies had the funds 
and enough training on A-76, could they have concentrated more on standard 
competitions than streamlined ones? Could they have turned less to direct 
conversions to meet OMB’s goals?
Organizational Adaptation: Theoretical Implications and Further Studies
Some avenues for research mentioned earlier include: bureaucratic 
adaptation and hollowing out, whereby hollowing steers government toward a one­
way street o f morphing into a business entity; how adaptive success is known; and 
the conditions that are hospitable to evolutionary strategies, particularly when 
political principals change or remain in power. There are more questions below for 
adaptation theory.
Leaders and followers in adaptation
The findings show a new way o f looking at bureaucratic adaptation. Their 
implication for theory is that agencies can modify the environment in which they are 
operating and the pressures on themselves using techniques that are available to all 
agencies, if  they choose to exercise them. The study found that agencies can 
sometimes band together to assist one another or resist a policy. What one agency
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does can affect the others and this builds a model o f leader agency-follower 
agencies. For example, more experienced agencies like DoD taught and provided A- 
76 resources for less experienced ones, some like DoE provided examples for others 
to follow, or some small agencies opened up lines o f resistance, such as changing 
the A-76 rules through congressional alliance. Further research may examine this 
exciting area o f inter-organizational adaptation dynamics in governance. What 
brings it about and what inhibits it? To what extent is this kind o f relationship 
dyadic and to what extent do agencies use one another to ease the pressures on their 
own organization alone rather than the collective?
Union-aeencv relationship
The study also found that union-agency relationship is a good strategy in 
coping with competitive sourcing. The continuing drive toward contracting out and 
weakening o f union influence in agency management has led to a perception of 
antagonism between unions and agencies. In this study, the implication is leaning 
toward a more cooperative model, wherein the unions can help agencies cope with 
and change their environments and protect their missions. Unions also play roles 
that agencies can not assume, such as lobbying Congress for more agency 
discretion.
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Slack and adaptation
In creating space for themselves, the role played by starting conditions, such 
as hollowness and slack, emerged. Having some unfilled positions enabled agencies 
to convert those positions to contracted ones without threatening existing staff, and 
it may have enabled staff to redesign processes using less staff and hence reduce 
costs and win competitions. This form of slack enabled the organization to cut costs 
on paper, but in fact be more realistic about how much various functions actually 
cost, since those lines were vacant, and did not cost anything.
One could say slack allowed competitive sourcing to come within the 
agencies’ “zone of indifference” or “zone of acceptance” (Simon 1947). But the 
study was unable to investigate the role o f slack more thoroughly. An empirical 
research is necessary to verify what one o f the OMB experts on the A-76 Circular 
emphasized during my interview that A-76 should only result in downsizing “only if 
the agency was overstaffed.”277 Does this mean that A-76 should only be mandated 
in big, inefficient agencies? This study suggests what happens when policies are 
applied across the board. Future studies may examine whether and how policy 
compliance is related to starting points.
What are the consequences o f removing slack or how is slack viewed? In a 
subtle contrast to downsizing, which federal agencies have gotten used to, A-76
277 Interview with David Childs, September 13, 2004.
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works, it seems, to seek out little by little and open to outsourcing whatever slack 
agencies may have been accumulating (or hiding) in terms o f positions at the 
agencies’ discretion but under OMB’s timelines, rather than to provide agencies a 
hard cutback target by a certain period that will have met the White House goal. 
Competitive sourcing therefore becomes more threatening in the long run as slack 
disappears. Removing slack, which enabled several agencies to adapt to a 
contentious policy with a manageable amount o f internal disruption, and which 
accorded some agencies the ability to play games, could have significant 
consequences for the bureaucracy.
So when is slack considered waste and when is it a good thing? Can we tell 
them apart in practice as opposed to conceptually? A-76 may have further reduced 
the amount o f slack in an organization by defining it as waste, although slack may 
be necessary in order to function. This raises the following theoretical questions of: 
What does slack consist o f in federal agencies? Where and how is it stored? When 
and how is it used? What happens to agencies that lose it? Are they less able to 
adapt to environmental shifts, less able to innovate, or less able to comply with new 
mandates that are underfunded, without reducing the level o f achievement of 
program goals? Is it in the interest o f Congress to maintain a certain amount of 
slack among the agencies, for the proper functioning of democratic institutions?
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Defining adaptive success
Another research question is, how successfully did the federal agencies 
adapt? What are other ways o f defining bureaucracy’s adaptive success? Adaptation 
theories talk o f “alignment,” often of internal structure, to external changes, and this 
study extended it by showing that adaptation involves strategies in multiple fronts, 
for example creating formal structures for the A-76 program while bargaining to 
relax OMB’s rules with the help o f allies.
One measure o f adaptive success cited here, the nature o f agency victories, 
also needs to be examined more closely. It was not obvious from all the OMB 
reports, but were the in-house victories mostly in small contests? Were bigger 
competitions -  not necessarily high numbers o f FTEs involved, but bigger dollar 
amount o f awards -  won by contractors? Agencies might prize budget stability and 
increases more than the level o f staffing - a study has noted that managers may even 
prefer contractors to low-level federal employees (Dunleavey 1991). The opposite 
could be true: agencies might be less concerned with losing high-dollar value 
awards than with losing loyal employees who have worked at the agency for a long 
time. Could there be variations depending on the type o f agencies?
One could also study two federal agencies that have competed similar 
functions but one made the award to the in-house team and the other to a private- 
sector contractor. What influenced the outcomes in each case? For the parent 
agency and the in-house winning team, what kinds o f lessons are obtainable to 
clarify the challenges and requirements o f the new governance?
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Recently, the experience o f Forest Service gave a glimpse o f the difficulties 
surrounding the agency’s management o f the new “hybrid” called the MEO or Most 
Effective Organization, the winning in-house team. In 2006 NAPA examined the 
implementation o f Forest Service’s MEO, Information Solutions Organization, and 
found that because it remained subject to federal employee, budgeting, and 
purchasing rules, it could not respond to changing workloads as quickly as Forest 
Service officials had anticipated (Olsen 2006). A Forest Service official 
acknowledged:
This organizational change, and especially the change to a contract-like 
relationship with our own internal employees, has been very difficult.. .Our 
management tends to continue to operate in the way that it had been 
accustomed. (Olsen 2006,1)
This new kind o f governance requires a new model o f change management that 
federal administrators and leaders are not prepared for, and should be an area of 
critical interest.
Bureaucratic Power and Politics: Theoretical Implications and Further Studies
The theory is that bureaucracy has inherent power and possesses the ability 
to defy a policy because o f its power base (Rubin 1985, Meier and O ’Toole 2006). 
This base could include its historical budget strength and size, and alliance with 
congressional committees (or previous White House occupants) that it could then 
use as a bargaining chip when faced with a hostile new president. But the federal 
agencies were also surrounded by more powerful actors that wanted to control
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bureaucracy. The study showed that (1) different components o f agency power 
function differently: budget power and staffing power, or the ability to command 
those resources, does not function in the same way as legislative support. Leaders 
may not wish to use those strengths. Congressional ties as a source o f agency 
strength may override weakness resulting from prior budget or personnel cuts. 
Congress could protect an agency with relatively little budget involvement. (2)
OMB power was perceived by agencies and/or conveyed in terms o f the out-year 
projections in the President’s budget. That projections were taken as promise o f 
reduced budgets was an intriguing way o f communicating displeasure or a threat, of 
encouraging or forcing compliance.
OMB power and budgeting
Some of this research was also about OMB power and how it is exercised, 
perceived, and/or conveyed that power. A major perception o f the threat was 
conceived in terms o f budget cuts from OMB if agencies avoided job contests. Was 
there actually a budget cut penalty in resisting competitive sourcing? When I 
examined the agencies’ growth o f budget authorities under the Bush administration 
to see whether their resistance to A-76 was a move that their leaders could have 
rightly calculated would not attract a great penalty from OMB, the small-sized 
under-compliers had growing budget authorities (adjusted for inflation), while the 
big under-complier, the Army Corps, was being cut, and HUD’s budget was flat.
The VA’s budget grew but the Iraq war could have been the big factor. These
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figures could indicate that the threat of budget cuts that federal agencies feared at 
the launching of competitive sourcing in 2001 was probably warranted in big 
agencies but not in those with smaller FAIR Act inventories.
Research into OMB may also look more deeply into what this study has 
found regarding OMB’s role in reforming bureaucracy. In competitive sourcing, the 
two functions o f OMB, management and budget, combine into a dynamic where the 
budget threat “forces” the reform. Is this a good marriage o f the two functions, 
where those reforms may be more or less technical and efficiency based or policy 
based?
In terms of budgeting and contracting out, this study opens a whole range of 
potential research. A few questions are, how do we know if  competitive sourcing 
saves money if  contracts do not appear in the budget? What happens to costs over 
time when government gets too contracted-out and loses its capacity to manage 
contracts? What can be done about the confusion on what the budget really is and 
how big is the government workforce, especially the shadow workforce?
Implications for Governance and Public Administration
The ideological fierceness of the parties to the debate sometimes masked the 
important impact and implication on public administration o f the competitive 
sourcing initiative. At the individual, employee, or micro level, fear o f losing the 
jobs they qualified for and performed for years under the public service credo was 
the easiest argument for the agencies’ recalcitrance that could be made —  not by
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the employees themselves but by those pushing for more public-private competition. 
That argument, while true, nevertheless concealed from public scrutiny the greater, 
macro-level pressure to break government down into assembly-line pockets o f work 
and its potential long-run consequences. The very personal face o f workers losing 
jobs from A-76, which an OMB official I interviewed said he thought was a 
powerful image against A-76, may in fact have worked to dampen understanding of 
the macro-level impact o f competitive sourcing by confining the issue to a simple 
case o f weeding out the inefficient worker. In A-76, in fact, the weeding out is done 
in teams whenever agencies lose a job contest. What does this suggest about the 
government as employer and its institutional growth (see Frederickson 2005)?
Institutional Decay
James Thompson (2006) recently wrote about the demise o f the federal civil 
service because o f the Bush personnel reform agenda. The findings o f the study may 
prompt further examination if  there are negative or downward cycles o f 
organizational decay. Earlier I asked whether hollowing out is a stage toward 
irreversible reliance on the private sector. Is it possible that once an organization 
passes a certain level o f hollowness or contracting that recovery is not possible or is 
highly unlikely? The study found that zealous implementation can be slowed down 
or stopped when unintended side effects accumulate. But what if  those mechanisms
278 Interview, name withheld by request, September 9, 2004.
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do not occur? What if  the process is implemented so quickly that there is no chance 
for these counter processes to be evoked? What happens if  an agency goes beyond 
its ability to supervise contractors, or contracts out core activities? What is the 
consequence for the agency, and for governance?
Rosemary O’Leary’s recent study (2006) o f “guerillas” in government points 
to some o f the forces that could press for a reversal o f failed policies.
Administrators are all potential guerillas who could act individually or collectively 
if  they perceive that policies are inimical to the good of their other principal, the 
citizens (see Wamsley 1990). This dissertation shows that guerilla government may 
become pervasive as bureaucracy gets more and more diminished in favor o f for- 
profit entities.
A Bureaucracy in Flux
The study found that the Bush OMB has tried the hardest at systematizing 
the inventories o f agencies compared to previous White House occupants; if  their 
effort succeeds at coming up with a comprehensive picture o f what work the entire 
federal government is doing, it ought to be a useful, very meaningful exercise. GAO 
(GAO 2000a, 24) had warned that officials found it “difficult to compare the extent 
and nature o f activities performed under contract with those performed in-house.” 
Agencies were simply having a hard time creating a complete picture o f their 
activities, how these activities were performed, and whether these activities were 
integrated efficiently to accomplish their missions. If the Bush OMB’s drive to
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create a systematic FAIR Act database untangles this fundamental complexity, it 
may well be the single most important achievement o f the President’s competitive 
sourcing initiative. But the findings show that simultaneous with building up a 
picture o f their organizations, agencies were being forced to decide on which pieces 
they could put on the competition block.
Process governance that breaks down functions just to see if  they could be 
performed by the private sector may not be good government. As an A-76 manager 
explained, “except for those very, very routine functions that don’t break the 
mission, there is a danger” o f losing agency capacity when contractors fail (Castelli 
2007,1). From the New Public Management era, the notion o f breaking down 
operations into manageable pieces has gone to the extreme and enabled formerly 
inherently governmental work to be outsourced. It is intriguing that agencies dealing 
with vital, national security infrastructures like Energy and NASA are also the most 
contracted-out agencies. Government’s work, unlike that of firms, relies on synergy 
where outcomes depend on many, dissimilar units with a long familiarity with 
public administrative values. GAO had repeatedly criticized the policy’s focus on 
segments o f work alone, without regard to the efficiency and effectiveness o f 
achieving overall mission.
There is certainly a lot o f research work to be done in this area. If the 
workforce defines an organization’s character, what would the definition o f the 
emerging federal bureaucracy be? Would the whole still be greater to the sum of its 
parts, as public administration scholars and opponents o f indiscriminate contracting
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out view “government” or “bureaucracy”? How would such an enterprise be led? 
What kinds o f leadership challenges are in store? What will become o f the “adapted 
bureaucracy”? Like the military, is it going to become a bureaucracy-on-demand, 
with pockets and teams o f civil servants always prepared to launch into defensive 
action? They have become a “situational workforce” (Laurent 2006, 329) but are 
they prepared for it? Clearly, the instrumentalist view of the bureaucracy in a vast 
market o f service providers is eclipsing its institutional role. These new questions 
are all relevant to the evolution o f public administration. My succeeding endeavors 
will try to carry this study forward.
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A The commercial activity is not appropriate for private sector performance 
pursuant to a written determination by the CSO.
B The commercial activity is suitable for a streamlined or standard 
competition.
C The commercial activity is the subject o f an in-progress streamlined or 
standard competition.
D The commercial activity is performed by government personnel as the result 
o f a standard or streamlined competition (or a cost comparison, streamlined 
cost comparison, or direct conversion) within the past five years.
E The commercial activity is pending an agency approved restructuring 
decision (e.g., closure, realignment).
F The commercial activity is performed by government personnel due to a 
statutory prohibition against private sector performance.
Source: 0 fice o f Management and Budget. May 29, 2003. Circular No. A-76,
Attachment A-3.
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■ Has an OMB approved “green” 
competition plan to compete 
commercial activities available for 
competition;
■ Has publicly announced standard 
competitions in accordance with the 
schedule outlined in the agency 
“green” competition plan;
■ Since January 2001, has completed 
at least 10 competitions (no 
minimum number of positions 
required per competition);
■ In the past year, completed 90% of 
all standard competitions in a 12- 
month timeframe;
■ In the past year, completed 95% of 
all streamlined competitions in a 
90-day timeframe;
■ In the past year, canceled fewer than 
10% of publicly announced 
standard and streamlined
■ HHB)SfcfcilBmpp«oded justifications 
for all categories of commercial 
activities exempt from competition.
Agency
■ Has an OMB approved 
“yellow” competition 




■ Has completed one 
standard competition or 
has publicly announced 
standard competitions 
that exceed the number 
of positions identified for 
competition in the 
agency’s “yellow” 
competition plan;
■ In the past two quarters, 
has completed 75% of 
streamlined competitions 
in a 90-day timeframe; 
and
■ In the past two quarters, 
has canceled fewer than 
10% of publicly 




■ Does not have an OMB 
approved competition 
plan;
■ Has not completed one 
standard competition or 
publicly announced 
standard competitions that 
exceed the number of 
positions identified for 
competition in the 
agency’s “yellow” 
competition plan;
■ In the past two quarters, 
exceeded a 90-day 
timeframe in more than 
25% of streamlined 
competitions; or
■ In the past two quarters, 
canceled more than 10% of 
standard and streamlined 
competitions.
2001 Original Scorecard Criteria)
Must Meet All Core Criteria:
■ Completed public-private 
competition on not less than 50 
percent of the full-time equivalent 
employees listed on the approved 
FAIR Act inventories.
■ Competitions and direct conversions 
conducted pursuant to approved 
competition plan.
■ Commercial reimbursable support 
service arrangements between 
agencies are competed with the 
private sector on a recurring basis.
Achievement of Some but 
not All Criteria; no Red 
Conditions.
Has Any One of the
Following Conditions:
■ Completed public-private 
competition on less than 
15 percent of the full-time 
equivalent employees 
listed on the approved 
FAIR Act inventories.
■ Competitions and direct 
conversions are not 
conducted in accordance 
with approved competition 
plan.
■ No commercial 
reimbursable support 
service arrangements 
between agencies are 
competed with the private 
sector.
Source: Results.gov. Resources for the President’s Team, no date.
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DOCUMENTARY SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
Documents Sources of Documents Research Themes Addressed
OMB mandates, orders, 
communications
OMB Rules, competition agenda, inter-organizational 
negotiations,
Executive Branch Management 
Scorecards and related explanations
OMB Agency performance, compliance, bureaucratic politics, 
rules of the game
Congressional deliberations, 
proceedings, testimonies
House of Representative, 
Senate offices
Congressional support to agency, controlling A-76 
studies, rules for outsourcing, agency reporting 
requirements, privatization, budget, personnel size
Agency studies, competitive sourcing 




Compliance with OMB, competition and outsourcing 
processes, evaluation, lessons
Agency memoranda, communications 
regarding competition policies and 
procedures
OMB, federal executive 
agencies; Congressional 
offices, committees
Agency compliance and strategies, mission definition, 
strategic adaptation
Agency Multi-Year Plans for 
Competition
OMB, agencies Mission definition, human capital plans, competition 
strategies
News articles Magazines, newspaper -  
digital and print editions
All of the above, especially perceptions, opinions, 
development of the issues, political dynamics and 
information battles
Budget documents Agency, OMB, Congress, 
CBO
Size of contracting, budget reduction, organizational 
stress
Personnel documents Agency, OMB, OPM Agency growth, personnel issues, labor-management 
relations
GAO reports GAO Outsourcing issues, A-76 rules and implementation 
problems, OMB oversight, human capital problems
Code of Federal Regulations CFR Comments of concerned parties
Published (book, journal articles) studies 
of agency experiences, strategies
Libraries, websites, 
agencies
Case studies of adaptation, power, outsourcing, 
organizational learning, privatization, cutbacks
Dissertations Libraries, websites Outsourcing, organizational adaptation, bureaucratic 
politics, cutbacks
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INTERVIEW THEMES AND QUESTIONS
I. On the agency’s FAIR Act inventory
■ How the agency complies with the Act; issues faced internally and 
externally in making the inventories
■ Whether the agency has delineated the functions well enough to protect 
core functions and support the agency’s mission and steps taken to 
ensure it
II. On the Bush Administration policy of competitive sourcing
■ Whether and how competitive sourcing is perceived as a threat
■ Whether some agencies resist A-76 and where the resistance comes from
■ How the agency adapts to OMB directives given organizational 
conditions
III. On the agency’s competitive sourcing plan and implementation o f the plan
■ Issues faced internally and externally; adaptation to OMB requirements
■ Strategies to implement the plans; agency success in competitions
■ Agency perceptions o f the policy’s impacts
IV. On OMB-agency dynamics in competitive sourcing
■ Negotiations or dynamics in complying with the policy
■ Whether and how there are deviations from OMB directives
■ Agency perception o f OMB’ Management Scorecard
V. On agency and clientele support
■ Whether and how the agency turns to other agencies, media, Congress, 
or client groups to air A-76 issues
■ How clientele support influence the implementation o f the policy
VI. On agency strength
■ Whether and how some agencies bargained effectively with OMB
■ Whether and how agencies used power and discretion in A-76 
implementation
■ Whether and how agencies achieved their own interests in A-76
■ Whether and how agencies worked to alter the rules o f the A-76 policy
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OPM • Competitive sourcing activities are under the Center for 
Human Capital Management Services
• HR Advisor provides information on competitive 
sourcing and potential RIFs
• Has FAIR Act Inventory Work Group
Green
Treasury • The Office of Performance Budgeting and Strategic 
Planning oversees competitive sourcing
Green
HHS • The Office of Competitive Sourcing has functional 
oversight responsibilities for the Department's 
implementation of competitive sourcing
• The agency developed an HHS FAIR Act dictionary of 
functions code definitions and FAIR Act database 
tailored to HHS specifications
Green
DOT • The Office of the Chief Strategic Officer directs the 
competitive sourcing program
Green
DOE • The Office of Competitive Sourcing/A-76 is under the 
Office of Management
Green
GSA • Competitive sourcing initiative is under the Associate 
Administrator of the Office of Performance Improvement
Green
DOD • The programs of individual services are reviewed by the 
DOD Competitive Sourcing Official
• Tracking A-76 cost is done through the Commercial 
Activities Management Information System (CAMIS); 
the DOD created a costing software, COMPARE
• Defense Acquisition University develops courses on A- 
76
• The Navy has Executive Steering Committee for regional 
oversight, guidance and decision making
Yellow
DOJ • The Office of the Chief Acquisition Officer oversees 
competitive sourcing
Yellow
DHS • Office of Competitive Sourcing and Privatization is 
under the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer and 
the Under Secretary for Management
• Has an internal DHS Competitive Sourcing Scorecard
Yellow
USD A • The Office of the Chief Financial Officer manages the 
agency’s competitive sourcing program
Yellow
DOI • Agency has established the Center for Competitive 
Sourcing Excellence under the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget
Yellow
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DOC • A Council of senior financial officers review the inventory 
of commercial activities
• Acquisition Review Board oversees and approves 
competitive sourcing efforts
• “Tiger Team” approach to identifying areas for 
competition
Yellow
NASA • NASA consolidated competitive sourcing activities under 
the Associate Administrator for Procurement
• Created an Agency Competitive Sourcing Team
• Senior NASA managers compose the Competitive 
Sourcing Review Board
Yellow
EPA • The Agency’s competitive sourcing program is overseen 
by a Competitive Sourcing Council composed of members 
of the Senior Executive Service and political appointees
Yellow
DOL • The Office of Competitive Sourcing provides centralized 
management to assist agencies throughout DOL
Yellow
State • The Department-wide Competition Council with
representatives from every bureau holds meetings every 
other month
Yellow
ED • The Competitive Sourcing Program Office
• Business case analyses are reviewed by the Executive 
Management Team staffed by the Department’s most 
senior officials
Yellow
SBA • An executive steering committee oversees the President’s 
Management Agenda
• Designed an Execution Scorecard to monitor progress
Yellow
VA • Barred by statute from conducting competitions, VA’s 
Management Analysis/Business Process Reengineering 
would achieve the same savings as MEO produced by A- 
76
Red
HUD • The competitive sourcing program is managed by the 










• The Strategic Sourcing Program Office manages 
the competitive sourcing program
Red
OMB • Office of the Director Red
AID • Designated the Assistant Administrator for Management as 
the Competitive Sourcing Official
• Established a senior level Executive Competitive Sourcing 
Committee
Red
NSF • The Agency’s competitive sourcing program is managed 
under the Office of the Chief Financial Officer
Red
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A-76 MEASURES FAVORING AGENCIES, FY 2004 BUDGETING
I. Public Laws
Public Law 108-199 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 
Division A - Agriculture and Related Agencies
Section 767 prohibits spending funds on competitive sourcing activity relating to rural development or farm loan 
programs______________
Public Law 108-199 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 
Division F -  Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies
Section 647(a) requires a cost-savings threshold for conversion of $10 million or 10 percent of the in-house bid in 
competitions involving more than 10 FTEs
Section 647 (b) requires annual detailed reporting on competitive sourcing
Section 647 (b) amends OMB Circular A-76 from requiring agencies to automatically limit to 5 years or less the 
performance period in any letter of obligation to in-house winners of competition
Public Law 108-108 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004
Section 340 (a) requires justification for amounts requested to perform competitive sourcing 
Section 340 (b) establishes annual reporting requirements on competitive sourcing activities 
Section 340 (c) requires submission of detailed competitive sourcing plans
Section 340 (d) limits competitive sourcing funding to $500,000 for DoE, $5,000,000 for Forest Service and 
$2,500,000 for Dol
Section 340 (e) requires a cost-savings threshold for conversion of $10 million or 10 percent of the in-house bid in
II. Amendments
Senate Amendment 1917 H.R. 2989, Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 2004
• Amendment prohibits the use of funds for implementing the revision to Office of Management and Budget Circular 
A-76 made on May 29,2003
• Roll Call Outcome, Yeas 47, Noes 48, Present, 1, No Votes, 4
House Amendment 381 H.R. 2989, Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 2004
Amendment prohibits funds in the bill from being used by OMB to require agencies to establish an inventory of 
inherently governmental activities performed by federal employees; establish or implement any streamlined 
competition procedures; require any follow-up competition for public- private competitions won by federal 
employees; or implement the trade-off source selection process for any activities other than information technology 
activities
Roll Call Outcome, Ayes 211 (17 Republican, 187 Democratic, 1 Independent), Noes 205 (204 Republicans, 7
House Amendment 379 H.R. 2989, Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 2004
• Amendment provides that none of the funds made available by this Act may be used to implement the revision to 
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 made on May 29,2003
• Roll Call Outcome, Ayes 220 (26 Republican, 193 Democratic, 1 Independent), Noes 198 (195 Republicans, 3 
Democratic) No Votes 18
House Amendment No. 893 H.R. 2115, Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act for FY 
2004 to 2006 (Aviation Investment and Revitalization Vision Act)
Section 624 prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from transferring to a private entity or to a public entity other 
than the United States Government of the air traffic separation and control functions operated by the Federal 
Aviation Administration on the date of enactment of this Act, or the maintenance of certifiable systems and other 
functions related to certification of national airspace systems and services operated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration on the date of enactment of this Act or flight service station personnel.
Roll Call Outcome: Ayes 56, Noes 41, Not Voting 3
House Amendment 270________[______________ H.R. 2691, Interior Appropriations Bill, 2004
Amendment prohibits any funds to be used for the implementation of a competitive sourcing study at the Midwest 
Archaeological Center in Lincoln, Nebraska or the Southeast Archaeological Center in Tallahassee, Florida.
Roll Call Outcome: Ayes 362 (163 Republicans; 198 Democrats), Noes 57 (all Republicans)__________________
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A-76 MEASURES FAVORING AGENCIES, FY 2005 BUDGETING
I. Public Laws
Public Law 108-375 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005
•
•
Section 326 allows the Agency Tender Official to file a protest and if  an interested party files a protest 
in connection with a public -private competition, a person representing a majority o f the employees 
who are engaged in the performance o f  the activity or function subject to the public -private 
competition may intervene in protest
Section 327 (a) requires a cost-savings threshold for conversion o f $10 million or 10 percent o f the in- 
house bid (but this does not apply in the case o f  a public-private competition conducted as part o f the 
best-value source selection pilot program authorized by section 336 o f  the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004)
• Section 327 (b) prohibits reorganization or modification o f functions to permit streamlined A-76 study 
and therefore excluded from (a) above
• Section 328 requires the DoD Inspector General to submit to Congress a report on DoD competitive 
sourcing, the sufficiency o f  the number o f civilian employees, and the reliability and 
comprehensiveness o f a system to track and assess the cost and quality o f  the performance o f 
functions o f  the Department o f  Defense by service contractors.
Public Law 108-287 Department o f  Defense Appropriations Act, 2005
•
•
Section 8014 (a) provides, among others, that no advantage shall be given to an offeror for a proposal 
to reduce costs for the Department o f Defense by not making an employer-sponsored health insurance 
plan available to the workers who are to be employed in the performance o f  such function under a 
contract; or offering to such workers an employer-sponsored health benefits plan that requires the 
employer to contribute less towards the premium or subscription share than that which is paid by the 
Department o f  Defense for health benefits for civilian employees
Section 8014 (c) provides that conversion o f any activity or function shall be credited toward any 
competitive or outsourcing goal, target, or measurement that may be established by statute, regulation, 
or policy and is deemed to be awarded under the authority of, and in compliance with, subsection (h) 
o f  section 2304 o f  title 10, United States Code, for the competition or outsourcing o f  commercial 
activities.
Public Law 108-334 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005
• Section 527 prohibits the Department from using appropriations for competitive sourcing for services 
provided as o f  June 1, 2004, by employees (including employees serving on a temporary or term 
basis) o f  Citizenship and Immigration Services who are known as o f that date as Immigration 
Information Officers, Contact Representatives, or Investigative Assistants.
Public Law 108-447 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 
Division A  - Agriculture and Related Agencies
• Section 757 prohibits the Department from using appropriations to study, complete a  study of, or enter 
into a contract with a private party to carry out, without specific authorization in a subsequent Act o f 
Congress, a  competitive sourcing activity relating to rural development or farm loan programs.
Public Law 108-447 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 
Division E - Interior and Related Agencies
• Section 332 (a) limits competitive sourcing funding to $500,000 for DoE, $2,000,000 for Forest Service and 
$3,250,000 million for Dol
• Section 332 (c) exempts the Forest Service from implementing the Letter of Obligation and post-competition 
accountability guidelines in competitions that involved 65 or fewer FTEs, the performance decision was made in 
favor of the agency provider; no net savings was achieved by conducting the study, and the study was completed 
prior to the date of this Act
•  Section 332 (e) requires reporting on incremental cost directly attributable to conducting the competitions, 
including costs attributable to paying outside consultants and contractors and, in accordance with full cost 
accounting principles, all costs attributable to developing, implementing, supporting, managing, monitoring, and 
reporting on competitive sourcing, including personnel, consultant, travel, and training costs associated with 
program management.
(continued on following page)




H.R. 4200 National Defense Authorization Act, 2005 (Engrossed as Agreed to or 
Passed by the House)
Section 323 (a) amends Section 2461 b o f title 10, United States Code. The amendment provides, 
among others, that no advantage shall be given to an offeror for a proposal to reduce costs for the 
Department o f  Defense by (I) not making an employer-sponsored health insurance plan available to 
the workers who are to be employed in the performance o f such function under a contract; or (II) 
offering to such workers an employer-sponsored health benefits plan that requires the employer to 
contribute less towards the premium or subscription share than that which is paid by the Department 
o f  Defense for health benefits for civilian employees
Section 324 establishes a pilot program during FY 2005 and FY 2006 to examine public-private 
competition for new requirements and functions currently performed by contractors that could be 
performed by civilian employees. Civilian employees shall have competed for approximately one- 
tenth o f  the funds spent during the two fiscal years on functions considered new requirements at the 
end o f  the pilot period. A  number o f contractor employees that are approximately one-tenth o f the 
number o f  civilian employees subject to competition during the two fiscal years shall have been 
subjected to competition. The Inspector General shall submit a report to Congress about the pilot 
program
Section 325 conveys a Sense o f  Congress that both civilian employees and contractors or their 
representatives should receive comparable treatment throughout the competition regarding access to 
relevant information and legal standing to challenge the way a competition has been conducted at all 
appropriate forums, including the GAO and U.S. Court o f Federal Claims.
Section 326 requires reporting on competitive sourcing and including specific data elements on 
competitive sourcing activities in the DoD’s system for tracking cost and quality o f  performance
H.R. 4200 Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, 2005 
(Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by the Senate)
Section 851(a) amends Section 2461(b) o f title 10, United States Code. The amendment provides, 
among others, that no advantage shall be given to an offeror for a proposal to reduce costs for the 
Department o f  Defense by not making an employer-sponsored health insurance plan available to the 
workers who are to be employed in the performance o f  such function under a contract; or offering to 
such workers an employer-sponsored health benefits plan that requires the employer to contribute less 
towards the premium or subscription share than that which is paid by the Department o f Defense for 
health benefits for civilian employees
Section 851 (b) Any function that is performed by civilian employees o f the Department o f Defense 
and is proposed to be reengineered, reorganized, modernized, upgraded, expanded, or changed in 
order to become more efficient shall not be considered a new requirement for the purpose o f  the 
competition requirements in subparagraph (A) or the requirements for public-private competition in 
Office o f  Management and Budget Circular A-76
Section 851 (c) prohibit reorganization o f functions for the purposes o f  avoiding the competition 
requirement in subparagraph (A) or the requirements for public-private competition in Office o f 
Management and Budget Circular A-76.
Section 852 directs the Secretary o f  Defense to prescribe guidelines and procedures for ensuring that 
consideration is given to using civilian employees for new requirements and for work that is 
performed by contractors and could be performed by Federal Government employees 
Section 853 requires reporting on competitive sourcing___________________________________________
House Amendment 766 H.R. 5025, Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2005___________________________________
Amendment provides that none o f the funds made available by this Act may be used to implement the 
revision to Office o f Management and Budget Circular A-76 made on May 29, 2003 
Roll Call Outcome, Ayes 210 (24 Republican, 184 Democratic, 1 Independent), Noes 187 (184 
Republicans, 3 Democratic) No Votes 36_______________________________________________________
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VETO THREATS AGAINST HILL EFFORTS TO BLOCK A-76
Congressional Bill Sponsors Statements of Administrative Policy (excerpts)
H.R. 3338 -  Department O f 
Defense




The real effect o f  the House's deep reductions 
would be to undercut the President's plan...and 
competitive sourcing...Reduced funding for A- 
76 studies would eliminate flexibility DoD 
must have to seek the public or private sources
H.R. 5120 - Treasury, Postal 
Service, And 
General Government 




Now is the wrong time to short-circuit 
implementation o f  the common sense principle 
o f  competition...Prohibiting the funding for 
public-private competitions is akin to 
mandating a monopoly
H.R. 2989 -  Departments O f 
Transportation And Treasury And 
Independent Agencies 




Now is the wrong time to short-circuit 
implementation o f this principle, especially 
since numerous agencies are starting to make 
real progress in this area. Prohibiting funding 
for public-private competitions is akin to 
mandating a monopoly
H.R. 2861 -  Department O f 
Veterans Affairs And Housing 
And Urban Development, And 
Independent Agencies 




The Administration asks that its budget 
amendment language allowing VA to continue 
its competitive sourcing studies be included in 
the final bill
H.R. 2691 -  Department O f The 
Interior And Related Agencies 




The Administration strongly opposes Section 
335, which would restrict the ability o f 
entities...to seek improvements in management 
and delivery o f  services through competitive 
sourcing
S. 1584, The Department O f 
Veterans Affairs And Housing 
And Urban Development, And 
Independent Agencies 





The Administration strongly opposes the 
omission o f  three key Administration 
proposals...allowing VA to conduct 
competitive sourcing studies.
S. 1585, Departments O f 
Commerce, Justice, And State, 
The Judiciary, And Related 






The Administration strongly opposes section 
108 that would restrict the ability o f  the Office 
o f Justice Programs or its components from 
seeking improvements through competitive 
sourcing
S. 1589, The Department O f 
Transportation, Treasury And 






The House version o f  the bill contains a 
provision that would effectively shut down the 
Administration's Competitive Sourcing
S. 1391 --Department O f The 
Interior And Related Agencies, 





The Administration seeks to improve the 
performance o f  government services based on 
the common sense principle o f  competition... 
Now is the wrong time to short-circuit 
implementation o f  this principle
(continued on following page)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 9 9
APPENDIX H (continued)
Congressional Bill Sponsors Statements of Administrative Policy (excerpts)
S. 2400 - National Defense 




We would also strongly oppose any 
amendment that significantly limits DOD's 
flexibility.. .such as by mandating that the 
Department's employees compete for a 
certain percentage of work currently 
performed by contractors. Arbitrary quotas 
...would undermine the Department's 
ability to redirect its manpower
H.R. 4568 -  Department Of 
The Interior And Related 
Agencies




The bill limits the funds that may be spent 
on competitive sourcing studies and forces 
agencies to make decisions based solely on 
cost considerations. The House is urged to 
remove this section and work with the 
Administration to refine reporting on costs.
H.R. 4766 -  Agriculture, Rural 
Development, Food And Drug 
Administration, And Related 





The Administration strongly opposes 
Section 749 of the bill, which prevents the 
Department from improving the 
management of rural development or farm 
loan programs through competitive 
sourcing.
H.R. 5025 -  Departments Of 
Transportation And Treasury 





The Administration strongly objects to 
section 645, which would require that 
competitions involving work performed by 
more than 10 employees be decided 
strictly on the basis of lowest cost...This 
represents a step backwards
DHS
S. 2537 -  Department Of 
Homeland Security 





The House version.. .would block DHS 
from using competition to choose the best 
source to handle basic administrative tasks 
associated with the processing of 
immigration applications and benefits.
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APPENDIX I 
THREAT-STRENGTH-RESPONSE INDICATORS














% of A-76 FTEs 
competed
DOD 270,600 -0.09 -30.3 18,366 0.07
VA 52,600** 0.06 -15.4 276 0.01
USD A 35,600 -0.06 -15 5,416 0.15
DOI 23,000 0.03 -12.8 1,641 0.07
ACE 16,500 -0.10 -0.2 - -
TREAS 18,400 0.09 -13.4 1,351 0.07
DOT 11,900 0.14 -8.9 329 0.03
HHS 11,200 0.22 -3.1 3,480 0.31
DHS 8,884 0.22 0.25 151 0.02
GSA 5,200 3.21 -31.8 1,301 0.25
DOC 4,800 0.57 6.6 506 0.11
DOE 4,700 0.37 -24.4 402 0.09
SSA 4,000 0.12 -3.1 102 0.03
HUD 3,600 -0.29 -22.4 0 0
NASA 3,400 -0.25 -25.2 602 0.18
DOJ 3,400 0.28 29.4 173 0.05
SBA 2,900 -12.93 -29.8 229 0.08
ED 2,900 -0.15 -4.4 230 0.08
DOL 2,600 -0.81 -8.5 222 0.09
State 1,000 0.06 7.6 33 0.03
OPM 600 0.08 -43.2 366 0.61
EPA 400 -0.09 -1.4 51 0.13
AID 300 0 -44.8 0 0
NSF 200 0.18 0.01 0 0
SI 0 0.08 -8.3 0 0
OMB *0 -0.05 -0.03 0 0
Sources: OMB 2003a; OMB 2004a; OMB 2004b; OMB 2005b; OPM, 2001
Note: Figures are rough OMB estimates based on 2002 submissions to OMB. Figures do not 
reflect workforce restructuring associated with the creation of DHS. DHS represents 
135,206 positions, of which 8,884 were available for competition in 2003. * OMB was not 
included in the 2002 baseline report on agency inventories. **As of October 2002, VA had 
created a plan to compete a total of 52,600 FTES.
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APPENDIX J 
STATISTICAL OUTPUTS






A-76 RESPONSE THREAT 
Pearson 1 0.955162221 
Correlation**
Sig. (1-tailed) 1.73195E-14 
N 26.000 26.000 
Pearson Correlation 0.955162221 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) 1.73195E-14
N 26 26 















♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
Correlations
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